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The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression

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Farhang Rajaee (Ed), Iranian Perspectives on the Iran-Iraq War: (Gainesville/: University Press of Florida, 1997), pp. 168, $ hardcover. =============================================================== Although, only representing one side, Iran Perspectives on the Iran-Iraq War is an intelligent and persuasive collection of articles that provides insights and facts about a forgotten historical tragedy of an eight-year war. As his second book on this topic, Farhang Rajaee has done a sound scholarly work in editing this volume. This readable and engaging book has multiple objectives: to update debate on unresolved issues of the Iran-Iraq war, to show the biased roles of international forces favoring Iraq, and to provide particulars about the controversial issue of the relationship between the war and Iranian revolution among others. To solidify this claim, the book refers to various dimensions and historical, economic, political, ethnic and religious backgrounds of the conflict between Iran and Iraq. The book's focus is on "Iraqi aggression," yet it is a valid source of information, facts, and reliable analyses useful for scholars as well as any individual interested in regional conflicts, international politics, and war. It also presents an analytical perspective on the causes and consequences of the war. The book is organized into three parts and fifteen chapters, including the editor's introductory chapter and the contributions of fifteen knowledgeable scholars. The first part of the book, Policy Dynamics, consists of six chapters that covers the roles of the regional and global forces in the conflict. The second part, Conceptual Dimensions, in five chapters, covers the various issues of the conflict between Iran and Iraq. The third section, Postwar Development, addresses the issues of post-war period. Understanding the historical and global connections of regional and national events and the relationship between the policies and actions of major powers and their interests in the world is obviously different than what is known as the conspiracy theory. The book clearly makes distinction between these two, while indicating its awareness of the prevalence of a conspiratorial mind among the Middle Eastern people in general and Iranian policy-makers in particular. For instance, the egoistic and paranoiac personality of Saddam Hussein is seen as a factor affecting all the war events. This volume succeeds in documenting it as a fact that Iraq started the war. It falls short, however, in proving their claim that "the US followed a conscious policy to...destroy the revolution, encouraging Iraq to impose a war on the newly formed revolutionary government" (p. 49). This position contradicts that "European states were selling arms to both sides in a hidden competition" (p. 47). Or, "it is possible that Iraq could not have waged the war, or continued it, without military support from the Soviet Union" (p. 36). And "the war began when the revolution in Iran was in a moderate phase, and evidence demonstrates that the Iraqis had been planning this aggression for months" (p. 95). As it is correctly stated elsewhere, "in the international arena, states have neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies, only permanent interests" (p. 70). It was the interests of these nations used as justification for the alternate supports for both sides in the conflict, or the shift from one policy to another, or the use of an entirely different policy during the second Iraqi aggression (against Kuwait). As part of this policy "...in 1986, as the Iran-Iraq war began to turn decisively in Iran's favor, the pace of U.S. intelligence information escalated as part of bid to at least restore Iraq's edge. The United States was not alone. In advance of the Faw counteroffensive, France, Egypt and Jordan provided help in reorganizing and retaining the weary Iraqi military, Reagan administration officials pointed out." (Robin Wright, LA Times, Feb. 16, 1998) Saddam was looking for an excuse to attack Iran to lessen the effect of Iranian revolution on Iraq and to declare the 1975 treaty of Algeria invalid. Based on his assessment of the Iranian military force as being disintegrated and dysfunctional right after the revolution, Saddam saw the time to be ripped for expansion of his territory. But "he grossly misperceived and thus miscalculated Iran's weaknesses" (p. 109). While countries in the region consistently sided with either Iran or Iraq during the eight years of war, the Soviet Union and the West supported both sides supposedly to maintain the balance of power in the region. Despite the fact that Iraq was the aggressor of the war, Iran created more enemies than friends. This was mainly due to Iran's lack of proper diplomacy and a hostile approach toward other countries. "In short, the Islamic Republic's foreign relations have been strongly ideological, personal, and reactive as well as oriented toward its few precious allies in the region" (p. 139). I may add that this was actually an extension of the internal policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). It was after the war and during the presidency of Rafsanjani that a practical economic and political policy was gradually adopted (p. 145). In the latter chapters, the book provides a comparative analysis of Iraqi aggression in Iran and Kuwait and criticizes the double standards of the international agencies, such as the UN. While preparing for the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam proposed normalization of relations with Iran. His intention was to either form an anti-Western bloc with Iran or to keep Iran neutral in the conflict. Though, officially, Iran declared its neutrality in the conflict, some Iranian leaders (radical Islamists) were naïvely deceived into entering the war against the West. The Iranian government soon corrected this major error; otherwise it could have brought a disastrous result for Iran. Although, many other mistakes of the war were to be recognized only after the end of the war death of Ayatollah Khomeini, an independent assessment of the war yet to be done. This volume falls short to include several internal factors that prolonged the war and weakened the position of Iran in the conflict such as the involvement of non-professional non-military personnel in the war affairs. It also fails to include the views of the Iranians who opposed the war. Lessons could be learned also through a self-critical perspective about the war and a fair assessment of the erroneous policies made by non-professional, ideologically oriented leaders in the power circle. The following are few more points overlooked by this volume: 1. The hostage taking was an important issue that undermined the legitimacy of Iranian demands as the victim of Iraqi aggression at international arena. 2. Instead of focussing on national interests, the IRI used a sectarian religious cause, virtually excluding many potential capabilities. This policy turned the territorial aggression of Iraqi forces against Iran into a war against Islam, overshadowing the fact that this was actually a war between two Muslim nations. 3. To engross the power, the struggle within the IRI grew to the extent that the elected president, Bani Sadre, was ousted. Also, the ethnic groups who were demanding local autonomy were effectively suppressed. The policy of monopolization of power led to opening of another military front against ethnic and religious minorities in Kurdestan at the border side with Iraq. The IRI's religious sectarian policy weakened patriotic sentiments and hindered a strong identification with Iran as a nation-state against the aggressor. 4. War was used as a means for political consolidation of the regime and as an excuse to suppress its opponents. This goal prevented Iran to reach an honorable peace when time arrived. "After recapturing Khoramshare [no parts of Iran were occupied by May 1982], Iran demanded $150 billion worth of indemnity. Saudi Arabia agreed privately to pay $50 billion worth of indemnity to Iran if it accepted the peace agreement" (p. 58). Regretfully, however, the IRI failed to use that opportunity in favor of an honorable peace and prevention of further war damages.

Kazem Alamdari, Ph D California State University, Los Angeles