Customer Reviews

Iraq 1941: The battles for Basra, Habbaniya, Fallujah and Baghdad (Campaign)

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It is unfortunate that Robert Lyman's very well written campaign summary, Iraq 1941, was not available four years ago, since it is loaded with lessons for the current Western intervention in Iraq. The fact that much of the fighting in 1941 took place around towns such as Fallujah and Habbaniya, makes Lyman's narrative seem all the more gripping and relevant. The British intervention in Iraq in 1941 is one of the lesser-known campaigns of the Second World War and Lyman's summary fills an important gap in the history of that conflict. Both the casual reader interested in modern Iraq and the student of joint military operations will find Iraq 1941 to be a valuable Primer.

The author's opening section on the origins of the campaign lays out the strategic importance of Iraq for the British war effort (oil), the state of British colonial rule in Iraq and the April 1941 coup by Rashid Ali that led to war. Aside from maintaining access to Iraqi oil, Winston Churchill also wanted to exclude German intervention on the Iraqi side - which was clearly in the offing. The section on opposing commanders and opposing forces are good on the British side, weak on the Iraqi side and completely omit the Germans. Although Lymann discusses the Luftwaffe force sent to Mosul, for some reason he never mentions the unit identifications (which were KG4, ZG26 and ZG76). This information is easily accessible on Internet sites like Fedlgrau.com and it is apparent that the author's research was limited to the British side. This volume has five 2-D maps (British & German operations in Iraq, April-June 1941; British movements, April-June 1941; British operations in Basra, May 1941; the siege of RAF Habbaniya, May 1941; and the British advance to Baghdad, May 1941), three 3-D maps (Habbaniya & Fallujah; advance to Baghdad; and capture of Basra) and two battle scenes (Luftwaffe attack on Kingcol; the attack on Fallujah).

The author's narrative of the campaign is quite good and one of the better ones that I have seen in the series for awhile; certainly the fact that this was a short campaign involving only small numbers of troops aided the author in this task. The reader will certainly be struck by the similarities between the British intervention in 1941 and the Anglo-US intervention in 2003, particularly the role of airpower. Despite the fact that 60,000 Iraqi soldiers were available to oppose fewer than 5,000 British troops, a small force of antiquated RAF aircraft were able to pummel the Iraqi troops whenever they attempted to mass for attacks. The Luftwaffe and Iraqi Air Force were unable to gain control of the air and this British air supremacy paved the way for British troops to roll into Baghdad by crushing Iraqi morale. While the Iraqis managed one half-way decent counterattack at Fallujah, their military performance in 1941 was just as pathetic as in 1991 or 2003. Readers should also note the looting in Baghdad in May 1941 that followed the collapse of the Rashid Ali regime, indicating that the looting after Saddam's fall in 2003 was far from unique.

Overall, this is a terrific campaign summary from Osprey, with a few caveats. Lyman's narrative is a bit too Anglo-centric, which makes it difficult to evaluate the Iraqi or German performance. There are some Arabic sources in English available that he might have consulted, or at least listed in his bibliography. The lack of the usual section on opposing plans is particularly glaring, in that it makes it difficult to assess enemy intentions. A bit more background on the nature of the coup and Iraqi demographics at that time would have been helpful, since today we know that Sunni and Shia attitudes about foreign intervention are radically different (for example, what group were the Iraqi levies at Habbaniya recruited from?). The lack of any information or estimates on total casualties for either side in the campaign is also noticeable. There is also one odd error that pops up here and there that may confuse some readers, which is that several times in the text the author confuses the German invasion of Greece (Marita) with Crete (Mercury). For example, on page 28 he writes, "on 8 April 1941, the day that British troops first came into contact with Germans on Crete.." but the invasion of Crete was on 20 May 1941.On page 55, he refers to General Wilson in Jerusalem on 6 May "following his evacuation from the debacle in Crete.." again, this should read `Greece' and not `Crete.'

I had read a little bit about British operations in the Middle East during World War Two. Robert Lyman's book is far more information than I found on this little-known campaign.

As a veteran of the current Middle East muddle, I found the 1941 maps of Baghdad interesting. Urban growth over 60 years and all that have changed the landscape significantly. Other maps and diagrams were recognizable even though 1941 and 2004 have more built-up areas. I was startled to find out that there are living veterans of that 1941 campaign. Sixty-five years is a long time, and active military service in that region during the 1940's meant that the soldier was exposed to every known human disease, and a bunch that still aren't on medical science's radar screen.

What a movie this campaign would make! Small bands of British soldiers (well, mostly Indian soldiers) with obselete equipment facing impossible odds and the latest British and German equipment, and succeeding through sheer pluck and superior leadership--this would eclipse the campaign against Rommel for sheer excitement.

Contrasting with the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States, the British operation was on a shoe string. The recent British forces in Iraq had the latest equipment and excellent communications. Pasha Glub's long desert march in 1941 was a epic--in 2003 such long-range desert movements were routine for GPS-equipped American and British units.

History shouldn't have to be repeated. History's lessons aren't always heeded. I wonder what lessons Saddam drew from the 1941 campaign?

At last a historian has taken the time to bring the Middle East into WW2. While not nearly as bloody as the battles taking place in North Africa, Russia, or Asia during 1941, the British invasion of Iraq aimed at preventing axis influence from seeping further into the Mid-East. Lyman's crucial text ably explains what was at risk here, the Middle East, Africa, perhaps even the war itself. In a time where history books barely even mention the Africa campaign of 1940-1943 it is hard to picture ww2 being a completely "WORLD" war, yet it was, and if more historians begin delving into this fascinating theatre of conflict we might better understand what is going on right now, and what happened before ww2. It is worth noting that the British not only invaded Iraq, but invaded Italian held Somaliland, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, Vichy French held Syria, Lebanon and Madagascar, and together with the Soviet army invaded Iran (Persia) to quell pro Nazi sympathies. At the time these events would have seemed the difference between victory and defeat for the British who were essentially fighting the war alone (the Russians came into the fight that year). It would be nice to see a historian write a definitive history of the war in the mid-east, and finally connect Asia and Europe into what should be remembered as a truely global conflict. At least for the sake of the hundreds of men who died on both sides and were subsequantly forgotten by history.

Many of the recent Osprey Campaign books have been excellent and nearly all have been solid operational histories. That's what I expected here. Instead, I got a plodding, highly-politicized history of the 1941 invasion of Iraq. If you keep its limitations in mind, it can still be valuable, particularly as there is otherwise very little available on the topic.

The most notable thing about the book is the highly-slanted anglocentric view point. The invasion of Iraq may have been necessary from a military point of view; the British cabinet thought so and that was what mattered. When fighting a war, particularly against such a heinous enemy, you do what's necessary; but cloaking it in morality is ludicrous.

We are told that the Iraqi government was illegal because they overthrew a British puppet, and the British invasion was perfectly legal because the Iraqis were going to violate a treaty forced on by the British -- note: they hadn't actually violated it, it was the British who did in order to prevent the Iraquis from doing so. It was necessary, because otherwise the Germans would "dominate the whole of the Middle East, Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean... and threaten India itself.... [and] made retention of the Suez canal impossible." This sort of thing in the section on the origins of the campaign, and even the conclusions, would be annoying but tolerable; in fact the entire book is riddled with it.

Curiously, Lyman details the political events leading up to the crisis in a fair amount of detail, which (if read carefully) disputes all of his conclusions pretty thoroughly. The Rashad Ali government clearly would have liked to see the British gone (who wouldn't in their shoes?), but was moving very cautiously. Lyman says that the British landings unnerved them into moving precipitously, i.e. to defend themselves against the threatened British invasion. The Germans never offered more than help against a British attack. While normally I would treat such a statement with great skepticism, the cables back and forth as well as the logistics involved support this. Any German force had to be flown in from a considerable distance, which meant it had to be small. So much for dominating the Middle East, etc. In fact, it is clear that the Germans saw this as an unexpected opportunity that they couldn't resist, but weren't willing to invest much in either.

The British didn't actually need the Iraqi oil (they had Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) and the Germans couldn't gain access to it as long as the British controlled the Eastern Mediterranean. That, of course, doesn't mean they could (or should) take the risk; but sixty years on, Lyman should have a bit more objectivity on the impact of the campaign.

If you can get past all this, or if you agree with him, Lyman writes a decent but uninspired history of the operation. The maps are good (as usual in a Campaign book) and the battle scenes are well chosen and well illustrated. What comes across clearly is that the 1941 Iraq invasion has more in common with Britain's nineteenth century colonial wars than World War 2. Understandable, since it was a colonial war, but I found it disconcerting.

Iraq was mandated to Great Britain's care by the League of Nations in 1920. After becoming independent in 1930, a treaty was signed between the two countries allowing Great Britain to continue protecting the fledgling country and its important oil reserves. Iraq was an important source for oil for Great Britain and it would go to great lengths to keep the oil flowing in its direction. After Poland and France fell to German blitzkrieg, it was equally important to keep this oil away from Hitler. With a clear understanding that Iraq was clearly moving toward Germany and not Britain, Churchill deemed it necessary to act proactively to insure the oil remained safe and ordered Basra to be seized as an opening move. Iraq was important for other reasons as well. It would help protect the eastern flank of Egypt and the Suez Canal as well as the passage to India.
This is the short version of "Origins"; Mr Lyman spends nine pages on developing the foundation for the campaign. It was done very well, providing a new student a good understanding of the political climate that would lead to combat in 1941.

The author proceeds to cover the key commanders for both sides. This chapter, like the whole book, is dominated from the British perspective and much of the attention is focused on the British officers. It was still done fairly well and you will learn of the key people of both sides.
Opposing Forces was a little disappointing, barely having any narrative. Almost the entire chapter was devoted to the listings of the units involved in the conflict. It also included info on the air forces that would be involved. The author makes up for this short chapter by devoting 59 pages to the campaign.
Combat coverage includes: the seizure of Basra, the battle for Habbaniya, the drive toward Baghdad by Habforce, the battles for Fallujah and Baghdad and the capture of Ashar. I thought this coverage was very good. The British had only 6,000 soldiers while the Iraqis had ten times that number but with the aggressive support of their air force, the Brit forces prevailed. Hitler had promised support to the Iraqis if war broke out but his actual help consisted of a few planes and weapons.

In typical Osprey manner there were both 2-D and 3-D maps which covered the above engagements. The five 2-D and three 3-D color maps were very helpful, giving the reader a chance to follow along with the narrative. The two dual page color illustrations were also good.
There are many fine photos of the key commanders and of the battlefields to add to the narrative. A small but helpful Chronology is provided to show the key events. A small Bibliography and Index close out the book.

In Conclusions the author summarizes the important considerations for taking action and what it would have meant to the war effort if Great Britain had lost Iraq. The stakes were high. Churchill saw that and tried to leverage his few forces in the area to keep control of the area. If Hitler had not been obsessed with invading Russia, he would have seen that taking Egypt and Iraq in 1940-41 would have given him the oil he needed while dealing a severe blow to the British Empire.

Despite a couple of detail errors, I thought the book was good with the chapters on "Origins" and "Campaigns" excellent but would have liked to have seen greater coverage of the German and Iraqi perspective. It seems obvious that the author studied only British sources. Even still I would recommend this book for interested WWII students for it provides valuable insights into an important timeframe and sector that will have far reaching affects for the Allies later in the war.

I was disappointed by this book. Its central flaw is that its a heavily British-centric military history of what was a multi-national and political conflict. The political background to the war is only briefly explained, and there are few details on Iraqi political events after the fighting started. Moreover, the description of the fighting is heavily focused on the experiences of the British and Indian forces, with few details being provided on the Iraqi forces - the Iraqi units and individuals involved often aren't identified while the British and Indian units are described down to the platoon level at times. As a result, the book does not really explain how the small and generally ill-equipped British force comprehensively defeated the larger and generally better equipped Iraqi military - the Iraqi forces seem to just melt away during the descriptions of most of the war's battles. Presumably the Iraqis were suffering from some combination of low morale due to a lack of support for the government and inadequate supplies and so lacked either the motivation and ability to fight effectively, but this is never properly described.

However, for all that the book does have strengths. Despite it's focus on the British experience, it does provide a fairly clear and well-written description of the main events in this little known war. The book is also illustrated with well-chosen photos and excellent maps, though the quality of its battle scene drawings seems below par.

In short, while I don't think that this book is a satisfactory account of the war, it was a useful introduction.

Britians role in Iraq began in 1915 with the expeditionary force the marched up towards Baghdad and was destroyed at Kut. Later when the country was handed to Prince Faisal, the brother of Abdullah, who had fough with Lawrence of Arabia, it became a British mandate. In 1920 the British fought a local Shia and tribal insurgency. In 1941 however the British had to fight against Rashid Ali's Arab nationalist government that was supported by the Mufti of Jerusalem Hajj Amin al Husayni and Hitler. In a swift campaign the British removed the pro-German Arab government but not after battles at places that would later become famous in the 2003 war.

A very interesting book that sheds light on this very fascinating time and certainly has some lessons for the present day. Like all of Osprey's military history books it is concise and includes many maps. It is mostly from the British point of view in terms of analysis of tactics and arms.

Seth J. Frantzman