Iraq War [Hardcover]

John Keegan (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: April 1, 2004

The Iraq War remains highly controversial, but in all the uncertainty about weapons of mass destruction, the use and misuse of intelligence, and the whereabouts of Saddam Hussein, it remains an awesome military and political event and a formidable exercise in American power aided by the British army. Throughout the war and beyond it, John Keegan's analysis proved more accurate than any other commentator's, and now he brings his unrivalled knowledge of military history to bear on the war, its conduct and consequences. Written with special access to new sources of information, this book will be the most authoritative and challenging account of a war which could both set the pattern for military conflicts in the 21st century and significantly affect the world political order.

Editorial Reviews

Amazon.com Review

John Keegan is recognized as one of the top military writers of his day, having authored comprehensive analyses of both World Wars and other significant historical events. In The Iraq War, he takes on a situation that was still murky and volatile at the time of publication. The result is a book rich with detailed information on the region and its key figures but somewhat hasty in its effort to provide a succinct history lesson. In the opening chapter, Keegan writes "The war was not only successful but peremptorily short, lasting only twenty-one days from 20 March to 9 April," and he later gives little mention to the protracted and amorphous violence in the region since Baghdad fell, characterizing as "aftermath" that which many see as the actual war itself. Between these sections, however, Keegan provides valuable insight into the geopolitical history of the region and provides an extensive biography of a ruler of whom most Westerners became aware only in the early 1990s: Saddam Hussein. Keegan presents Saddam as a brutal thug who is also possessed of a powerful and vicious political savvy, and charts his growth from Ba'ath Party muscleman to ruler of Iraq. Sections on the military efforts of the U.S. and British forces are extensively detailed and offer insight into not only what the plans of the coalition forces were but the strategic philosophies behind them as well. Keegan characterizes the war as "mysterious," seeking to understand why opposition forces seemed to disappear from active combat and why the citizens of Iraq paid the conflict little regard. And while such mysteries have not yet been solved, it is clear given the ongoing instability in Iraq that the final chapters of the Iraq War have yet to be written. --John Moe --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

From Publishers Weekly

Ubiquitous military historian Keegan (Intelligence in War) offers a reportage-based account of a "mysterious war." Keegan addresses the war's anomalies—200,000 soldiers took a country of almost 30 million in three weeks; the war's justification (WMD) never materialized; the Iraqi army "melted away" and the populace tried only to stay out of the way—by surveying the post–World War I origins of Iraq, Saddam's rise to power, the nature of his rule and his external ambitions. The result is a work with broader scope than Murray and Scales's TheIraqWar (2003), and one that makes a case for the war as justified in moral, legal and practical contexts. Saddam emerges, predictably enough, as a particularly nasty regional despot and the architect of his own destruction through his intransigent failure to satisfy the demands of an increasingly frustrated international community. Keegan divides his account of the campaign itself into "American" and "British" chapters, and he praises the skill of the planners and commanders of both armed forces. His accounts of British operations in the Shiite south and the U.S. drive on Baghdad affirm the high morale and fighting power of the troops involved. Keegan in particular demonstrates the U.S. mastery of mechanized maneuver war, but underplays the problems of control and pacification that have been making headlines since the turn of the year.
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 288 pages
• Publisher: Random House; First Edition edition (April 1, 2004)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0091800188
• ISBN-13: 978-0091800185
• Product Dimensions: 6.3 x 0.9 x 9.5 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.1 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 3.2 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (52 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #4,904,604 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

22 of 25 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Nice read....for what it is, June 29, 2004

By 

S. A Troutt (MURFREESBORO, TN USA) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: The Iraq War (Hardcover)

Will Durant ended his history with 'The Age of Napoleon' because the correct treatment and understanding of historical events requires perspective. Simply put recent events are too clouded with emotions and opinions and rarely are all the verifiable facts known (or knowable)for objective analysis.
Keegan is an excellent military historian in my opinion. His book about WW1 is both gripping and well written. He has also written several books about the philosophy of war which I also recommend. I like his writing style, concise crisp there is alway a nice flow to the words, enjoyable and engrossing.
So, this book? Keegan does a good though brief review of basic 20th century Iraqi history and the rise of Saddam into power. The Iraqi-Iran War, the first gulf war(Kuwaiti-Iraqi war) are all covered and set the table for the present fighting. 9/11, WMDS and Saddam himself are all weighed objectively and the intense attempts by the US/GB to involve the UN make for good reading (French and German leaders' feelings about the US are both disturbing and disquieting)
The fighting (or lack of) by the the inital US/GB military units is both well written and informative (Keegan flat knows his military and his review of both the strengths and weakness of the US/GB forces during the brief period of the war itself is very good). But the book basically ends with the taking of Bagdad. The capture of Saddam and the death of his sons are included in the pictures but is not really covered in the text.
I think it was noted in another review that the war did not really start till 90-100 days after the fall of Bagdad. I'm not sure that I would go that far. I think that the fall of Bagdad was the end of phase one, the overt military phase. The Iraqi military was conscripted, woefully armed and poorly led. Overwhelmed outgunned the army simply 'melted away'. But the Irregulars (technicals) fought to the death. And still are.
So Phase two, the civilian insurgency is both ongoing and not covered by this book ---though hinted at in the conclusion section.
So if you want to read about the general buildup and initial phase of this war, Keegan is good.

9 of 9 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars A Broad Overview that Lacks Soul, August 17, 2004

By 

C. Price "Layman, Lawyer, Blogger" (Southern California) - See all my reviews
(VINE VOICE)    (REAL NAME)   

This review is from: The Iraq War (Hardcover)

Having read many books by Keegan I expected this one to be first rate. I was disappointed. It is not that this book is poorly written. Keegan writes with a good style. The problem is that -- with the exception of some background material -- I did not really learn anything about the Iraq War that I did not already know from watching the news, reading the papers, and reading a couple of the books by imbedded reporters.

Keegan begins with several chapters of background material on Iraq and Saddam Hussein. We follow Hussein from his time as a hack thug for the Baath party and follow his rise to ultimate power in Iraq. Keegan then provides a background that takes us up to the Iraq War. This section is clearly written and, thankfully, nonpolemic. As Keegan describes the events leading up to the war, you get the impression that he likely approved of the decision to go to war, but he is certainly no apologist for the War. But he does make clear that Hussein was not in compliance with the UN Resolutions.

It is when the book moves into the Iraq War that I started feeling deja vu. It was like getting the same information I had gathered while the war was going on. He covers the movement of U.S. and British forces in rather broad strokes. Episodes I had hoped to learn more about were glossed over with a sentence or two. One example is the apparently ill-fated Apache assault on the Medina Division. Though only one aircraft was lost, almost all were damaged and -- judging by news reports -- failed to accomplish their objective. I had hoped to get more information from Keegan about this assault and gain the insights of perhaps the leading military historian about the implications for modern warfare. But I did not.

All is not bleak. The book is a good overview of the war. There are some interesting points made about America's approach to logistics and Britian's approach to urban warfare. But the only reason I expended the money I did was because I thought Keegan would deliver more than he did.

29 of 36 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Historical Perspective and Military Details, June 14, 2004

By 

GEORGE R. FISHER (Boston MA United States) - See all my reviews
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Amazon Verified Purchase

This review is from: The Iraq War (Hardcover)

John Keegan is the Defense Editor of The Daily Telegraph of London; he writes knowledgably and fluently about the second Gulf War and its antecedents.

The first half of the book is the history of Iraq from the time of Mesopotamia, with an emphasis on the origins of Saddam Hussein and his Ba'ath party. There is a secular history of the modern Middle East, parallel to and different from the history of the rise of Islamic terrorism. In Iraq specifically, the secular history is more important to understanding the country's development and the people whom it is hoped will be able to create a stable and peaceful nation out of the rubble and turmoil that presently exists.

Keegan gives an interesting, offshore critique of the neo-con policies in this historical context, such as pre-emption, the belief in the salutary effect of implanting democracy, particularity (i.e., "A city that is set on an hill ...") and Zionism. He also provides a very interesting analysis of European attitudes toward the war. Eastern Europe supported US policy because they saw Stalinism in Saddam, which they knew and hated. Western Europe by and large protested, the root of their disagreement being what Keegan calls "Olympianism": the strong belief that supra-national institutions can provide the solution to conflicts between states, the EU locally and the UN globally. Keegan describes this as the belief that "laws will be obeyed by their mere promulgation".

Keegan gives a stirring description of Tony Blair's speech before The Commons in March 2003 that turned back a vote of no-confidence despite the defection of many in his own party and paved the way for Britain's active participation.

The second half of the book is a somewhat detailed description of the assaults by the US forces up the river valleys and into Baghdad, and the British forces investing and taking Basra. The difference in approach between the first and second Gulf Wars is analyzed.

Of more importance than the military maneuvers is the issue of the behavior of the Iraqi army and populace, which Keegan describes as "mysterious" and which he feels has an important bearing on the difficult security situation after the end of formal hostilities. The mystery is that the armies didn't really fight, they mostly deserted and vanished back into their homes; and the general population often behaved as though they were on a movie set, going about their daily business and ignoring the battles.

The decision to disband the military and the police and to exclude Ba'ath members is criticized and is held partly responsible for the effective morphing of the foreigners and fedayeen from irregular soldiers to looters to urban guerillas, recruiting numerous demobilized and unemployed soldiers. The British are credited with more experience in such situations based on their years of colonial rule, which led them to the more practical approach of establishing law and order rather than worrying about the ideological objective of immediately establishing democratic institutions.

The book is interesting and worth reading. It fails, however, to pursue the "mystery" which it introduces at the beginning; the book ends with very little thought given to its causes or its solution.