Customer Reviews

The Iraq War: A Military History

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There are already too many books on the Iraq War, but this compact and mostly objective history is the best of the bunch if you are looking for a quick and factual overview from the purely military perspective. Other books treat individual events in greater depth, or take stronger (often controversial) positions on the issues, or provide deeper analysis of the thicket of surrounding issues. But none does as good a job at covering the basic facts of the military operations.

If you are looking for an informed and clear-headed account of the military operations of the Iraq War without the encumbrance of ideology or political agendas start here. What analysis this book does contain is provided in a separate chapter at the end of the book and consists exclusively of clear-headed and balanced insights into the military lessons (many of which are bitter pills) of the war.

The only real shortcoming of this book is that it is so understated. Events that loomed large in the hysterical real-time media coverage of the war (the firefight at the overpasses on the approach to Baghdad, the Jessica Lynch "rescue") are all given their proper place in the context of the overall strategic situation. As a result, it is easy to miss important clarifications (e.g. the extent to which the disorientation of the maintenance convoy that was attacked at An Nasiriyah was an almost inevitable consequence of the Coalition plan and the speed with which it was executed), though the implications are clearly spelled out (support units need better close-combat training).

Like many history books published by non-specialty presses, this one suffers from a lack of maps and diagrams. The few maps that are provided, though colorful, are not tied to the text and convey very little information. There are also no organizational charts provided, which is particularly frustrating given the difficulty of following who did what in a campaign that involved so many ad hoc formations.

But these are minor issues. Overall this book is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand what happened in Iraq in 2003 -- and the military implications for the years ahead.

I found this descriptive military history of the Iraq War to be balanced, fluid, and comprehensive--in the various fields of battle, armed forces staff and theater organization, and the cooperation between services and allies. I am not really a military history buff, but I found this book to be filled with information that somehow had not reached me through the newspapers or television accounts of the War. I found myself grateful to, and admiring the ingenuity and adaptability of, the soldiers, sailors, and airmen (and women) of the United States. I also found the chapters on the political organization and terror of Saddam's Iraq to be very informataive.

I also liked John Keegan's account of the Iraq War (also available on Amazon). Each book has different strengths. This book seemed to capture the "theater"-eye view very well.

This is a definitive book by two outstanding authors, and should therefore be on everyone's reading list. I agree with Publisher's Weekly - this is going to be essential reading for those who want to stay informed in today's increasingly troubled world. Christopher Catherwood, author of CHRISTIANS, MUSLIMS AND ISLAMIC RAGE (Zondervan, 2003) ...

This novel is a solid and very informative overview of the war with Iraq, including a review of the earlier Desert Storm campaign and some reflections on the 12 years of containment and attrition the U.S. and the United Kingdom engaged in against Saddam Hussein.

Murray, one of the best military historians of our generation, and Scales, a retired Army major general and one of the leading intellectuals on the art of war and technological change, combine to give this book an enormous chronicle of warfare contemplation. A wide range of personal relationships also allowed the authors to interview many of the key participants immediately following the battles.

The Iraq War captures the audacity and daring of General Franks' campaign plan and the persistent boldness with which it was executed. Also emphasized is the fact that the component commanders truly understood Franks' intent and, when in doubt, took risks and kept pushing the envelope for more speed and more surprise.

There are no gigantic revelations in the authors' account of Operation Iraqi Freedom and their assessment of what worked and what didn't; however, they highlight some principles that every sophisticated American should reflect upon when thinking about our future national security policies. Several of these principles are covered in the remainder of this review.

Murray and Scales signify the human element in war and the stunning mismatch in technology, training, experience, and professionalism between the coalition and the Iraqis. But once the fighting shifted into the existing guerilla phase, most of those advantages lost much of their force.

An implicit contrast is drawn between the Marine Corps system of every member being a rifleman and every convoy being expected to protect itself and the very different Army model of inadequately trained non-combat soldiers being protected by combat forces. It is clear from their outline of events that the Marine Corps progress through the inhabited areas was actually much more challengeable than the third division's drive through the desert. This is not to minimize the extraordinary speed and drive of the Army's flanking maneuver, but it does raise an interesting question about examining more carefully the Marine Corps doctrine for urban warfare (and their practice of policing areas with the support of local people).

The authors report favorably on the subtle, intelligence-led British effort to capture Basra with minimum casualties to the Shia and the way in which this effort made policing the city much easier. Americans could gain an education from the British in the art of policing potentially hostile people.

The largest intelligence failure of the war was our underestimation of the power of the Baathist secret police and the torture system they employed to force others to continue fighting against us. This mistake was compounded by the fact that we didn't comprehend the bitterness that the Shia people had harbored toward us since 1991. In that year, they rebelled at what they thought was President George H.W. Bush's suggestion and then 50,000 were slaughtered by Saddam's forces, while the U.S. did nothing. In the early stages of the Iraq war, these people were restrained by a palpable fear that we would not persist, and they would not risk helping us until they were confident that our troops were there for the duration.

The role of the Syrians and other hostile forces is undeniably clear. One example cited is "the enemy was far more skilled ... Hornbuckle was later to learn that most of the attacking fedayeen were not Iraqis but Syrian jihadists who had made the trip to Baghdad specifically to kill Americans; out of the thirty POWs captured on Curly, twenty-eight were Syrians." (p. 215)

This and other references raise not only the question of why the Syrian dictatorship was allowing them to enter Iraq but also speculate where these enemies were being trained, since it their training was clearly superior to that of their Iraqi counterparts.

A succinct description of the second campaign requirements to rebuild a new system of safety, health, prosperity, and freedom are worth being read by every American:
"Success in this new war will not be gauged by how many Republican Guard tanks are destroyed but by the less tangible and quantifiable measurement of people's acceptance of a new Iraqi leadership. Attitudes will be influenced less by demonstrations of fighting strength than by the emotional security that comes from safe streets, employment, electricity and fresh water. ... wars are conducted by human beings for political ends."
(p. 237)

Every informed American should read this book to place their embedded memories of specific events into the larger context of the two campaigns of the war. The first campaign we won brilliantly. The second, we are now engaged in. We should make sure that we learn from these campaigns and apply our learned knowledge to the next time.

In their book "The Iraq War: A Military History," Murray and Scales demonstrate their expertise in the study and writing of military history and analysis. However, this book is not necessarily a history of the Iraq War as much as it is about the re-making of the American military machine. In any case, their research, as well as their writing, is sound and candid and makes for interesting reading.

While the authors do focus on military history, they fail in adequately explaining the Iraq War. However, the authors do give readers some good historical background on Iraq and the Middle East in general. They begin by writing on the troubled history of Iraq and the Middle East, including Iraq's independence in 1932, Saddam Hussein's rise to power in 1979, and the rain of terror against his own citizens. The authors take a brief look at the 1980 "Iran-Iraq War, Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait that resulted in the "Gulf War", "Operation Enduring Freedom", and the rise and ultimate fall of the "Taliban".

Murray and Scales' primary focus is on the US military, its deficiencies, and its growth and development into a modern, unified force. They conclude that this growth was a byproduct of lessons learned during and after the "Vietnam War". They also discuss improvements in professionalism in the US all-volunteer military that reduced jealousies and uncooperativeness among the various military branches. The authors describe the military build-up, not only in means of manpower but in the military's arsenal, including the famed F-15 and F-16 fighters, sidewinder missiles, aircraft carriers, Abrams tank, and most importantly, in computer and other technologies, which in some cases, allow missiles to strike any enemy target with pinpoint accuracy, from a safe distance.

The "Iraq War" covers the great importance of/and improvements in "interservice" communication. That is, the communication between and within the different armed services of the United States (Army, Navy, Air force, Marines, and Special Forces). Murray and Scales give readers a close look at coalition forces, with emphasis on the British and US military relationship and cooperation.

Then the reader is taken on a military trek across the desert, while demonstrating the perils faced by coalition soldiers in unfamiliar territory and a hostile climate. They describe how once soldiers made their way into Afghanistan they were confronted by a maze of buildings where they faced a new kind of enemy and battlefield known as "urban warfare" where

"light infantry, mechanized infantry, armor, and artillery should all train more regularly together in tactical scenarios that test the adaptability and flexibility of commanders as well as troops [and where] in the future the U.S. military needs more precision in weapons designed for the close fight, and these weapons must be made available to every maneuver unit on the battlefield".

By this, the authors are suggesting that the hardest fought battles in modern warfare will be those that take place in unfamiliar inner-city terrain. Such is the case in Iraq and Afghanistan where this type of fighting takes place on the unfamiliar streets and buildings in "Basta" and "Baghdad". Murray and Scales point out that "Technology is a tool . . . only training can enable the soldier or marine to use the tools of war effectively".

"The Iraq War: A Military History" is well researched, written, and presented, but unfortunately the authors missed the point of their book; I learned little more about the Iraq War than I already knew. However, they did a noteworthy job in bringing to the forefront the transformation of the American military machine-a lesson not lost.

Historian Victor Davis Hanson has remarked that the United States has fought four Iraq Wars, the Gulf War of 1991, the 12 year armistice enforcement from 1991 - 2003, the Iraq War of the Spring of 2003 and the Insurgency War of 2003 - . Historian Williamson Murray and Gen. Robert Scales (ret.) have collaborated on this late 2003 volume about the third US v. Iraq War that ended with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's Baathist regime. Their intent was to write a straightforward account of the lead-up to the conflict in context, a description of the actual US/British led invasion and an analysis of why the conflict ended the way it did and what the results mean for future United States and British military strategy and policy.

Previously, Murray had written the military account of the US air war during the 1991 Gulf War and Maj. Gen. Scales had written the official postwar analysis of that six week conflict. Both are experts in the US military's strategy and weaponry. And more importantly for how they wrote this work, both are knowledgeable in how the United States changed its approach to manpower and tactics between the first and third Iraq Wars.

The significance of this volume is to concisely describe how the US military approached its third Iraq War, what the differences were on the operational level between this conflict and previous ones and likely lessons to learn and apply for future military operations. The Iraq War was written in late 2003, after the end of the operation to overthrow the Baathist regime and before the insurgency and founding of the new Iraqi government took hold. So the authors' comments about the continued need for initiative, change and operational awareness in future conflicts is almost prophetic in light of the last two years.

The change in tactics in the 12 years between the wars was near revolutionary. For decades, the military had attempted, with sometimes great failures, to integrate the various services, to have a more networked approach to battle and to place much more decision making authority at the junior officer level.

The authors description of the origins of the present conflict, especially in regards to the period from 1998 to 2003 have to be some of the best summary descriptions of how the United States and Britain went from a soft conflict in enforcing the no-fly zone to a hot war with invasion in print. The 30 page summary of this time period should stand the test of time in its description of this time period.

The authors spend considerable time in this short volume, 258 pages, in contrasting the evolving nature of the US military and the static, fearful state of the Iraqi military and its totalitarian regime. What makes this book especially useful is how it places this war in context of US military operations from the Korean War to the present. In what could have been a standard 'setting of the board' before a war piece of writing, the authors instead write a near case study on the modern, revolutionary applications of synergy of forces, networked operations, rapid intelligence and useful training to a type of warfare so traditional that a Clausewitz or Thucydides would recognize.

The book does break down operations by time and emphasis, like the initial ground campaign or the British war near Basra; but the more one reads of this volume, the necessity of the joint nature of operations ends traditional ways of dividing chapters and sections. When the military operations become so seamless, that American units can blend in with British commanders for a day or so without a loss in communications or mission ability, then the reader can begin to understand why this war was conducted so differently from other conflicts.

As this book describes actions on the operational rather than command level, mistakes are usually listed as failures to plan for supply services, or the rate of speed or lack of, that forces had to contend with due to failures in joint planning or operations. The actual combat against Iraqi forces is largely described as mismatch between a highly mobile force with decisions made at the junior level vs. an Iraqi force that could have dug in to make a short fight a lot harder had it communicated and coordinated effectively.

The ultimate lessons from this book include future benchmarks such as independent forces that are capable to move as ad hoc units, with precision. There are warnings from the authors about an over-reliance on technology and the "white noise of information" overload. Their warnings about the best ways to fight a highly technological force such as the US or the British through guerrilla insurgency are sadly true 3 years later. The authors recommendation that civilian leaders need to handle the problems that come through victory are just as important as the need for the military to adjust to changing battlefield environments continues to ring true on a daily basis.

The reader will not find detailed descriptions about the political or cultural implications or machinations before, during or after the Iraq War of 2003, as this is strictly a military account. What the volume is essentially about "how military force has the capacity and will to defeat rogue states that threaten the vital interests of the American people ( pg. 252)." The maps and pictures are excellent and relevant. For its purposes, this book is highly recommend.

If you're looking for a good objective overview of the invasion of Iraq I'd highly recommend this book.

The Iraq War is a decent overview of the recent war in Iraq. It's strongest points are made in the early chapters where the authors attempt to put the war in context. "Origins of War" and "The Opposing Sides" are the best summaries I've seen on the build up and causes of the war -- from Saddam's duplicity to the UNs fecklessness, Murray and Scales provide an outstanding background as to why war occurred. The summary on the ground war was adequate, while the chapter on the air war was relatively weak and uninspired. The most disappointing aspect of the book was its lack of insightful post-war analysis and impact of the war on our future military capabilities.

But, all in all, the book is a good read and well worth the cost for the outstanding pre-war analysis.

I purely enjoyed reading this book. It is an excellent initial encapsulation of the war and sets a high standard for others to follow. From the strategic level to the trenches, it reverberates with rich detail as the authors talk us through the decisions and battles of this short but vicious conflict. And while enamored with our great technological capabilities, they maintain perspective when they write that, "Technology may alter how wars are fought, but it will never change the fact that wars are conducted by human beings for political ends."
As Patton wrote, "The man is the weapon."

And the ending is inconclusive - properly, I feel, reflecting the reality of the situation today. I fear that they will have to write a sequel. I pray that it is short.

This book is worth your time and money.

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Summary:

Great reading that is hard to put down. The writers are insightful, with expert, well researched and provide compelling information gleaned from expert well connected sources whom they had long term friendships and associations with.

The book appears factually written without an apparent political agenda. An increasingly important factor for books coming out this year.

Truly substantial information, facts, and details of the war. Substantially more than will be commented on here. Many disparate situations are better understood and explained by this book - like how can a mechanical support team get lost in the middle of combat?

Political Year Issues:

General Franks re-wrote modern military tactics with his blitzkrieg through Iraq to topple one of the most brutal dictatorships with the (one time) 5th best army in the world. Could the war have been won with much greater costs and loss of life on both sides?

Good thought provoking information including substantial captured Syrian jihad troops in the fedayeen forces - what were they doing there? What does this mean to us in looking forward to the next middle eastern crisis?

Questions Remaining:

If we found no weapons of mass destruction, but we knew they were there before (they were previously used and the US, England, France and Russia sold them to Saddam Hussein and all agreed they were there at one time). Where did they go? Do the presence of Syrian jihad troops give us a strong enough linkage to pursue Syria for the missing WMD's? (This is my personal belief, for what little it is worth.) The point being there is no evidence of the WMD's being destroyed, therefore they must be someplace. Buried in the desert? Or, in a neighboring country?

What is Syria's role in this war (with its superiorly trained troops), and potential aftermath issues that will have to be addressed within this decade? Syria remains a dictatorship that harbors and trains terrorists in its Bacca Valley and still plans to drive every Israeli Jew into the Mediterranean Sea - regardless of any peace treaty.

Negatives:

Could use more dialogue to bring out the first hand experience, rather than being a citation.

Could have used more maps and diagrams. These are really essential for digesting troop movements relative to cities, and relative locations in a fairly dispersed and desolate land.