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3.0 out of 5 stars
Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success, January 29, 2008
This review is from: Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success (Praeger Security International) (Hardcover)
Cordesman prolifically chronicles Middle Eastern military affairs, and Iraqi Security Forces is a typical work for him with much information but little analysis. He does not debate the rationale for the Iraq war--what's past is past--but, with the benefit of hindsight, suggests that strategic mistakes could have been avoided. Included on a long list of bullet-points are failures to assess Iraqi nationalism accurately, to plan effective information operations, establish the civilian infrastructure necessary for nation-building and post-conflict stability, and establish workable systems of governance.
The strength of Cordesman's analysis lies in its clear chronology of attempts to rebuild Iraq's security forces. One chapter, for example, examines "coalition training and equipment efforts" in 2003. The next one outlines the failure to deliver adequate training and equipment through the first half of 2004, and the following one describes growing momentum in efforts to train the Iraqi military (curiously, without mentioning then-lieutenant general David Petraeus, who spearheaded such efforts).
But Cordesman's work has problems. It reads like a notebook with facts and figures cut-and-pasted, then poorly integrated into the narrative. A chapter outlining Iraqi security and defense views includes no Iraqi Arabic sources and just a few quotes culled from the Western press. Nor does Cordesman make any use of captured Iraqi documents that might, for example, shed light on the evolution of the insurgency.
Some opinions are presented as fact, to his work's detriment; he is critical of U.S. over-reliance on exile groups, which he says lacked credibility in Iraq without ever explaining why such exile groups dominated every Iraqi election. If only "internal" figures who remained in Iraq have legitimacy, does he counsel partnership with Shi`i cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, the only such "internal" leader to emerge in post-Saddam Iraq?
Cordesman can also be imprecise. While he is correct to note that de-Baathification applied only to the top four tiers of party members, representing perhaps 40,000 individuals out of two million total party members, he is wrong that these firqa' level employees became Baathists only for convenience, to qualify for jobs. Achieving firqa' status required complicity in Baath operations. There are also critical omissions, such as the absence of discussion about prewar efforts to train the Iraqi security forces and the subsequent operations and integration of these Free Iraqi Forces.
Sloppiness with sources and citations is a problem. On page 3, for example, he reproduces practically verbatim and without citation several paragraphs of an article this reviewer published in 2005.[1] Although Cordesman does not intentionally plagiarize, this incident does suggest inattention and an over-reliance on careless research assistants. To Cordesman's and the publisher's credit, they are rectifying the problem and including the citation on the electronic version of the text and all future editions. The lack of an index and bibliography make Iraqi Security Forces inconvenient to reference.
Iraqi Security Forces offers no earth shattering solutions. Cordesman's recommendations--emphasis on force quality and more attention to the police--are too general to be valuable. So, too, are his broader asides on the need for better policy integration and a more articulate U.S. grand strategy. Cordesman's works often read like compendiums, and this book, which offers little utility to the journalist, academic, or policy practitioner, is no exception.
Michael Rubin
Middle East Quarterly
Winter 2008
[1] Michael Rubin, "A Comedy of Errors: American-Turkish Diplomacy and the Iraq War," Turkish Policy Quarterly, Spring 2005.
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