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3.0 out of 5 stars
Short-term view of a long war, December 22, 2004
This review is from: The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict between the IRA and British Intelligence (Paperback)
I think this books deserves to be labeled "good" only if you take the bare tactical or military approach. I red a lot of NI conflict stuff in the past, and I see this one as the best source both in terms of tactics (from all sides) and warfare analysis (the most completed I ever found about the republican war machine). There are at least four whole chapters dedicated to describe the PIRA weaponry, its making, its smuggling an its use (or misuse)by the organisation. I also reccomend chapter IX, where Mr. Gherarty makes a reflexion about the survellaince and intelligence sistems developed by the British State during the "Troubles" and the aftermath and consequences to the British people such a "Big Brother" policy could have. I also should mention part III of the book, an interesting pre-independence historic account. Put the rest to rest. Erratic writing and typos (at least in the edition I have) match a biased and short-term vision. As an example, at some point the author states that in 1979 there were just 13 (¿?) trouble-related deaths in Ulster and that this reflected a sharp decline of violence in the province. Anybody who has ever red the basics about the NI conflict knows that August 27 1979 was one of its bloodiest days, with the killing of 23 people,18 soldiers plus 5 civilians, including Lord Mountbatten.There were almost 50 fatalities just among the security forces that year. Another biased statistic management appears in the 1972 death account: for Gherarty, ALL the civilians killed in NI this year (323) were victims of the PIRA. Indeed, as it was for the entire war, loyalist paramilitaries killed more innocent people (106) than the republican ones (88) in 1972. Some conclusions also show the wishfull thinking judgment of Mr. Gherarty. His quotes about the PIRA as a "defeated army", regarding all the concessions they won throughout the conflict, are laughable. Yes, you can say that NI is still a part of the UK; but a part whose political system, policing, security and justice were negotiated with another country (namely the Irish Republic). Had the PIRA been effectively vanquished, all this would prove to be unthinkable. Republicans certainly failed to meet the unrealistic goal of an United Ireland under their own terms, but through the GFA, they gained full access to a non less certain road to a de facto integration between North and South. I believe the troubles were, from the military point of view, a stalemate, as acknowledges Mr. Gherarty in other chapters of his book. But a real stalemate is produced by the parity of strength between two contestants; when this parity doesn't exist, and there is still a no-winner situation; should you call that an stalemate, or a defeat of the stronger force?
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4.0 out of 5 stars
One of the better books on "The Troubles", May 27, 2010
This review is from: The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict between the IRA and British Intelligence (Paperback)
First, it's necessary to point out that those reviewers who proclaim that this book shows how the "IRA fought the Brits to a standstill" are completely misrepresenting the book, and probably reflecting their own assessments (some will say, prejudices). In fact, the author's clearly stated conlusion - and the underlying theme of the book, citing the previous erruptions of "the Irish War" which he describes - is that a resort to terrorism/armed struggle actually set back, rather than accelerated, progress towards reform. One can understand why Tony Gerraghty's real conclusion is one that many will be unable or unwilling to accept. But to misrepresent his stated conclusions will not do. For me, what makes this stand out as one of the better books on "the Troubles" is that it doesn't just provide an interesting narrative, backed up with fascinating detail, on the deadly, see-saw battle of wits that went on between security forces and terrorists/insurgents/call them what you will (I saw their handiwork first hand, and to me they will always be terrorists, however perversely clever they were at times - I will never think anything else of people whose stock-in-trade was shooting people dead on their doorsteps or planting bombs under their cars). The highlight of this book is that the author is able to illuminate his narrative at key points with forcefully-argued but informed and insightful assessements, which often challenge and cut through the more common received wisdoms infuenced by politicial expediency, over-simplification, prejudice or propaganda. And it's worth repeating this book's central conclusion - that all the blood-letting was counterproductive to the cause(s) for which it was supposedly shed, the repetition of a largely ingrained response which had failed before, and failed again. A lesson for all sides to the conflict in NI, and for conflicts elsewhere. Sometimes, a resort to violence happens. Sometimes, it may indeed be a distasteful necessity, if carried out with restraint. But most times, it just doesn't pay. There are not merely less bloody ways of resolving disputes, usually, they are are smarter and more effective ones. Sweat saves blood; brains saves sweat and blood. If shooting people dead on their doorstep, or blowing them up, is the best way we can come up with to influence events, then we are really not being very clever, are we?
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4.0 out of 5 stars
TRUE STALEMATE, June 26, 2009
This review is from: The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict between the IRA and British Intelligence (Paperback)
Northern Ireland presents one of the oldest conflicts as well as perhaps the first urban insurgency. Between 1969 and at least 1997 the IRA has carried out a campaign of bombings, assassinations and shootings in Ireland and elsewhere, while British authorities have responded with arrests and covert military operations. The author's focus here is the war of intelligence conducted by both sides. Knowledge is power, and in a war like this more than any other, it is a key to victory. The book's first half describes events after 1969, and lists key weapons used by the IRA. Part two is an Irish history lesson up to partition in 1922. If ever a war was 'unwinnable' in military terms, this is it. Geraghty makes it clear the situation is something of a true stalemate. The British can not stop the rebels from disrupting civilization as bombs can be made easier and easier to hide over time, and killed or imprisoned terrorists can be replaced. But the Irish also face a dilemma. Not only can they not defeat the British army, government surveillance is now so effective it is almost impossible for IRA agents to communicate over any distance. Geraghty displays no special bias toward either side. He condems the IRA, responsible for most of the killing, including a case of a woman targeted for comforting a wounded soldier. The insurgency clearly cannot be thought of as a just war. But the Loyalist side is far from clean as well, having committed many senseless murders of innocent Catholic civilians, guilty only of being at the wrong place at the wrong time. While IRA fighters may be quite fierce and courageous, they are also quite naive in a way. Were they to win a complete victory, reunifying Ireland and driving Britain out, they would still face over a million angry Protestant Loyalists, capable of creating incredible mayhem of their own. What, one wonders, would Ireland do then?
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