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Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked

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One of a series of must read books on Vietnam for all who want to enter the field of International Relations and Foreign Policy. The author in a very methodical way details how America's National Security Apparatus of decision-making simply stalemated over Vietnam, not due to blunders but to positions that were well argued from both stand points. One group of advisors recommended no withdraw at any price. The other could not agree on how to win a victory and then exit. In the meantime, four presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon tried to win and escape at the same time as American boys blood reigned on the soaked soil of Vietnam. Although few blame Harry Truman's mistake by forcing a limited war to save South Korea, fewer know Truman started us in Vietnam as well when he first gave $10 million in Military Aid to the French in 1947. However, every president after him escalated the war to win it, only to see all attempts for peace evaporate when trying to stop it. What you find is the explanation in this book on why such outstanding advisors to five presidents could only agree to escalation to prevent withdrawal but develop no victory strategy at the same time. Leslie Gelb answers and details the blunders at the very center of National Security Council points of view. If you want to see how decisions were made back then, this is the book for you! In the end, you will question why so many failed leaving so many to die and few excuses to remember.

This is an excellent, balanced, and well-written study of American foreign policy in Vietnam by two unusually able scholars. It refutes the modern mythology that LBJ and/or Nixon "dragged Congress kicking and screaming" into the conflict, and notes that a plurality of New Hampshire voters who supported McCarthy in Feb. 1968 went on to support George Wallace and Gen. Curtiss ("Bomb Hanoi back to the stone age") LeMay in the November election--that is, they were Hawks protesting a "no-win" policy rather than Doves who wanted to abandon South Vietnam to the Communists. Highly recommended.

Very well-researched book regarding American policy towards Vietnam. The authors explore the constraints of each president, especially LBJ, when they had to deal with Vietnam. Especially incisive is the authors' view of "minimum necessary" vs "maximum feasible" constraints on US presidents w.r.t. Vietnam. This is not a conspiracy book or a first-person account. It is geared towards the academe who wants to learn about how US foreign policy was conceived and implemented wrt Vietnam.

Since 1945 through 197? the U.S. was in S.E. Asia; firstly financially, then advisory, then militarily. All cold war thinking with an eye on China and Russia to the east. Ho Chi Minh surfaced as the Communist liberator of his country shortly after WW II and, after routing the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, his perception as a serious threat to the eyes of the Western World took on more weight. The Domino theory became the sales pitch and American aid increased and increased. America increased support to the corrupt Diem regime in the south and, supported reneging free elections in 1956. Quagmire is an understatement. But, we have to remember, at the time, our leaders were reacting to an unfolding situation and their decisions were shaped by policy and events that were happening then. We have hindsight to benefit from and form our opinions.

Gelb & Betts have painstakingly pieced together hours and hours of research and created a very detailed analysis of Vietnam from World War II through the fall of Saigon in 1975. Their hypothesis is sound and supported concretely with credible sources.

This stuff is fascinating and highlights one major thing, the U.S. could never win given its self imposed limitations and fears concerning S. E. Asia. The U.S. escalated as reaction to the ever increasing power of the Vietcong and, other than bombing, U.S. plans never involved invading the north, Cambodia or Laos. The U.S. never really took control of the situation other than to react. This kept USA on its back foot and denied it the initiative. In a nutshell, the Vietnam war took place on the enemy's schedule and they protracted it knowing the U.S. would eventually tire.

The book is broken into 5 parts:
1. Decisions getting into Vietnam
2. Goals: The imperative Not to lose
3. Means: The minimum necessary and the Maximum feasible.
4. Perceptions: Realism, Hope and Compromise.
5. Conclusions.

Each part has 3 - 4 chapters within and the conclusion wraps up and summarizes all the analysis. It's very detailed and at times complex. If you want a first rate analysis of U.S. policy towards Asia, this is the book. I highly recommend it.