25 of 27 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A smart and balanced look at the history of the shari'a, October 20, 2008
Before I started reading through The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State, tried to also read through several reviews of the book to get a sense of what criticisms were out there. The handful of reviews on Amazon tended to be negative and I made note of the criticisms levied against Feldman. After reading the book, I can't help but notice that Feldman is being criticized for things he didn't say or that the main point of the book is being misrepresented (at least by reviewers here).
First and foremost, this is a book about the history of shari'a law. The book is comprised of three parts, dealing with the heyday of shari'a law, its decline during and after the late Ottoman period, and prospects for the future. A theme that runs through the book is that when the scholarly class successfully acted as keepers of the shari'a, they provided an important check to executive power. Over time, due to the effects of reforms and the integration of the scholarly class into the ruling executive's regime, unbridled and unchecked executive power became the norm. The shari'a as a result, became less a force for legitimate rule, and more of a specialized area dealing with family/civil matters.
The main premise of the book is not that most people in the Middle East want a return to shari'a law. Even this is a problematic basis for attacking Feldman here because he clearly distinguishes between what the shari'a was during its time of prominence, and what most people think of when they hear the word. Feldman also points out that what most modern Islamist parties aren't actually calling for the shari'a to be implemented in its traditional sense, but a system where scholars have a more subjugated role. Most important figures in Sunni Islamist parties aren't trained religious scholars and it is unlikely that they would want a system in place where trained scholars have a check against their power. The most prescient point in all of this is that these Islamist parties must be given the chance to come to power and fail before their appeal diminishes.
Criticizing Feldman for producing a short book is also a relatively pointless exercise here. He in no way claims to definitively tackle this issue in its entirety. Rather, the book provides an excellent starting point for a complex subject. No one book could adequately handle the magnitude of the origins, evolution, and future of the shari'a, but Feldman gives us a great place to start.
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27 of 37 people found the following review helpful:
1.0 out of 5 stars
Please read some real Islamic history instead, November 8, 2008
I would like to encourage anyone who buys this book to at least do yourself the favor of reading some standard historical works related to Islamic history, especially those parts which Noah Feldman uses to support his thesis in this book. If Feldman had submitted this work to any peer-reviewed scholarly journal it would have been rejected, as it is filled with unsupported characterizations, historical inaccuracies and, where there is sourcing at all, endnotes which do not support his thesis. This work is so professionally negligent that I would encourage any potential employer to review this book and its documentation before hiring him.
In providing some examples, I'll break them down roughly into Feldman's outline:
"WHAT WENT RIGHT?" - pages 17-56 discuss how important Islamic law was to the "success" of Islamic states.
- On p. 21, Feldman argues that Muslims equate Islamic law with the Islamic state, and that support for Islamist parties derives from the fact that there is popular support for restoring Islamic law. Feldman cites no evidence to support this. In the Arab world there is strong support for maintaining Islamic law in family law and personal status, but this is already in place in secular states like Egypt and Syria. There have been no instances of popular pressure in favor of full implementation of Islamic law similar to those which often take place due to economic reasons or anti-American or anti-Israel protests. Where Islamist parties have done well in the Arab world (e.g. Egypt and Palestine), observers tend to attribute at least part of this support to protests against corrupt, authoritarian, unpopular regimes.
- On p. 23 Feldman claims that in classical times Islamic scholars were "the only meaningful check on the power of the rulers." Over the pages that follow, he engages in a highly theoretical discussion of what he thinks the Islamic state functioned like, creating a "subtle arrangement" which involved a "balance of power between the scholars and the caliph." This arrangement was so subtle that if you read historical works by real Middle East academics you won't find any examples of this. In reality, there was a balance on the power of Abbasid caliphs after their Central Asian slaves obtained so much power they could overthrow the caliph, and after around 940 AD the Abbasid caliphate (founded in 750) was a figurehead. The caliphs of the preceding Umayyad empire (661-750) also ruled on a whim, with only the three-year reign of Umar II (717-720) considered by Islamists to have been in line with Islamic law. From circa 940 to 1517 there was no single caliphate in the Arab world, but a broad array of warring Muslim states. Then the Ottomans took over, and the fact that the Ottoman dynastic rule lasted for centuries despite the fact that Islamic law has always banned dynastic rule should tell you something.
- On p. 30 Feldman admits that scholars couldn't really just dismiss a caliph, even though many claimed the theoretical right to do so, but goes on to assert generally that "uncertainty about succession made the scholars extremely important," (p. 32) but without documenting this claim. He does then give one specific example, that of Ibn Taymiyya (incidentally, the scholar from the classical age most frequently cited as an authority by the Wahhabi establishment in Saudi Arabia, the most fanatical clerical class in the modern Arab world). Feldman cites Ibn Taymiyya's fatwa in the 13th century authorizing jihad against the Mongols, and in favor of the Mamluks, who were based in Egypt. The Mongols had superficially converted to Islam, and Ibn Taymiyya said their rule could be rejected because they weren't legitimate. Yet it was the military force of an opposing Muslim army which stopped the Mongols. Feldman doesn't explain how Ibn Taymiyya supports his claim that Islamic law can work in the modern world.
- On p. 34 Feldman claims that "scholars could affirm the legitimacy of an alternative claimant." This claim, unlike most, cites a source. Endnote 26 provides the example of the "rebellion" against Hakim I of Andalusia in 805, which was supported by scholars. But see Philip Hitti's magisterial "History of the Arabs," p. 512, in which Hitti explains that Hakim I, who ruled from 796-822, did face a scholar-supported rebellion in 805, but he suppressed it and crucified the rebels. He faced another such rebellion in 814, but suppressed it as well, and crucified the rebels upside down. He then went on to rule eight more years. How does this support Feldman's thesis?
- On the same page Feldman then goes on to claim that a change in ruler brought about through force "might be accompanied by a fatwa declaring the illegitimacy of the deposed ruler." This is true, but does it not occur to Feldman that this is because the new ruler had the power to execute the scholars and simply replace them with more pliable ones? Feldman gives no example of an Islamic ruler who took power by force, failed to obtain a fatwa in his favor, and then said "Okay, I've lost legitimacy, I'll resign." I can't think of any.
- On pp. 45-48 Feldman discusses Ottoman rule in the Arab world (1517-1918) and tries to argue that the Ottoman implementation of Islamic law provided "stability" and the "rule of law," discussing tax law and criminal law specifically, although again without meaningfully specific examples. He asserts on p. 46 that the "threat of delegitimization" gave the ruler "incentive" to show he was in accordance with Islamic law. He gives no example of any Ottoman sultan actually facing this alleged "threat of delegitimization." It is not clear whether or not he understands that during most of the Ottoman period the Arab provinces were de facto independent of Istanbul, ruled by local elite and recognizing Ottoman suzerainty only in name. Finally, the Ottoman period stunted the development of the Arab world for centuries. It wasn't until 1795 that the Ottomans legalized the printing of books in Arabic, as they believed that Islamic law prohibited this invention as sinful "innovation." Islamic law, to the extent that it mattered, was much of the problem.
- Islamic law did contribute to the success of Islamic states in one crucial respect - they maintained Muslim rule over subjugated peoples, and ensured that they would become Muslim over time (e.g. Islamic law provides the death penalty for conversion from Islam; a Muslim man may marry a Christian or Jewish woman but not vice versa, and their children must be raised Muslim, etc.). I do not find it surprising that Feldman - who is Jewish - does not emphasize this element of Islamic history.
"DECLINE AND FALL" - this section (pp. 57-102) includes Feldman's theory about why the Islamic state failed. His discussion is so far removed from historical reality that I would simply suggest that if you are interested in this period, read a real history book on the Ottoman state; I have listed some below. Suffice it to say that that historians attribute the Ottoman decline to multiple causes - the opening of New World markets which deprived the state of revenue; the European development of superior seafaring and naval technologies; the inefficiency of the Ottoman guild system; the protectionist Ottoman trade policy that prohibited many exports for fear they would lead to shortages; and the overall stagnation of Ottoman society which viewed almost all change as un-Islamic innovation at a time of rapid progress in Europe.
"THE RISE OF THE NEW ISLAMIC STATE" - Given Feldman's historical discussion, its hard to see what useful lessons could be drawn from it, but some items are worth noting.
To begin with, in the modern Middle East there have been two full-fledged Islamic states - Iran and the Sudan. Feldman doesn't mention the Sudan even once. He does discuss Iran, and admits that it is viewed as a failure by its citizens, but this doesn't discourage him. I guess one could call Saudi Arabia an Islamic state, and he does discuss it, but Feldman doesn't hold the Saudis up as a model. He cites the contrasting examples of the Islamist ruling parties in Turkey and Pakistan, saying that the former has been a success and the latter clearly a failure. Yet Turkey's Islamists have not yet implemented Islamic law. How does this support his thesis?
Some books I recommend if you want to understand Islamic history:
"The History of the Arabs," Philip K. Hitti
"A Concise History of the Middle East," Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr.
"The Muslim Discovery of Europe," Bernard Lewis
"What Went Wrong," Bernard Lewis
"The Arab World: An Illustrated History," Kirk H. Sowell (my book)
"The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600," Halil Inalcik
"The Decline & Fall of the Ottoman Empire," Alan Palmer
"The Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition," Norman Itzkowitz
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