Customer Reviews

The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State (Council on Foreign Relations)

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Before I started reading through The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State, tried to also read through several reviews of the book to get a sense of what criticisms were out there. The handful of reviews on Amazon tended to be negative and I made note of the criticisms levied against Feldman. After reading the book, I can't help but notice that Feldman is being criticized for things he didn't say or that the main point of the book is being misrepresented (at least by reviewers here).

First and foremost, this is a book about the history of shari'a law. The book is comprised of three parts, dealing with the heyday of shari'a law, its decline during and after the late Ottoman period, and prospects for the future. A theme that runs through the book is that when the scholarly class successfully acted as keepers of the shari'a, they provided an important check to executive power. Over time, due to the effects of reforms and the integration of the scholarly class into the ruling executive's regime, unbridled and unchecked executive power became the norm. The shari'a as a result, became less a force for legitimate rule, and more of a specialized area dealing with family/civil matters.

The main premise of the book is not that most people in the Middle East want a return to shari'a law. Even this is a problematic basis for attacking Feldman here because he clearly distinguishes between what the shari'a was during its time of prominence, and what most people think of when they hear the word. Feldman also points out that what most modern Islamist parties aren't actually calling for the shari'a to be implemented in its traditional sense, but a system where scholars have a more subjugated role. Most important figures in Sunni Islamist parties aren't trained religious scholars and it is unlikely that they would want a system in place where trained scholars have a check against their power. The most prescient point in all of this is that these Islamist parties must be given the chance to come to power and fail before their appeal diminishes.

Criticizing Feldman for producing a short book is also a relatively pointless exercise here. He in no way claims to definitively tackle this issue in its entirety. Rather, the book provides an excellent starting point for a complex subject. No one book could adequately handle the magnitude of the origins, evolution, and future of the shari'a, but Feldman gives us a great place to start.

Feldman proposes a brief yet interesting history of Islamic constitutional law. He suggests that a corpus of Islamic legal scholars helped provide a meaningful check against executive power. However, "Westernization" reforms have led to unbridled executive power and marginalized Islamic scholars to issues of family law. Feldman then proposes how a current Islamic state might function with Islamic scholars playing a larger role than merely being confined to family law.

Feldman's book is short and does not provide enough evidence to support some of these claims. For example, he does not provide concrete examples of when scholars successfully opposed Sultans and won. He also relies a bit too much on conventional wisdom, such as the claim that most people in Islamic countries want sharia (even if translated into rule of law), which he does not show through polls. The book is a useful thought piece, which is precisely its purpose, but Feldman will need to gather more evidence to fully support his thesis.

I would like to encourage anyone who buys this book to at least do yourself the favor of reading some standard historical works related to Islamic history, especially those parts which Noah Feldman uses to support his thesis in this book. If Feldman had submitted this work to any peer-reviewed scholarly journal it would have been rejected, as it is filled with unsupported characterizations, historical inaccuracies and, where there is sourcing at all, endnotes which do not support his thesis. This work is so professionally negligent that I would encourage any potential employer to review this book and its documentation before hiring him.

In providing some examples, I'll break them down roughly into Feldman's outline:

"WHAT WENT RIGHT?" - pages 17-56 discuss how important Islamic law was to the "success" of Islamic states.
- On p. 21, Feldman argues that Muslims equate Islamic law with the Islamic state, and that support for Islamist parties derives from the fact that there is popular support for restoring Islamic law. Feldman cites no evidence to support this. In the Arab world there is strong support for maintaining Islamic law in family law and personal status, but this is already in place in secular states like Egypt and Syria. There have been no instances of popular pressure in favor of full implementation of Islamic law similar to those which often take place due to economic reasons or anti-American or anti-Israel protests. Where Islamist parties have done well in the Arab world (e.g. Egypt and Palestine), observers tend to attribute at least part of this support to protests against corrupt, authoritarian, unpopular regimes.

- On p. 23 Feldman claims that in classical times Islamic scholars were "the only meaningful check on the power of the rulers." Over the pages that follow, he engages in a highly theoretical discussion of what he thinks the Islamic state functioned like, creating a "subtle arrangement" which involved a "balance of power between the scholars and the caliph." This arrangement was so subtle that if you read historical works by real Middle East academics you won't find any examples of this. In reality, there was a balance on the power of Abbasid caliphs after their Central Asian slaves obtained so much power they could overthrow the caliph, and after around 940 AD the Abbasid caliphate (founded in 750) was a figurehead. The caliphs of the preceding Umayyad empire (661-750) also ruled on a whim, with only the three-year reign of Umar II (717-720) considered by Islamists to have been in line with Islamic law. From circa 940 to 1517 there was no single caliphate in the Arab world, but a broad array of warring Muslim states. Then the Ottomans took over, and the fact that the Ottoman dynastic rule lasted for centuries despite the fact that Islamic law has always banned dynastic rule should tell you something.

- On p. 30 Feldman admits that scholars couldn't really just dismiss a caliph, even though many claimed the theoretical right to do so, but goes on to assert generally that "uncertainty about succession made the scholars extremely important," (p. 32) but without documenting this claim. He does then give one specific example, that of Ibn Taymiyya (incidentally, the scholar from the classical age most frequently cited as an authority by the Wahhabi establishment in Saudi Arabia, the most fanatical clerical class in the modern Arab world). Feldman cites Ibn Taymiyya's fatwa in the 13th century authorizing jihad against the Mongols, and in favor of the Mamluks, who were based in Egypt. The Mongols had superficially converted to Islam, and Ibn Taymiyya said their rule could be rejected because they weren't legitimate. Yet it was the military force of an opposing Muslim army which stopped the Mongols. Feldman doesn't explain how Ibn Taymiyya supports his claim that Islamic law can work in the modern world.

- On p. 34 Feldman claims that "scholars could affirm the legitimacy of an alternative claimant." This claim, unlike most, cites a source. Endnote 26 provides the example of the "rebellion" against Hakim I of Andalusia in 805, which was supported by scholars. But see Philip Hitti's magisterial "History of the Arabs," p. 512, in which Hitti explains that Hakim I, who ruled from 796-822, did face a scholar-supported rebellion in 805, but he suppressed it and crucified the rebels. He faced another such rebellion in 814, but suppressed it as well, and crucified the rebels upside down. He then went on to rule eight more years. How does this support Feldman's thesis?

- On the same page Feldman then goes on to claim that a change in ruler brought about through force "might be accompanied by a fatwa declaring the illegitimacy of the deposed ruler." This is true, but does it not occur to Feldman that this is because the new ruler had the power to execute the scholars and simply replace them with more pliable ones? Feldman gives no example of an Islamic ruler who took power by force, failed to obtain a fatwa in his favor, and then said "Okay, I've lost legitimacy, I'll resign." I can't think of any.

- On pp. 45-48 Feldman discusses Ottoman rule in the Arab world (1517-1918) and tries to argue that the Ottoman implementation of Islamic law provided "stability" and the "rule of law," discussing tax law and criminal law specifically, although again without meaningfully specific examples. He asserts on p. 46 that the "threat of delegitimization" gave the ruler "incentive" to show he was in accordance with Islamic law. He gives no example of any Ottoman sultan actually facing this alleged "threat of delegitimization." It is not clear whether or not he understands that during most of the Ottoman period the Arab provinces were de facto independent of Istanbul, ruled by local elite and recognizing Ottoman suzerainty only in name. Finally, the Ottoman period stunted the development of the Arab world for centuries. It wasn't until 1795 that the Ottomans legalized the printing of books in Arabic, as they believed that Islamic law prohibited this invention as sinful "innovation." Islamic law, to the extent that it mattered, was much of the problem.

- Islamic law did contribute to the success of Islamic states in one crucial respect - they maintained Muslim rule over subjugated peoples, and ensured that they would become Muslim over time (e.g. Islamic law provides the death penalty for conversion from Islam; a Muslim man may marry a Christian or Jewish woman but not vice versa, and their children must be raised Muslim, etc.). I do not find it surprising that Feldman - who is Jewish - does not emphasize this element of Islamic history.

"DECLINE AND FALL" - this section (pp. 57-102) includes Feldman's theory about why the Islamic state failed. His discussion is so far removed from historical reality that I would simply suggest that if you are interested in this period, read a real history book on the Ottoman state; I have listed some below. Suffice it to say that that historians attribute the Ottoman decline to multiple causes - the opening of New World markets which deprived the state of revenue; the European development of superior seafaring and naval technologies; the inefficiency of the Ottoman guild system; the protectionist Ottoman trade policy that prohibited many exports for fear they would lead to shortages; and the overall stagnation of Ottoman society which viewed almost all change as un-Islamic innovation at a time of rapid progress in Europe.

"THE RISE OF THE NEW ISLAMIC STATE" - Given Feldman's historical discussion, its hard to see what useful lessons could be drawn from it, but some items are worth noting.

To begin with, in the modern Middle East there have been two full-fledged Islamic states - Iran and the Sudan. Feldman doesn't mention the Sudan even once. He does discuss Iran, and admits that it is viewed as a failure by its citizens, but this doesn't discourage him. I guess one could call Saudi Arabia an Islamic state, and he does discuss it, but Feldman doesn't hold the Saudis up as a model. He cites the contrasting examples of the Islamist ruling parties in Turkey and Pakistan, saying that the former has been a success and the latter clearly a failure. Yet Turkey's Islamists have not yet implemented Islamic law. How does this support his thesis?

Some books I recommend if you want to understand Islamic history:

"The History of the Arabs," Philip K. Hitti
"A Concise History of the Middle East," Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr.
"The Muslim Discovery of Europe," Bernard Lewis
"What Went Wrong," Bernard Lewis
"The Arab World: An Illustrated History," Kirk H. Sowell (my book)
"The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600," Halil Inalcik
"The Decline & Fall of the Ottoman Empire," Alan Palmer
"The Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition," Norman Itzkowitz

It appears Feldman, has stayed true to his scholarly understanding of what Islam is all about, and has not been overtaken by present time demonization of Islam. In reality Islam is modification on Judaism , while accepting the best of Christianity. Saudis, Talaban and Alghadeh are not Islam. They are every thing that Islam negated. Gilded palaces of Saudi Family is not Islamic, restricting women and covering them head to toe is not Islamic, worshiping money is not Islamic. What you see in Islamic world today is Christianity before Renaissance . Islam needs to be rescued from corrupt leaders of the countries committing crimes in the name of Islam. Feldman is well aware of this and has done his research well.

I am glad I finally bought this book, despite the surprisingly negative reviews I had had the misfortune of reading.

Looking back at those reviews it seems quite obvious now, that some of the reviewers had not even bothered to read the book before commenting on it. Some of them were using the review to grind their personal axe against the author. One of the reviews was not even about the book, but was a direct personal attack on the author, verging on character assassination.

These reviews remind one of the medieval church's reaction to Copernicus and Galileo's ground-breaking ideas.

Coming back to the review: This book is a brilliant work of original scholarship. It offers a fresh perspective on the workings of the classical Islamic state, going back to the early days of Islam through the nineteenth century.

The book's core concept is that the Islamic state was based on the rule of law. The state was justified by law, was governed by law, and , as a result, was essentially a legal state. The book explains how the shari'a, as the unwritten Islamic constitution, was instrumental in shaping the traditional Islamic state over the centuries.

Most importantly, the book shines a new light on the role of Islamic scholars, the ulema, in the classical Islamic state, and highlights how they enjoyed a high degree of prestige and respect. It further elaborates how the Islamic scholars, as the acknowledged interpreters of shari'a, were able to keep the autocratic rulers beholden to the law/shari'a, and were, thus, instrumental in ensuring the supremacy of the rule of law in the Islamic state.

Not many people, not even Muslims, are aware of this aspect of the Islamic state.

As a matter of fact, many Muslims look at the current status of the shari'a and the role of religious scholars, ulemas, in Muslim countries today, and come to the conclusion that, this is how it has always been. This book dispels a lot of such misconceptions.

Anyone who is interested in learning the historical background of the Islamic state, and wishes to gain an understanding of the current movements for the Islamic state; and all those following the recent political developments in the Arab world will find this book timely, informative, and of much value.

Although I'am a newbie in Islamic history and philosophy, the book overall becomes quite interesting describing some issues on current Middle East Governments and linking their failures to problems arising from the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the duality in trying to introduce western democracy and keeping long standing Sharia tradition.

The basic premise behind Noah Feldman diagnostic of the current failure of most Islamic States is trying "to establish themselves as legal states in the twin senses of being justified by law and governing through it".

In summary he basically states that the failure of current governments was the loss of checks and balances given by Scholars through the codification of the law and its interpretation into written codes.

While he extends quite on the reasons behind the failure, I feel he doesnt quite elaborates much into the possible ways to the formation of a new Islamic Model State. The main proposition lays of the re-establishment of the legislature and the interpretation of it through the scholars and the judges.

The book definitely is thought-provoking and inspiring in tryind to find a new model for development that is compatible with democracy, tradition and theology.

The author knows exactly what he is talking about. And unlike most of the literature he is trying to discuss the issue logically and in details.
He seems to have very good understanding of the way muslims think in the East.

Noah Feldman's thesis is based on a false premise; one that suggests that Muslims around the globe are clamouring for an "Islamic State".

This assumption is repudiated by the fact that in the recent elections in Pakistan, all parties propagating the establishment of Sharia based Islamic State were trounced and the centre-left PPP formed a coalition with the number two party, the centre-right ML and the secular nationalists of the ANP.

In Indonesia as well as Bangladesh, there is little appetite for the Islamists while in Iran, if the Mullahs ever permitted a fair and transparent elections, they would be wiped out. No wonder the ruling Ayatollahs vet every candidate and reject the nomination papers of any secular liberal Muslim candidate, not mentioning the impossibility of anyone from the Left seeking any public office.

And in the Arab heartland, it would take no more than one cycle of elections to ensure that Muslim Brotherhood return to the margins of society where they have historically belonged.

Noah Feldman's deeply interesting and profoundly misleading book supplies an answer to a question that must puzzle Americans who buy the argument that Islam is a religion of peace: Why do Muslim voters always turn out majorities for violent Islamist parties?
The short answer, according to Feldman, a Harvard Law professor and heavy hitter at the Council of Foreign Relations, is that misgoverned Muslims subscribe to a religion that makes much of justice, and they yearn for a return to a rule of law -- sharia -- that they believe worked in their glorious past.
You have to recognize that Feldman misrepresents the political goals of the Islamists, which he equates with the Muslim Brotherhood. In particular, he accepts the published platform statements of the various national Brotherhood parties, while ignoring their (more indicative) speeches to their adherents.
As well as to non-Muslims. The Islamists have not been shy about telling us what they intend, which does not match the anodyne statements in the party platforms.
According to Feldman, sharia offered (at a time when no other religion or political system did so) a promise of law-based government, and divine law at that. The sultans had to defer to sharia, and sharia was (by a fluke of Muslim history) the preserve of independent scholars, the ulama.
The scholars served as a counterbalance to the inherent despotism of kings, leaving Muslims satisfied that something other than mere force ruled their lives.
Right here Feldman goes off the rails. He asserts that sharia was (and is) egalitarian, at least for men, and that this contributed to the satisfaction of the populace and, so long as they were seen to be deferring to sharia, to the legitimacy of rulers.
This is false. Sharia is egalitarian only among Muslims. It requires that non-Muslims be treated as inferiors at law.
However, if, as Feldman is, you are primarily concerned with finding some constitutional framework that might replace the failed states of the majority Muslim countries, perhaps you can overlook this inconvenient truth. Whatever his motive, Feldman does overlook it.
He argues that the unintended outcome of the Tanzimat (Ottoman reform movement of the 19th century) was a disaster for the balance of political interests in Muslim states.
The independent scholars were ruined by being replaced with a written constitution. The constitution was then revoked, leaving not even a theoretical restraint on the executive.
This system of no checks and no balances, he says, carried over to the 20th century, after the last sultan departed. Thus, almost all Muslims consider themselves oppressed, their rulers illegitimate.
Instead of looking to some modern, parliamentary replacement, they look backward to the good old days, when executives were restrained by sharia.
Though pessimistic about its chances, Feldman considers this atavistic approach almost the only conceivable way that a new, stable and just constitutional framework could be arrived at in majority Muslim countries.
Since so far Islamist parties always win when elections are more or less free, the rest of the world had better learn to deal with it, he says.
But he is misleading or worse when he treats sharia as something internal to Muslims. Muslims who live in non-Muslim countries say (to pollsters and in widely distributed sermons) that they wish to live under sharia, too.
The kicker is that when they say that, they mean everybody -- not just Muslims -- must live by sharia.
Feldman concludes: "Just now, the Islamist promise of the rule of law offers the only prospect for meaningful political justice for many Muslims. If it, too, fails, the alternative may well be worse."
It's difficult to see how non-Muslims could peacefully co-exist with the success of Islamism, however.

Repetitive, biased and sympathetic commentary about un-Islamic or so called Islamic regimes: caliphates, kingdoms and emirates of Sunni Muslim rulers of the past 14 centuries... False premises on which this whole thesis is based on: Sunni Scholars were custodian of Sharia, orienting the rulers implement the Islamic law. Not a fact, most the scholars of the time were not monitoring the rulers of course not; rather interpreting Sharia the way it best suits them and the ruler, like one of the Koranic injunctions: "obey those in authority among you", or the prophet's saying that "scholars are his heir". These so called scholars were accomplice most of the time, innovators, inventors of Hadiths (Prophet Mohammad's sayings and traditions), concocting false traditions of the prophet Mohammad to justify their rulers' illegitimate rights to the empires and caliphates...Very few Sunni scholars revolted or spoke against the rulers, most of the time it was Shia imams and their followers who did not give up speaking the truth and revolting against the tyranny and falsehood of the rulers of the time. The writer ignored all these and other facts of the Muslim history, rather most of the time his opinion is not substantiated with reasons, facts or examples at all...The writer also tried to place the present day government of Iran in the same league to which Taliban belongs, not a fair assessment...
He totally ignored the Muslim majority countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, some references to Pakistan not much, his unblinking focus is on Middle Eastern countries, which were carved by the west after fall of Ottoman Empire and WWII... another inaccurate assumption was about the objectives and the following of the Islamists- They are not moderate nor widely accepted by the Muslim majority. Iran is a different case.

He tried in vain to discuss The Fall and Rise of Islamic State in less than 200 pages, of course real history, reasons and facts cannot be fit into small space like this... Imagine how Islamic Iraqi Constitution would be which he helped white house to write for Iraqis... WOW