The Islamic Shield: Arab Resistance to Democratic and Religious Reforms [Paperback]

Elie Elhadj (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: January 1, 2007

America's War on Terrorism uses democratization of the Arab World as a main weapon. The Islamic Shield argues that democratization of Arab countries is a fantasy because democratic elections today would lead to replacing the dictatorships of Arab rulers by Islamist theocratic dictatorships. The book contends that the Arab peoples are generally characterized by a culture of obedience to hierarchical authority in the home, school, mosque, the work place, and the country at large. The book identifies religious and cultural causes, as well as domestic and foreign political factors that set off Jihadists' terrorism. The book recommends solutions, stressing that political expediencies will not end terrorism. The Islamic Shield examines why two different countries; Saudi Arabia, an Islamist monarchy; and Syria, a quasi-secular republic, share in common non-representative non-participatory dictatorships mired in cronyism and corruption. The examination concludes that genuine reforms are not likely soon. The two countries can be prototypes of other Arab countries. The Islamic Shield considers: why do non-Arab Islamic countries elect women as prime ministers while Arab rulers and Ulama (Muslim clergy) condemn democracy as un-Islamic and treat women as lesser beings? Should benevolent dictatorship replace Arab democracy as an objective? Who shapes the Islamic persona? Is Islamic Law changeable? If yes, who may change it? How likely that an Arab Martin Luther, or Kemal Ataturk might emerge? What might be causing the growing attachment of Arabs today to radical Islam? Did politicizing Genesis 15:18 politicize the Quran? How sustainable is a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict? What might the effect of a Shii crescent of influence be on stirring bloody conflicts between Shiis and Sunnis? What might the legacy of the George W. Bush Administration be in the Muslim world? What might be the outcome of the War on Terrorism?

Editorial Reviews

About the Author

Elhadj is a banker with 30 years of banking experience in New York, Philadelphia, London and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. For most of the 1990's, Elhadj was chief executive officer of a major Saudi bank. At age 54, he joined London University's School of Oriental and African Studies to attain his Master's Degree and Ph.D. His doctoral dissertation addressed issues of food self-sufficiency and water politics in the Middle East. His Ph.D. dissertation, Experiments in Water and Food self Sufficiency in the Middle East, was published in 2006 by Dissertation.com.

Product Details

• Paperback: 276 pages
• Publisher: Brown Walker Press (January 1, 2007)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1599424118
• ISBN-13: 978-1599424118
• Product Dimensions: 9.5 x 7.1 x 0.6 inches
• Shipping Weight: 15.5 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (4 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,535,471 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

11 of 11 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Heads in the Sand, September 27, 2006

By 

E. A. Lovitt "starmoth" (Gladwin, MI USA) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: The Islamic Shield: Arab Resistance to Democratic and Religious Reforms (Paperback)

I'd like to round up all of the Washington D.C. policy-makers and lock them into a big room and make them read "The Islamic Shield." Then we'd discuss what they read, without the usual patriotic and political flatulence filling the air. We'd discuss Professor Elhadj's six strategies to defeat the Jihadists, plus the three political and moral strategies that the United States must follow in order to get ourselves out of the Middle-East quagmire that we helped create. There are also three strategies that Arab rulers must follow (they do not include democracy and free elections), and the United States needs to lend a hand (perhaps in the form of a few discreet shoves) in this effort, too.

As President Eisenhower might have remarked, it's time to take our foreign policy back away from the military-industrial-big-oil complex, and earn the respect of our neighbors, again.

"The Islamic Shield" is brilliant, but pessimistic. If you read the leaked National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq that came out yesterday, describing Iraq as the 'cause celebre' for Jihadists, this book will expand on that theme in excruciating and maddening detail. Professor Elhadj concludes by asking, what is the likelihood of a terrorist defeat? He answers:

"On the short-term, the likelihood is rather slim. The confrontation today involves fundamentalist politicians brandishing the Quran and the Bible, bent on crushing each other into submission."

The author of "The Islamic Shield" was born in Syria, and had a thirty-year banking career in New York, Philadelphia, London and Riyadh before he decided to return to London University's School of Oriental and African Studies at age 54, "seeking answers to questions on cultures and religions, politics and developmental prospects of Arab countries." This book is the result of his personal experiences (with the emphasis on Syria and Saudi Arabia), and his seven years at London University. He presents a very unique perspective on Arabic religious and cultural history, and on the differences between the Shiis, the Sunnis, the Wahhabis, the Ismailis, the Druzes, and the Syrian Alawites.

Believe me, you will not be bored. Most likely you'll be gritting your teeth with rage at the ignorant, arrogant Middle Eastern policies implemented by our government. You will learn why suicide is such an attractive option to the Jihadists. You'll find out how (this is the one that maddens me) "...on April 9, 2003 the US army won the battle against a tattered Iraq. But, Iran, without firing a shot won the war for Iraq."

This is an important, fascinating book even though the US government is exposed as inept and foolish. I suppose we can take comfort in the knowledge that the author is even harder on the Ulama class (mullahs) and their needlessly archaic interpretations of the Islamic Hadith (the traditional sayings and actions of the Prophet Mohammed).

My only wish is that "The Islamic Shield" had been proof-read a bit more closely. There are many misspellings, and at least one egregious statistical blooper. Hopefully, future editions will correct these problems.

9 of 9 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A candid look at the Middle East, October 7, 2006

By 

Dennis Littrell (SoCal) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: The Islamic Shield: Arab Resistance to Democratic and Religious Reforms (Paperback)

Although this book could use a good editor and some serious proofing--there are needless repetitions, some quizzical expressions, inconsistent spellings and capitalizations, hard-to-read tables, and a whole slew of typos--I still give it five stars because it is otherwise a great piece of work.

Elhadj writes with a penetrating clarity that eschews most of the usual biases--both Middle Eastern and Western--about what is happening in the Middle East, and explains why democracy and religious reforms are not about to happen there any time soon. His thesis includes the important insight that it is Arabic culture that is resisting change as much as, if not more than, Islam itself. After all, there are Islamic democracies--but they are not in Arab lands.

Elhadj makes the case that it is the interpretations of clerics more than the content of the Quran itself that has inspired the Islamic terrorists. He draws a distinction between moderate Muslims, orthodox Muslims, and jihadist Muslims. He says that there are three factors--Islamic extremism, tyranny by Arab rulers, and the Israeli and American occupation of Arab lands--that are "driving moderate Muslims into orthodoxy, and orthodox Muslims into Jihadism and terrorism..." (p. 13) He presents solutions to this "vicious-cycle" including reforms by the Ulamas who interpret Islam, reforms by autocratic regimes, and a one-state solution to the Israeli/ Palestinian conflict.

However, the reform of the clerics is not likely to happen, and certainly autocratic rulers do not voluntarily give up their power, and a one-state solution has never been acceptable to the Israelis and the Palestinians. Result? The situation in the Middle East is likely to get worse before it gets better.

Elhadj is particularly critical of the America invasion of Iraq. He gives the American "objectives" as seen from an Arab perspective:

"The first objective is to control Iraq's 113 billion barrels of proven oil reserves." In support of this objective (denied by the Bush administration and its supporters, but obvious to just about everybody else in the world), Elhadj notes that on the day Baghdad fell, "US troops proceeded to protect the Ministry of Oil while mobs nearby were not prevented from looting and burning other government ministries and libraries, museums, and colleges." (p. 199)

The second objective, "is to hand US corporations billions of dollars in business contracts to reconstruct Iraq's war ravaged infrastructure..."

"The third objective aims at bolstering Israel's security. To the Arab mind, destroying any Arab asset would benefit Israel."

"The fourth objective is to use Iraq as a base to change the regimes in Damascus and Tehran and to warn other countries not to oppose US interests."

"The fifth objective is the Arabs' belief that American Evangelists [sic] interpretations of the Old Testament to expedite the second coming of Christ plays a major role in influencing the Bush Administration's policy against Iraq."

Elhadj sees the sixth objective as a personal vendetta held by President Bush against Saddam Hussein since Hussein plotted to kill his father.

And finally, he believes Arabs see the invasion of Iraq as the beginning of a war against Islam to replace the Cold War and to foment sectarian war between Sunnis and Shiis. (pp. 170-171)

For the record I agree that objectives one, two, five, and part of seven are likely true, but tend to disagree with the others. Certainly a replacement for the Cold War is an enticement for Bush and the military establishment. After all, a war unites the populace at home behind the government. And of course the military and those who supply the military like to see their soldiers and equipment tested under actual combat conditions. On the other hand, sectarian war between Sunnis and Shiis does not further American interests in the Middle East. What America really wants in the Middle East is stability.

Elhadj explains some of the many fine distinctions made between what the Prophet said or didn't say, and what he really meant, as interpreted by various Islamic Ulama. For some this is an important part of the book. For those of us who hear this sort of thing all the time regarding Christianity, it tends to make the eyes glass over. The difference between the largely symbolic and the literal interpretations of the Bible as well as the differing spins are rather too well experienced, and largely irrelevant to our problems. The real solution--as Elhadj suggests--is to abandon the parts of these religions that are out of step with the modern reality and especially those that call for violent solutions.

Of more interest are the chapters comparing Islam in Wahhabi Saudi Arabia and Islam in more secular Syria. Elhadj allows us insights into the political, social, and economic realities in those countries.

However I thought the chapter on solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was less than convincing. Elhadj proposes a one-state solution but doesn't show how that might come about. There is also a slight Muslim bias in his expression. For example, he writes, "The fact that 850,000 Jews emigrated from the Arab world on the eve of Israel's creation is an indication that these people must have found it agreeable to live with Muslims under Muslim rule for centuries before leaving." (p. 158) A better interpretation would be that the fact that they left their homes for an uncertain place in a new land suggests just the opposite.

Elhadj sees the "root cause of the Arab Israeli dispute...in the fear that grips the Arab World..." He says that Arabs believe that the two lines on the Israeli flag indicate that Israel wants to occupy all the land between the Nile and the Euphrates rivers and that this frightens Arabs. (p. 158)

I could argue against this notion but I am running out of space. The best thing to do is read this important book yourself and experience a different point of view, some with which you may agree, and some with which you may not.

8 of 8 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Where are the flowers and cheers in Baghdad?, October 13, 2006

By 

Ikhwan Choe (Seattle, WA - USA) - See all my reviews

This review is from: The Islamic Shield: Arab Resistance to Democratic and Religious Reforms (Paperback)

Flowers and cheers for the US troops marching into Baghdad -- this is what Vice President Cheney blithely promised. It was a pleasing thought to entertain on the eve of a problematic war. However, the author of The Islamic Shield, with his intimate knowledge of the Middle East, would have found the frivolity of such a thought appalling: "Arab frustration over American Middle Eastern policies since the late 1950s have gradually transformed Arab admiration and affection towards American egalitarianism, sense of justice and fair play into dislike, and then into hatred. It is as if each one of the victors' triumphs has scarred the collective memory of the Arab generations. It is as if the effects of the events that humiliated Arab pride and sensibilities have been accumulating in the Arab minds and psyche well after the victors had thought that they got away with their attack. It is as if every man, woman, and child killed, every young man's bones crushed, every home bulldozed, and every tree uprooted kept accumulating in the Arab collective memory and psyche until a critical mass of humiliation and anger was reached." Obviously, there is dissonance of memory between the victim and the victimizer. The US troops marched in, and were met by bullets and bombs. They still are. It was insane to expect flowers to grow and cheers to rise on such a terrain.

Had The Islamic Shield been in print a few years earlier and had certain key decision makers actually had the curiosity to read it, perhaps we would have been spared the glib litany of democracy and freedom overnight, if not the war itself. Briskly and incisively, the author lays out a whole gamut of Arab behaviors, practices, and institutions that stubbornly keep the Arab world what it is now, or rather what it has been for centuries. The problem of the undemocratic political culture of the Arab world is compounded by the pervasive influence of an immobile religious orthodoxy. Repeated foreign intrusions only made matters worse. Needless to say, this way of shorthand summation does not do justice to the author's finely discriminating handling of the subject. For example, he highlights the contrast between the Arab Muslim states and the non Arab Muslim states and rejects the careless generalization of the Muslim world at large. He also compares the political tyranny of Saudi Arabia with that of Syria, and shows why the most violent expression of Arab frustration had to come from a particular religious ideology nurtured in Saudi Arabia.

Dr. Elie Elhadj, the author, had a successful career in banking before he decided to immerse himself in a scholarly pursuit. The way he conceived this book reveals a cast of mind fashioned in the crucible of the world of practical affairs. He doesn't seem particularly interested in exhaustive description or analysis for its own sake; rather he is intent on determining the nature of the problems and on how to solve them. Part I is a comprehensive analysis of the various forces which have shaped the contemporary Arab reality. This is followed in Part II by a discussion focused on today's most burning issue, namely, the Jihadist terror. The author offers four possible strategies to counter Jihadist terrorism. These are: (1) taming religious orthodoxy; (2) removing the domestic spark through democratic governance and poverty alleviation; (3) removing the foreign spark by solving the Arab Israeli conflict; and (4) removing the foreign spark by ending the US occupation of Iraq. These are, to say the least, daunting propositions. To begin with, where are the necessary political wisdom and courage to be found? The author does not say. All the same, we are indebted to him for the questions he asks. Without consideration of them, there is no path out of the conundrum of the Middle East.