Customer Reviews

The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War

5 star:		(3)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

I've read many books on the Israel/Palestine conflict (Smith, Tessler, Bickerton/Klausner, etc.) but this one is by FAR the best. First, it's actually fun to read. Gelvin writes as if he is there in the room having a conversation. The book is peppered with jokes and wry observations, and although Gelvin obviously knows his way around the academic world, there is none of the usual academic jargon. Second, most historians present history as one disconnected thing after another. Gelvin states a theme at the beginning of the book and sticks to it. For Gelvin, the conflict has had three phases: the first involved the initial encounter between two peoples (Jewish settlers and Arabs); the second began in 1948 when it was defined as an interstate "Arab-Israeli conflict" and the Palestinian question dropped off the map for most of the world (except the PLO); the third began in 1993 when Israelis and Palestinians recognized each other and brought the conflict full circle. This should be obvious, yet no one else I've read has said this directly. Also, the author keeps reminding the reader of the global context for the conflict, from the emergence of nationalism in Europe and its impact on Jews and Arabs in the nineteenth century to the impact of the end of the Cold War.
This is definitely a five star book, but I can see how it will drive some people nuts (i.e. those who can't bring themselves to use the words "Palestine" or "Palestinian" in their reviews). Zionists claim their nationalism is special, but Gelvin points out that it is pretty much a typical 19th century nationalism: it reconstructs Jewish history in its image, it insists that Jews have a right to establish a sovereign state on a piece of land they ruled thousands of years ago, etc. But all nationalisms do the same thing. What will really drive people nuts is that Gelvin shows how much Zionism and Palestinian nationalism resemble each other: both invent traditions, both claim to fulfill their peoples' national destinies, both have used terror to accomplish their goals. Gelvin doesn't let the Zionists off the hook, but he doesn't let the Palestinians off the hook either. Just read his analysis of the PLO doctrine of armed struggle or his profile of Arafat. His argument here is simple: while both national movements have a lot to answer for, if you accept the right of Jews or Palestinians to self-determination, you really can't ignore the right of the other side to self-determination either.
One small criticism: I read another book by this author (The Modern Middle East) in which he added inserts with anecdotes and stories that were related to points raised in the main text. They were a really good read, and I wish he did the same in this book.

Like Gelvin's other general readership work, The Modern Middle East (Oxford University Press, 2005), this is more an analytical essay than traditional textbook. In a field of study that is almost impossibly broad, this work aims to center on central themes and problems rather than a step-by-step narrative of events. More than anything else, reading this work is like sitting down with a very smart, very knowledgeable person for many cups of coffee: you learn a lot, but a lot gets breezed by as well. And the time passes quickly.

This emphasis on the "big picture" is both the book's greatest strength and its most significant weakness. Although aimed at undergraduates and a general audience, without recourse to other works, the reader may not feel that they have a sufficient grasp of chronology or of major actors. For this reason, readers may well find a basic textbook like those by Charles Smith or Mark Tessler to be of value. At the same time, what this work offers - far more than any other work that I know of - is an understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict as rooted in the very modern problem of nationalism. In a field that often gets caught up in the details or polemics, this broad approach is both engaging and intellectually provocative, offering the reader a means of seeing the Arab-Israeli conflict in a broader context than is generally offered.

Gelvin's breezy style is, at times, too dismissive and, while he argues that both Zionism and Palestinian nationalism are both modern constructions, his fundamental sympathy for the Palestinian cause is clear. This "imbalance" will, no doubt, engage some readers and annoy others. Regardless of political inclinations, however, there are few readers, either novice or specialist, who would not benefit from a careful reading of this engaging and important survey.

As an amateur historian, I appreciate it when I read a book that takes an over-exposed subject and makes it fresh. Gelvin is a superb historian and writer as well as a polymath who is entirely comfortable writing about politics, literature, international exhibitions, poetry, and world history. He uses a short story by the Jewish-Austrian writer Joseph Roth to investigate how and why European Jews turned to nationalism, archaeological evidence to describe how nationalisms like Zionism remake national histories, Palestinian poetry to elaborate the experience of exile, and biographical sketches (Theodor Herzl, Ariel Sharon, Yasir Arafat, Mahmoud Darwish) to make history come alive. His writing is fluent, witty, and never pedantic. I almost felt guilty reading a book this enjoyable about such a bloody and endless conflict.

Clearly written in a conversational tone Gelvin's book serves as an excellent framework for understanding the history the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. What sets it apart from many other books is its willingness to look into factionalism on both sides.

On the Zionist side he correctly notes the schism between Labour Zionists and the 'Revisionist' stream. To some extent he underplays the Altalena incident - he states that Irgun ship was shelled by Ben Gurion and omits the fact that it was sunk in order to force the submission of the Irgun to main stream Haganah views, however he follows up by relating that the rift doesn't become symbolically healed until 1964 when Jabotinsky's body is reburied in Israel.

On the Palestinian side he notes the factional violence between the Palestinian clans. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire the primary focus of the local Arabs was not a local nationalism but an orientation towards a Greater Syria based in Damascus. (pp97-98) Gelvin shows the gradual reorientation to a local nationalism as a result of the split by the League of Nations into areas administered by France and Britain. Gelvin also correctly parses Golda Meir's statement "there <<was>> no such thing as Palestinians" (much misquoted as "are") as a reference to a time in the 1930's when Jews identified themselves as Palestinians and the local Arabs activists identified themselves as part of some pan-Arab movement. What might have been more illuminating would have been a discussion of the alliances, some temporary, some permanent between Druze, Bedouin and Palestinian clans with the Zionists.

The book could also be improved in its coverage of the planned pattern of expulsion and dispossession of Mizrahi and Sephardi Jews from Arab lands. Mostly middle class in their countries of origin, they were forced to liquidate their assets to survive and were unable to take the proceeds (or much more than the clothes on their back) with them at a time that the State was not well equipped but obligated in its founding principles to take them in, which it did so willingly and without question. Undoubtedly they were disadvantaged over previous waves of immigration but the main story is that by and large they formed their own relationships, power bases and integration into the Israeli body politic and in this sense are no different than immigrant communities elsewhere.

I do have problems with Gelvin's coverage of the 1982 Lebanon war and after. Here he chooses to channel Avi Shlaim's point of view rather than developing his own voice and it comes off sounding inauthentic. Though the main reason for the war was Palestinian terrorist raids from Lebanon against Israeli communities in the north the secondary reason was to protect Lebanon's Maronite community from sectarian violence so that they could act as a permanent buffer. The massacre at Sabra and Shatilla was the primary reason for the failure of partnership between Israel and the Phalangists due to moral outrage within Israel. It was deemed better to have no partner at all than one that could commit such atrocities.

In spite of these criticisms I find Gelvin's book fair and far ranging. His coverage of the early years of the Yishuv and of the Ottoman collapse are succinct. His use of Palestinian/Israeli poetry to discuss current sentiments is a bit quirky but it works. The middle years showing the relationship of the Palestinians to various Arab governments needs a bit more fleshing out IMHO. He is willing to examine nuances such as the differences between Hamas in Gaza vs. Hamas in the West Bank and the position of rival factions. He also challenges conventional notions that anti-Zionist sentiment was solely Islamic. While it is true that the 1929 Arab riots were started over (falsified) claims that Jews were trying to take over the Al Aqsa mosque compound there were many religious Muslims who were friends to the Jews and Gelvin points out that some of the more radical 1930's anti-Zionist spokesmen came from Christian communities.

My copy is the 2nd edition. In future revisions I hope he will expand more on this kind of analysis. As a college text or for a reading club it would serve as a good jumping off point for further discussions and investigations. Recommended.

Gelvin is a professor who knows plenty of facts. But that does not stop him from misleading his readers in this piece of propaganda.

This book does have some really interesting material in it. Some of it is about Masada. Here, the author complains that the traditional Masada story is pretty far off. I tend to agree with much of what Gelvin says here. But I also feel that Gelvin is wrong to imply that Masada is being used as an excuse by Jews for the policies of Israel. I think Israeli policies are typically driven by a desire of Israel to protect the rights of its citizens.

The author discusses Golda Meir's comments about the Levantine Arab nation not having existed prior to 1967. Gelvin and I disagree here: he says that Meir's claim was absurd, while I say it was accurate. As a matter of fact, I think the Levantine Arabs still do not behave like a nation. They do not ask for rights for themselves. They do not ask for land. They ask only for less rights for Jews. They are more like the Sudeten Germans, who did not ask for independence, but merely for an end to Czech independence. Or the Ku Klux Klan, which does not ask for freedom for Whites, but an end to freedom for Blacks.

Gelvin spends some time discussing the Levantine Pavilion at the 1939 New York World's Fair. This exhibit looked like an idealized Jewish "tower and stockade" construction. And I found the whole section quite interesting. But I was shocked that Gelvin did not appear to take a strong stand against the way the British were treating the Jews at the time. As I see it, the British White Paper of 1939 was one of the most obviously evil acts of a rather wicked twentieth century. I can't imagine why anyone would want to appear to be neutral about it. But Gelvin implies that the Jews should have been more moderate, at a time when we can all see that moderation was totally unsuccessful in preventing a truly huge disaster in which millions of Jews were murdered. That's quite a view to take.

Just to make sure that we readers can be sure where Gelvin stands, he then whitewashes the "poetry" of racist thugs such as Mahmoud Darwish. And he casually mentions that the Jews took land that belonged to the Arabs. But wait a second. Does all land belong to the Arabs? Even land that wasn't Arab before, or was sold by the Arabs to others? Gelvin is misleading his readers quite badly here by implying that all of the Levant was (and is) rightfully Arab land. And he has to know better than that.

In my opinion, if the Arabs want peace, they can have it in five minutes, just by calling off their war and abiding Jewish rights in the region. I suspect the Jews truly want peace, even one that may not be totally fair to them. But it doesn't matter: the Jews would have no choice but to accept such a peace, since they need peace to survive and prosper.

I think we need some scholarly works on the Arab war against Israel, rather than all the propaganda we see. And I think that Gelvin knew enough material to write such a book. Unfortunately, he did not write that book. He wrote this one.