Customer Reviews

Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America (Policy Papers (Washington Institute for Near East Policy), No. 58.)

5 star:		(13)
4 star:		(0)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(2)
1 star:		(5)

 

 

Martin Kramer's monograph had its genesis before September 11, but its opportune arrival directly raises the question of how 2,600 specialist academics from 125 American universities and colleges had practically nothing to say - except after September 11 - about Bin Laden?

Kramer's monograph answers this question by placing it in the context of the ideological transformation of Middle Eastern studies since the Second World War.

As Kramer shows, the field was originally an antiquarian and linguistic guild that after the Second World War became highly politicized, dominated by sociologists and political scientists, and by 1966, embodied in the Middle East Studies Association of North America (MESA).

Kramer demonstrates that Middle Eastern studies has been characterized by political advocacy of Arab nationalism that specialists view as a beneficent force in a Middle East which they hold to be a region of burgeoning modernization.

Kramer's does not encompass a detailed aetiology of these ideas (which can be traced in large part to the Englishmen Arnold Toynbee and Sir Hamilton Gibb) but explains well the effects of these notions.

Kramer indicates how the discipline suffered a crisis of confidence in the late 1970s, which spawned the "triumph" of Edward Said's seminal work, Orientalism (1978). Said's work, as Kramer shows, was a pungent critique of Western scholarship, producing a new discipline called post-colonialism, which regarded all previous Western scholarship as a tool of Western dominance which deprived Middle Eastern societies of their own narrative, fostered racist assumptions and stimulated discriminatory practices. This new orthodoxy now accused "Zionists" like Bernard Lewis, and even Arab nationalist champion Gibb himself, of committing this alleged heresy.

But as Kramer ably shows, the new orthodoxy has not stood the test of time, with MESA failing to accurately predict Middle Eastern developments. The progressive forces expected to overthrow oppressive American Cold War arrangements, as Kramer shows, never materialised. Instead we got the decidedly non-secular, revivalist Islam offered to Muslims with Iran's fall to Khomeini in 1979.

Few MESA members, Kramer also notes, had anything useful to say about Saddam Hussein, who invaded and annexed Kuwait before MESA was inspired to consider his brand of Ba'athist Arab nationalism malevolent. These specialists, Kramer also shows, forecast disaster for what was instead a decisive US intervention in Kuwait that reaffirmed American prestige.

In answer to his critics, Kramer would concede that even the finest specialist cannot necessarily predict the choices of men. But he sees in Middle East specialists a more pervasive deficiency. For world wide, they mysteriously viewed Saddam as capable and likely to carry the enthusiasm of the Arab world when, given the opportunity of Desert Storm, his army deserted in droves and his subject peoples rebelled.

Kramer also indicates that the series of American policy errors in the 1990s - leaving Saddam in place, decamping from the scene of American blood-lettings, chartering an open-ended Israeli-Palestinian peace process dependent on the probity of Yasser Arafat - were inspired largely by the orthodox MESA attitudes.

Readers interested in how post-colonial texts serve as ammunition for Islamists and a handicap for secularist reformers in the Middle East, will find much of interest in Kramer's book. One example: Malcolm Kerr, one of the few MESA members not to have prevented his abiding concern for the Arab world to dispel his misgivings about Orientalism, was gunned down in 1984 outside his office in Beirut. He had become two years before president of the American University of Beirut. "There is surely irony," writes Kramer, that Said and the "progressive" scholars ... should have delegitimised the one university in the Arab world where academic freedom had meaning, thanks to its American antecedents."

Kramer duly notes that Said was later to say he regretted the enthusiastic reception of his book by the Islamists. But Kramer also observes that Said failed to explain why his writings were received thus, and Said's confessed inability to explain Islam to the West is a remarkably candid disclosure - which is widely neglected.

Kramer rightly devotes attention to the ascendancy of John Esposito, who progressed from a remote scholar on the fringes of Middle Eastern studies to its epicentre in the mid-1990s. Kramer defines Esposito's winning formula as the ability to produce scholarly and favourable volumes on Islam and Islamic society, shorn of Said's rancid anti-American and post-colonial baggage, and tailored to the needs of college texts. He refurbished the Islamist phenomenon as representing democratic, participatory movements, thereby sanitising them for the public and confounding patterns of social tension in the Middle East with those in democracies.

Kramer credits Esposito with popularising much of the outlook and attitudes of the post-colonial school and thus duplicating with the US government and public Said's success with the academy. As Kramer shows, Esposito has been duly followed by Augustus Richard Norton, whose new doctrine holds that `civil society' in the Middle East is the wave of the future that threatens to uproot Middle Eastern despotisms.

Only such a doctrine, Kramer notes, could explain the appearance of historian John Voll before a US congressional committee in 1992. Voll argued, apparently with seriousness, that Sudan was a democracy when in fact it was (and remains) governed by a junta without political parties and the scene of savage persecution of Christians and animists.

As Kramer's readers will infer, we presently find ourselves at a potential crossroads, where matters could take a new course. In short order we have witnessed the collapse of Oslo, September 11, the speedy American military successes in Afghanistan, and subsiding Islamist fervour in the wake of demonstrated Western resolve. Kramer's monograph provides a timely explication of the larger and detailed issues involved. Its hostile reception at the latest MESA Conference forewarns us how it will be resisted. But as Kramer amply demonstrates, resisting the duty to deconstruct ideological fixations among Middle Eastern specialists has impoverished the field and misled government and now is not the time to compound the error.

The topic, at first glance, is very narrow. This is not a book about how to study the Middle East, nor about American academia, but about the intersection of these: how the Arab Middle East in fact is and has been studied in American universities.

Once this narrow focus is understood and accepted by the reader, there is a fascinating read here. Kramer is very knowledgeable about the inner workings of "Middle Eastern Studies," and more particularly about the Middle East Studies Association (MESA). The story he has to tell is actually more entertaining than most of the novels with academic settings, and the humor more mordant, because it is all true, alas. The second chapter about Edward Said is worth the price of the book.

Of course the Marxists and other Israel-bashers won't like this book -- it tells us too much about them.

That said, there are regretful lacunae in Kramer's book. It would seem that "area studies," of which the Middle Eastern is but one, can lend themselves to superficiality perhaps more than the traditional disciplines of history, language study, sociology, religious studies, etc. Kramer is a bit evasive on this. And Kramer is also a tad too fond of social science jargon. "Paradigm," a word introduced with the present meaning by Thomas Kuhn back in 1962, appears on practically every page of Kramer's book. Kuhn himself, in the second edition of his book, in 1970, found himself obliged to clarify his meaning.

But these are minor quibbles. I learned a great deal from this book, especially about the pretensions of (some of) America's academics. Five stars here, well earned.

An important and extensively documented expose of the inadequate scholarship and extreme political bias of Edward Said, John Esposito, et al. Notice that most of the reviews posted here are not asessments of the book itself, but mere expressions of the political opinions of the reviewers. If you have questions about the debate over Israel and the Arabs, about why they hate us, about Islam, or about Edward Said and Orientalism, read this book. It will explain to you who is writing what and with what sort of goal in mind. Then you can decide for yourself.

A much needed declaration on the failures of Middle East scholarship. Academia has continued on its liberal path to build a Middle East paradigm rooted in hegemony and keeping up with the most modern intellectual jargin while ignoring the real situation in the Middle East. If the professors of Middle East Studies and MESA were more competant their opinions would be heralded througout America. However, MESA and academia aim at subverting those that do not buy into the dominant paradigm that America is imperalistic. Kramer dismantles this innaccurate paradigm in an accurate and revolutionary way.

Middle East Academia on college campuses has become a uniform mass saying in unison that imperialistic America's foreign policy has created this "Oriental" attitude that patronizes the Middle East. The academics reply they are simply telling the truth. I have yet to see a Middle East country not accept American aid. Middle East scholars have missed the reality boat on the Middle East. Where is the scholarship on Middle East terrorism? Fundamentalist Islam? Kramer is brutal, but honest in this assault and anyone thinking about Middle East Studies as an academic discipline must read this first!

This is the book that many Middle East "experts" don't want you to read precisely because its arguments are so completely accurate and devastatingly true. Kramer has been vilified because his arguments cannot be challenged. This well-documented and finely written study is the best history of Middle East studies ever written. It explains why America has been psychologically unprepared and misinformed in approaching every major crisis in that region down to the present one.

Martin Kramer provides abundant evidence that the politically correct Leftists dominate the academic field of Middle Eastern Studies in the United States. These individuals are also intellectually incompetent and possess an intense hostility toward the values of Western Civilization. The author quotes esteemed scholar Bernard Lewis as deploring the painful fact that "Professional advancement in Middle East studies can be achieved with knowledge and skill well below what is normally required in other more developed fields or more frequented disciplines, where standards are established and maintained by a large number of competent professionals over long periods." The situation has worsened considerably since the 1978 publication of Edward Said's "Orientalism" which essentially perceives most Middle Eastern scholarship as bigoted imperialistic attacks upon the Muslim world. All cultures are basically equal and it is outrageous, according to Said, to claim that the West has surpassed the Islamic nations in all of the sciences, literature, and the arts. However, it is impossible to hold Said's position without ignoring the solidly established truth concerning the 500 year decline of the followers of Mohammed. This collapse occurred long before the so-called Western imperialists directly impacted the events and decisions of the Muslim leaders of the Middle Ages. Scapegoating the West is absurd and illogical. Martin Kramer seems to shy away from pointing out Said's tacit, if not explicit, Marxist intellectual underpinnings. Needless to add, I have no such reluctance. It is virtually impossible to understand these Leftist academics unless one addresses the Marxism pervading their writings.

Kramer warns that the radical Liberal Middle Eastern academic agenda is politically motivated. These academics feel uncomfortable with the very notion of objective and disinterested scholarship. Instead, they prefer to embrace the thinking of Michael Foucault who argues that truth really doesn't exist and ultimately those in power mandate what is to be the accepted interpretation of any given set of facts. Should we still be pessimistic even after the attacks of 9/11? Haven't Liberal academics like John Esposito been thoroughly humiliated by their gross underestimation of the threat of Islamic militancy? Isn't their day in the sun over because the general public is now aware of their malicious shenanigans? Alas, the author fears that these Leftist extremists are solidly ensconced within their academic departments. It is therefore incumbent upon us to consistently take them to task when they fall into error. The intellectual wars must not be avoided if we are to have any chance whatsoever in fighting the war on terrorism. You must read Martin Kramer's "Ivory Towers on Sand" if you truly desire to comprehend what is at stake. A visit to the author's new web site, Campus Watch, should be strongly considered. Moreover, it is also incumbent upon you to do your share in this battle for the hearts and minds of the students attending these universities. We are not morally allowed to sit on the sidelines.

Nearly all major historical events are unforeseen by the experts. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, the fall of the USSR and the terror attacks on the US by the Al-Qaeada fanatics are cases in point.

Martin Kramer has taken advantage of this truism to write a polemical "expose" of the Middle East academic establishment in the form of the Midde East Studies Association (MESA) in the US. He charges that they were blinded by pro-Muslim and pro-Arab bias. Kramer further charges that the field was left to Muslims and Arabs following Edward Said's intimidating attack on orientalism.
However, Kramer does not offer any proof of how the WTC attack could have been foreseen. If Bernard Lewis and other academics did warn of impending catastrophe nonetheless, why weren't their views taken into account? The thesis that the US discounted Islamist terrorism entirely is incorrect, since both the former Bush administration and the Clinton administration kept close tabs on Bin Laden and other Islamist groups, and sought actively to contain them. True, maximum resources were not devoted to the threat. However, at any given time there are a large number of potential threats, and there is no objective way of knowing which particular one will become a reality.
The September 11, 2001 attacks were surprise attacks. As the Americans learned at Pearl Harbor in 1941, and as the Israelis learned on Yom Kippur 1973, there is nothing quite as dismally surprising as a surprise attack. Furthermore, in each case it is possible to show how the "sure warning signs" were missed or ignored due to negligence or incorrect conceptions. But such attacks are always based on the premise that the victim is off guard and has incorrect conceptions.
Kramer does no analysis whatever of the actual course of events, and gives us no explanation of what sure signs were missed. He expends all of the meagre pages of this book questioning the credentials and objectivity of virtually everyone who has written about the Middle East in the US in the last 20 years except "friendlys."

If Kramer knew the truth about the attacks and about Islamism, why didn't he publish his book on September 10, 2001? Undoubtedly, it would have been more valuable.

The fact is, that living in Israel, and being exposed to a host of non-MESA studies and evaluations of the Middle East, I never came across a prediction that the next batch of trouble would come from Osama Bin Ladin. Hardly anyone heard of Al-Qaeada. Everyone was betting on Iraq and Iran as the next arch-villains of the Middle East.

There is no doubt that much of the US Middle East academic establishment are guilty of reflex anti-Zionism, and many may have a roseate view of Islam and the Arab world. On the other hand, a glance at the Staff of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, reveals that it is top-heavy with Zionist sympathizers and has no Arabs at all.

Middle Eastern studies are not necessarily the exclusive province of Arabs or Muslism, but it is hard to see how cannot hope to study the Middle East objective without involving any Arabs at all.
Academics who have a valid contribution to make can best prove it by making that contribution, rather than by tearing down their colleagues.

To sum up, it is a lot of money for 150 pages of polemical dysinformation. Unless you are deeply involved in the field, know some of the players, or perhaps need a remedy for low blood pressure, spend your money elsewhere in my opinion.

Ami Isseroff, D.Sc.
MidEastWeb for Coexistence

Charles D. Smith's negative review must be taken with a grain of salt. His own book, "Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," is clearly biased against Israel. For example, it takes pains to catalogue Israel's alleged violations of Oslo while ignoring the Palestinians' far more serious actual violations, and that is only one example of the bias that runs throughout his book. Smith's book is a good example of what Kramer is criticizing, so his review does not come as a surprise.

Kramer's work is a necessary corrective to the direction that much modern "scholarship" has taken in this field. It's about time.

Okay, so the style is a bit polemic, and far from smooth. The content is explosive. Kramer relates how our univeristies allowed themselves to sponsor second-rate scholarship by men and women whose agenda it was to paint the entire Muslim wolrd as a place where an eitire race was being opressed by western chauvinism. Because chairs in Middle Eastern studies were generously funded by Arab oil states, univeristies granted tenure to scholars whose work was decidedly inferior, work that would not have passed minimal standards of scholarship in any other department of the university. Because these men and women were imbued with post-colonial theore (ie. the theory states that everything that is bad in the Middle East is the fralut of former colonial powers,) they were unable to take a clear-eyed look at the Middle East and spot, for example, the fact that many Islamists were bent on violence. Shame on Harvard.

I have been a student of the Middle East and Canadian studies for many years. I have always been shocked by the difference between the two fields. Unlike their Canadian counterparts, Middle Eastern academics seem subsumed by the politics of the region. More times than not, a student gets the sense that academics are writing not about the situation as it is, but rather, the situation as they would like it to be.

Dr. Martin's work provides a much needed context from which to view North American based Middle Eastern studies. His eloquent arguments and his ability to contextualize different paradigms of Middle Eastern thought provided some much needed context to my academic studies and for that, I am extremely grateful.

I can say, without reservation, that this is the most inspired and original work dealing with Middle Eastern Studies that I have ever read. I look forward to Dr. Martin's future projects with great anticipation.