18 of 19 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
A very good book for one with some background, January 4, 2003
This review is from: Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) (Paperback)
This volume tells a very important part of the story of the Japanese Army and its part in dragging the nation into a catastrophic war. It is well and clearly written and generally quite strong in its sources. It is not the first book one should read about interwar Japan and its march to war, since it really does not present a rounded view of Japanese politics and the army as an institution. But for someone who understands the general background, it is fascinating and useful.
One caution: in common with many books written by specialists in Japanese history, it presents a very distorted picture of the mindset and actions of the Roosevelt administration. The central problem is an implicit assumption that Japan was the central concern when in fact its importance to FDR and his lieutenants lay in its relationship to the problem of Hitler. Deprived of this context, the actions of the administration are truly inexplicable.
Will O'Neil
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1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Hard to find but well worth the effort, October 20, 2010
This review is from: Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) (Paperback)
Michael A. Barnhart's modest-sized study is one of the finest available to non-Japanese speaking/reading students of the Pacific War, and although not without judgements with which one may rightly quibble, is indispensable in the long run. Within a mere 270 pages Barnhart traces Japan's catastrophic road to triumph & ruin; from the egoistic smallscale victories of Manchuria through the fatal decision to enlarge the China Incident, followed by disaster at Nomonhon, thence down a dark path contorted by fatal, and astonishingly irrational, interservice rivalries that eventually lead to Shinjuwan and Hawai sakusen.
I would disagree with the assessment made by Barnhart--in which he echoes Akira Iriye--that Japan did not hold the reins to its own fate...as I would with some of his conclusions about Japan's successes based upon "peaceful competition" in the postwar world. The book's tone is moderate, unemotional, and scholarly throughout; this is agreeable enough for those in search of the Truth of Accountants, but it utterly fails to capture the more sinister, paranoiac weltanschauung of Japan's leaders and populace during the era...Nonetheless, by & large this book is masterful, and no serious student of the Pacific War, let alone the causes that led to the conflict, can afford to do without it.
Apart from these minor criticisms--which should not be read as in any way disparaging--Barnhart cannot be highly commended enough for creating some semblance of rational order from the tangled, ensnarled netherworld of pre-war Japanese military "planning"...In which "plans"--and there were far too many--were less about actual plans than concepts for plans, (and as such bear more than a passing resemblance to more recent military misadventures by the West.) He also manages to identify most---though not all--of the key players in the Japanese army, navy, & civilian government who figured in the events leading up to war. For their arrogance & follies he makes no excuses. He shows as well that those men who were able to argue for a diplomatic settlement, as those who understood Japan's economic frailty, were swept aside like straws in a flood in the reactionary torrent leading to December 8th, 1941.
Finally, the copy I obtained appears to have been reprinted as a paperback in 1998, and was quite inexpensive: page for page one of the very best values possible, IMHO. Highly recommended!
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