Customer Reviews

Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict

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Tragedy has been described as a drama in which the main character is brought to ruin as a consequence of a tragic flaw, moral weakness or inability to cope with unfavorable circumstances. The story of Japan from the moment it was opened up to the West by Commodore Perry until its surrender is, as Hoyt tells it, such a tragedy. The book does an excellent job of describing the context of Western imperialism and Western racism that shaped Japan's perceptions of what it needed to do for national survival, and the chaotic state of affairs where the civilian government could not control and was wholly intimidated by the military ran amok and bent on war with China, the tar baby that eventually consumed Japan and started the sequence of events that led it to war with the United States. Surprisingly, Hoyt makes it clear that up until the time the United States made its oil embargo against Japan, it was the Soviet Union that was enemy number one in the militarist's (including Tojo) strategic thinking, as Japan sought to create a buffer zone around it as well as lands to exploit for natural resources and as markets for its manufactures (in line with the Western colonial system). Most importantly, Hoyt traces the evolution of the mind set of the Japanese government and how, starting with the "China Incident" and followed on with rationalization upon rationalization, it dug an inescapable hole for itself that led to the downfall of the nation. The only complaint is that the writing at times is a bit unsophisticated, but it does not detract from the powerful storytelling.

A number of reviewers have already pointed out the inaccuracies in this book, I would add to that on page 159, it said,"... a pun based on the characters gai ŠQ meaning foreign, and gai ŠO, meaning harm." The two Kanji characters there have been placed wrongly.

Despite the litany of atrocities committed by the Japanese Imperial Army in China, and the clearly stated aim of the Japanes move to the South was to secure the resources of SE Asia, the author concluded the book by saying, "Asia owes a great debt to Japan for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere... More than any other nation, Japan caused the end of colonialism in less than two decades after the war."

Does Hoyt really believe that Japan went to War in SE Asia, against Britain, USA and the Netherlands in order to free the colonial subjects of those nations? If that was their intentions, why did those "colonial subjects" welcome the return of their "colonial masters?"

After the conquest of Singapore, an estimated 50,000 innocent Chinese males were massacred under an operation known as "Sook Ching".

Does Hoyt realise that when the Japanese were ruling Singpapore, any Singaporean, walking past a Japanese solder, has to bow to him, if not he would be slapped or severly beaten up? The Singaporeans never had to do that to the British soldiers when the British were in control. In addition, does Hoyt realise that the cinemas at the time of Japanese control only admitted Japanese, the locals were not allowed? If that was Hoyt's idea of "liberation of the Asian people by Japan", Hoyt has a very strange idea of the meaning of liberation.

I probably shouldn't post a review, since I didn't read this book to the end. I couldn't bear to. The first three chapters on Japanese ancient and feudal history were riddled with misconceptions and plain inaccuracies.

One example of many: The author states that Japan's first emperor, Emperor Jimmu, reigned around 600 A.D. and had to contend with the influx of Buddhism from China. Jimmu was around at least 1200 years before 600 A.D., and he predated Buddhism in Japan by many centuries.

Further, the author repeatedly insists that the samurai class during the Edo (Tokugawa) Period were swaggering warriors who beheaded peasants at the slightese whim. Although the samurai enjoyed many privileges, beheading peasants at will during peacetime was not one of them. The authoritarian Tokugawa government strictly punished any breach of the peace, whether committed by a commoner or a samurai. People of all ranks (including peasants) had at least some level access to the protection of the law and redress in the court system. It's a myth that samurai could kill any commoner at will and with impunity.

I hate to be harsh, but a book about history needs, as a minimum, to be well-researched and have its facts straight. It's difficult to have any faith in the author's analysis and conclusions otherwise. This book purports to be able to trace the rise of Japanese militarism to the psychology and sociology of the feudal samurai, yet it description of the samurai feudal era is spotty. (The book was written in the 1980s, when the U.S. was being economically "invaded" by Japanese business. The book also hints at being able to explain Japanese business psychology through explaining Japan's Pacific War). If the author wants to find the roots of Japanese militarism in samurai culture, he needs to have had a more in-depth understanding of samurai culture itself.

Quite apart from the history of the war from Japan's viewpoint, this book gives one of the most lucid thumbnail histories of Japan you will find anywhere. It also clearly shows that although we in the West frequently confuse the ethos of bushido with those of chivalry, they were very different.

One of the reviews here mentions the "unsophisticated" style of writing. I don't like that description but I'm not sure I can think of a better one. It struck me as the exuberant writing of a really good high school report--which sounds derogatory but in fact works very, very well here and makes it a pleasant read that draws you on easily. Some of the other criticisms in the reviews I think may be due more to typesetting and proofing than to mistakes by the author. (The aircraft mislabeled is in fact not a Betty at all but due to the twin tail surfaces I believe to be a Nell.) My only criticism of the book would be the illustrations which frequently add nothing to the text. I get the impression they were assembled by someone who hadn't really read the book. The space given to illustrations of Americans is totally wasted. Does anyone who would be reading this book need a picture of Bull Halsey? The fact that there are no substantive criticisms of the book's content in these reviews indicates its excellence.

*Chapter Four

I have read several books on the Pacific portion of WWII. Let me start here with the apparently contradictory statement that despite the fact that there was only one very inadequate map to accompany this book it gave me the best strategic sense of the war in the Pacific I have ever taken away from a history text.

This is certainly a product of a timeline stretching from first European contact in the 17th Century to the end of WWII. Everything is put into context and while I don't agree with a lot of Edwin Hoyt's suppositions, I did enjoy the perspective this overview gave me.

As is probably obvious from my previous comments only the salient tactical points of the war are covered with overall focus being strategic. Also with all the context provided probably only about half of the book is really about the actual war in the Pacific.

To give an example of the richness of understanding to be gained from the overall context take Pearl Harbor. In 1898 against China, 1904 against Russia, and 1917 against Germany, the Japanese struck without a declaration of war. It was a common tactic of the Samurai and had been employed by modern Japan several times. In a 1941 Japan controlled exclusively by the militarists, cut off from oil by a US embargo, and threatened by the industrial potential of the US it seems almost a given that Pearl Harbor would take place.

I did not know that Yamamoto was so opposed to war with the US--only that he had masterminded the Pearl Harbor attack. He was very aware of US industrial power and constantly sought the "decisive battle" with US Naval forces that was still Imperial Navy doctrine even after his assassination by the US. He also knew Pearl Harbor had been a failure when no one else saw it as such because they had failed to destroy any US carriers.

I do find it disconcerting that several reviews say this book is from the Japanese perspective. Hoyt is not Japanese and his theory of why Japan went to war was based on the contradictory points of her desire to be a Neo-Colonial power and to lead Asia out from under the White Man's yoke. He claims the Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was actually a credible attempt by the Japanese to give power back to other Asians and at the end of the book implies that the war almost justified the freeing of Asian peoples and that this was really one of Japan's aims. That is a little too much for me to swallow.

Still a very good book though that challenges a lot of assumptions. For example that the Atomic Bomb really didn't make Japan surrender. It was the devastation that the Emperor saw first hand after the Tokyo fire-bombing and his pressure on a weakening military-led government to seek peace. In fact it is a miracle that the military gave with such relative ease and I can only assume that the surrender must have been such a great shame that their will was completely broken for them to acquiesce so complacently.

Another assumption challenged was that kamikazes were a natural expression of the Japanese spirit and war effort. Most commanders were horrified at the idea of people flying to their deaths. Evidently a distinction was made at being prepared to die for the Emperor and setting out with the goal of dying in mind.

At any rate I could go on and on about the wonderful things I learned from this book. Let me just say that other than some annoying repetitions of Japanese slogans, and some questionable suppositions by Hoyt this is a very good history book both in content and the way it is written. If you were to only read one book about the war in the Pacific I would recommend this one.

Carping over Hoyt's historical analysis of Japan leading up to the 19th century aside, Hoyt presents Japan's attempt at imperialism based upon his access to Japan's Official sources. He shows the rise of militarism, especially by the Army and its control of the Japanese Government and the mindset that led to Japan's invasion of Manchuria, China and all that followed. Of most interest to me was how factionalized the military was, how apparently unorganized was its planning and what lack of control the higher ups had over their inferiors, both in the Army and, to a much lesser degree, the Navy.

I had been aware of the Japanese atrocities in Nanking and the Bataan Death March but Hoyt made me aware of the similar atrocities in Hong Kong and Singapore as well as other incidents. I never felt that Hoyt tried to excuse the Japanese behavior but he did show that often it was the result of the actions of local commanders who frequently disregarded the orders of their superiors. In other instances, notably in the Phillipines, Hoyt shows how more compassionate commanders were replaced by more barbaric commanders when Tokyo felt the officers weren't successful enough.

I feel that the book is impressively researched and well written. I am particulary impressed with the description of the changing attitude of the military once it realized that the war was lost and its suicidal phiosophy for itself and the people, starting with the adoption of Kamikaze attacks, first on ships and then against the B-29s. Finally with training for the entire population.

A great book to read together with Toland's book for an understanding of the Japanese mentality that lead them into WWII.

Hoyt's book takes in the entirety of Japan's national grand strategy from the time of Japan's 'opening' by the Americans in 1853, to its destruction by the Americans in 1945. Along the way we are treated to a look at Japan's world view, her national leaders for good or mostly for ill, her overall aims, frustrations, crimes and seemingly inevitable immolation and downfall. Hoyt uses as the basis of his narrative Japan's own declassified 101 volume history of the war, and what we thus have is a departure from the standard Pacific War history as told from the point of view of the United States and her allies. For the most part, it succeeds in bringing a valuable, though by no means flawless, perspective to the subject.

Examining the arc of Japan's development, empire building and destruction does not mean Hoyt is an apologist for Japan's militarist dictatorship; quite the opposite. Hoyt examines in detail the infighting between leading cliques in Japan's government, the role of the Emperor as it waxes and wanes, the connivance of the press and military public relations in spreading lies, disinformation, shamelessly inaccurate propaganda, and radicalizes the youth and people of the nation; the rogue elements of the army as it plunges the nation into foreign adventures the government itself ruled out, ultimately culminating in the China Incident which in the minds of Japan's rulers forced the logic of so much else; and the rationale behind their cynical plans for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japan's various hideous war crimes are touched on often, apparently in insufficient detail for some of the reviewers here, but they are there; so, uncomfortably, are some of the actions perpetrated against the Japanese by the Allies, which in the eyes of the Japanese would certainly also be considered war crimes, such as the deliberate policy of mass murder of civilians in the fire bombing of Japanese cities. The vengeful victor's justice of the war crimes trial in Tokyo forms somewhat of an afterword to the book.

The book's writing is fluid, straight forward, journalistic in nature. Hoyt can be scathing and sarcastic and sometimes arch in covering the actions and motivations of the Japanese leadership as it lurches seemingly unconcerned towards catastrophe; his characterizations of people like Tojo ("stupid") are, shall we say, blunt. It is not true that he somehow is unbalanced in favor of Japan's side, but it IS true that he is unsparing of feelings when he examines Americans such as General LeMay, or what might be seen as inadequate foresight by Roosevelt's foreign policy team. Hoyt is trying to give a balanced view, but again, the book focuses on the view from Tokyo, not from Washington.

This is not the only book the reader should pick up for a good one-volume treatment of the Pacific Theater. However, it is somewhat unusual in its point of view, reads quickly, and gives the reader an appreciation (though certainly no endorsement) of Japan's overall (seriously flawed and criminal though it was) aims and strategy, and why it was doomed to fail.

I was hoping for a good military history/overview of the War from the Japanese perspective, but what I've found is a biased review of the War from the Japanese revisionist perspective.

The book starts well with good narrative of what was going on in the Japanese government leading up the invasion of China and the "China Incident" and how the Army forced its way into control over the government with both intimidation and outright murder of civilian and military leaders. He then goes on to suggest it was Americas "racism" that shifted their focus off of China and the Soviet Union to the Pacific in a quest for material resources (mostly Oil). The narrative quickly goes downhill with incredibly biased claims and accusations towards America and her allies, excuses for Japans behavior during the war, no mention of some of the Japanese Army's most egregious acts towards civilians in China and the Philippines or only a brief passage of such incidents including;

1. No motion of the treatment of civilian Americans during the occupation of Manila.

2. No mention of the indiscriminate shelling of Manila by the Japanese as the Americans began to take the city and the Japanese ran to the hills.

3. Twice proclaiming that the Americans "assassinated" Yamamoto and then stating he was "murdered" by the Americans.

4. The Rape of Nanking illicits a one sentence statement during his discussions of Japanese atrocities in China.

5. The proclamation that the Doolittle Raid did more harm than good for the Chinese. He says many thousands of Chinese were brutally murdered by the Japanese as retribution of hiding the Doolittle flyers. It's as if the Japanese were simply helpless victims of inertia and have no culpability for their actions because of where the planes landed. Never mind their brutal actions against Chinese citizens started long before the Doolittle raid.

6. The firebombing of Tokyo was greater war crime than the rape of Nanking, Bataan Death March, and the use of POW's as slave labor which makes Curtis Lemay a greater war criminal than Tojo (again, 1-sentence discussion of the latter two items).

7. The War crime trials against the Japanese at the end of the war were a sham and most of the convicted were innocent (my comment - no doubt some of them did not deserve hanging and even Nimitz was uncomfortable with the trials).

8. The dropping of the atomic bombs did NOT bring about the end of the war. In fact, he proclaims this to be the greatest myth perpetuated in all of WWII.

9. American Policy's against Japan during their aggressions in China were "racist" in nature. (comment - he completely ignores that the Japanese are some of the more racist people on the planet). While America's treatment of Japanese citizens is nothing to be proud of AFTER they bombed Pearl Harbor, cutting of oil and steel shipments to a country whose forced expansion against non-aggressive neighbors can hardly be called `racist'.

10. No mention of the Japanese use of biological weapons on Chinese citizens. On at least one occasion the Japanese dropped fleas infected with bubonic plague on a Chinese city hoping to set off the plague before the US got into the war.

But the icing on the cake is his claim that rest of Asia has Japan to thank for ending the West's colonialism by starting the war. As if the Japan are now some kind of hero to the rest of Asia for driving out the Americans/Dutch/British (the Philippines was due to take over control of their own country in 1946 - another coviently forgotten fact in his book). Never mind that those same `racist' nations spilled the blood of 1000's of their sons to kick out the Japanese so those newly `freed' nations could have true freedom. Somehow, I don't think the Koreans, Chinese, or Pilippinos are lining up to "thank" the Japanese.

If you want an inside look at the politics of Japan during the war this book will give it to you. Just be ready for the authors obvious bias against the West in conducting a war against a brutal, war-mongering nation bent on the conquest of Asia regardless of the cost.

This is one of the few books that really shines in documenting the Japanese strategy/politics from Meiji period to the end of WWII. The huge scope in this single volume limits the depth of details it can reach. However, it is detail enough for a general reference of all the events involved from Japanese's side point of view. Mr. Hoyt also takes an indifference approach to the subject matter. He not only lambast the rape of Nanking, rape of Hongkong but also General LeLand's bombing of Tokyo, which kills 200,000.

There are also some minor mistakes on this book that leaves a scar in my mind. A few examples:
1. The illustrations have a pictures of the "Betty" bomber. The legend say it is a Type 0 bomber. However, a "Betty" should be a Type 1 bomber.
2. In the middle of book, when he describes the Janpanese army's joke at the foreign minister by claiming him as the harm minister (because of the similar pronounication in Japanese), Mr. Hoyt misplaces the Kanji characters with his explanation. This makes the context and Japanese meaning of the character in opposite.
3. When he refers to the hanging of General Itagaki by the conviction of murdering of the old marshal, he uses Zhang Hsueh-Liang at the end of the book. However, Zhang Tso-Lin was the old marshal while Zhang Hsueh-Liang was the young marshal (Zhang Tso-Lin's eldest son). Surprisingly, he refers them correctly in the middle of the book when he is discussing the murder around in 1936.

As interested as I am in Japanese culture and history, I had some trouble with this book. First, Hoyt does not use the traditional Japanese rendering of names, that is family name first, then given name. That upset me. Soon following that, this book was read under a cloud of suspicion
from page 8 on. I quote from said page, where Hoyt describes the impact of Commodore Perry's visit in 1853, when among Japanese barons was "circulated the letter from American President James Fillmore...", prompting the question "Who the hell is James Fillmore"? When Perry sailed from Norfolk in 1852 the president was Millard Fillmore.

Perhaps I'm picking at nits, but when an American writer can't get the name of a US president correct, that tends to cast a shadow of doubt over everything else he writes. That is a shame, for the book would have been an interesting take on the events described, had I been able to trust Mr Hoyt in the following 415 pages.