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Jesus and the God of Israel: God Crucified and Other Studies on the New Testament's Christology of Divine Identity

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Bauckham argues that Second Temple Judaism was "strict", and that the high Christology of Paul could only be conceived within the context of Jewish monotheism. Both the Shema and the Decalogue make clear statements of monotheism, and in Second Temple era "there is evidence...the passage recited included not only the Shema itself but also the Decalogue. Observant Jews, therefore, were daily aware of their allegiance to the one God alone" (p 5).

In direct contrast to the hierarchy of gods pervasive among the pagans, Jews viewed God as the sole ruler of everything. It is nothing short of amazing that in this culture the highest Christology was present among early Christians "before any of the New Testament writings were written" (p 19).

Bauckham finds that "In the earliest Christian community, Jesus was already understood to be risen and exalted to God's right hand in heaven" (p 128). The Aramaic 'Maranatha' likely dates to the first years after the death of Christ and is an example of this. Doxologies and hymns offer more evidence, found in Paul's epistles, of worship that dates to the first years after the crucifixion.

Earliest Christianity was a mutation, as Hurtado has noted, of Judaism. And what is very strange about that mutation is that the Christians insisted they were still worshiping the one, sole God, while they worshiped Christ.

These are complex essays, rich and rewarding.

This is a superb primary essay (revised from its stand alone book GOD CRUCIFIED earlier)with remarkable supporting essays and further argument about the inherent claims of Christians regarding Jesus and his relation to the monotheistic Jewish worship of one God. The initial book/essay gives the argument in broad strokes while the supporting essays fill in specific substance to the broader strokes. I have learned much from this series of studies and highly recommend it to those interested in the continuity of the claims in regard to Jesus' Divinity arising in the New Testament Church and continuing to this day. In addition to the NT evidence, Bauckham does an outstanding survey of Second Temple monotheism and its interactions with the surrounding Greco-Roman cultural religious mileu. He then demonstrates the ability of the Christians to identify Jesus with God within the monotheistic structure of extant Judaism by dealing with the IDENTITY of God. An excellent discussion of the difference between the conceptualization of identity with God rather than the ontological (nature of) being God opens one's mind to the modes of conceptualization that were available to Jesus, his disciples, and the Church as it understood more and more clearly what it practiced from its earliest days (indeed, from the Resurrection Day!)- the worship of Jesus.

If you were to read only one book of religious study this year, this should be the one. It is thrillingly enlightening and challenging! This is a text which will richly repay multiple readings and from which one may find many references worthy of further consultation. Don't miss it!

Richard Bauckham's book Jesus and the God of Israel: God Crucified and Other Studies on the New Testament's Christology of Divine Identity (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008) appeared after my own recent book on monotheism and Christology, The Only True God: Early Christian Monotheism in Its Jewish Context, had been completed. I thus welcome the opportunity to write this review and continue the conversation between Bauckham and myself on this topic of mutual interest.

Jesus and the God of Israel is not the "big book" on this subject which he is apparently still working on, but rather includes a revised version of his earlier book God Crucified : Monotheism and Christology in the New Testament as well as several other studies, both previously published and forthcoming, several of which those of us who are interested in this topic will have heard him read as conference papers. As Bauckham acknowledges, a thorough and in-depth study of the texts and issues highlighted in this book is still needed, and he does not claim that the present work accomplishes this (pp.x-xi). Nevertheless, it contributes in interesting and exciting ways to the ongoing scholarly exploration of this area. While I am persuaded that Bauckham is wrong about certain key points, I would add that even when he is wrong he is asking excellent questions, and providing interesting and creative answers that will, even when not ultimately persuasive, nevertheless serve to move our thinking forward and open up new and fruitful avenues of inquiry.

Bauckham groups previous approaches to the topic of monotheism and Christology into two main categories (pp.2-3):

1) Those who claim that Jewish monotheism was "strict" in New Testament times, and thus either deny that there is any sort of "divine Christology" in the New Testament, or attribute such a Christology if present to a radical break with Judaism;
2) Those who claim that Jewish monotheism was less "strict" and that its mediator figures and exalted partiarchs provided a precedent for the divinization of Jesus.

Bauckham then goes on to emphasize his differences from both these approaches, being persuaded on the one hand that Jewish monotheism in this period was indeed "strict", while also believing that high Christology was possible in that context (p.3).

The subtitle of Bauckham's book contains the key terminology he has introduced into the scholarly discussion of monotheism and Christology, namely "divine identity". In contrast with previous scholarship that has focused on "function" and/or "ontology", Bauckham seeks rather to focus attention on the question of who God is rather than either what divinity is in the abstract, or what God does (although in fact Bauckham focuses a lot of attention on the latter as intrinsic to his understanding of "divine identity"). If there is one key weakness to Bauckham's work, it is his failure to take the time to clarify in detail what exactly "divine identity" means. At times, it becomes clear that Bauckham's usage of this terminology is far from self-explanatory, and that the phrase does not seem to use "identity" in the way it usually is in English. One common place to encounter it nowadays is of course in referring to identity theft. Bauckham's references to more than one person sharing the "divine identity", and even to an identity that the Son shares with the Father, seems at times to be at odds with the terminology itself (see e.g. pp.3-4, 236, 263, 265). This does not necessarily mean that Bauckham should use other terminology, but it does suggest that more attention needs to be paid to clarifying the meaning of "identity" as he uses it, before we can hope to have this terminology clarify texts from ancient Judaism and Christianity (see p.154 for a helpful discussion of the concept, one which is nevertheless much too brief to justify the concept as the foundation for all that precedes and follows in the book).

Bauckham himself focuses (somewhat ironically, in view of his attempt to get away from earlier categories such as "function") on characteristics of divine identity that are often specifically about what God did and does. Being persuaded (and asserting on numerous occasions throughout the book) that there was a clear line of division between God and all else in Judaism in this period, Bauckham emphasizes, in particular, God's creation of all things and rule over all things as defining the "divine identity" and distinguishing God from all else. The divine name is mentioned as well, as name and identity are obviously closely related. Yet Bauckham spends relatively little time on this most unique facet of the divine identity (no one but YHWH is YHWH, after all!), perhaps because in texts from ancient Judaism (as well as the Samaritans), God's name was something that he seems to have been willing to share with others. The angel Yahoel in Apocalypse of Abraham is the classic example, but if one explores beyond the New Testament period, then the figure of Metatron (referred to in Rabbinic texts as "the little YHWH") also requires consideration, as does the Samaritan notion of Moses' investiture with the divine name. If God is willing to share this arguably most unique facet of the divine identity, what does this suggest about Bauckham's assumption that anyone who is at any point included in the divine identity must, by implication, have eternally been part of that identity? In fact, that line of argument seems to be little more than a restatement of the classic argument that "function implies essence", and seems to provide no better evidence of its truthfulness.

If "identity" is moved beyond the level of the individual to the corporate level, as in the case of family identity, then we can see how such a notion might well fit some of the relevant textual evidence. Family identity can be shared - through marriage or adoption, a new person can be incorporated into a family. Yet, presumably because of a desire to avoid "adoptionism", this manner in which identity might be shared with someone who did not previously possess it remains largely unexplored.

Bauckham rightly emphasizes the role of worship as making the distinction for Jews in practice between the one true God and all others. Exclusive worship gives expression to Jewish belief in God's uniqueness, rather than the divine uniqueness itself being defined in terms of monolatry (pp.5-6, 11-13). Bauckham's assertion on numerous occasions that there was no "gradation" of divinity from God on the top down through an uninterrupted hierarchy is never justified, and once again the irony is that the question of whether there was an absolute difference in essence separating God from all other existing things seems to be an ontological one. If ontology and function are eschewed, and worship is not what distinguishes God from all else but merely a recognition of the distinction, then what does God's distinctiveness consist of? In addition to Philo's definition of the relationship of the Word to both God and creation in a way that suggests there was indeed the sort of ambiguity Bauckham denies (Who is Heir of Divine Things? chapter 42 § 206), later Jewish mystical works illustrate well how emanationism continued to exist in a Jewish context, in conjunction with affirmations of "monotheism", i.e. exclusive devotion to one God. At any rate, Bauckham repeatedly asserts the existence of a clear dividing line, but does not provide the sort of evidence necessary to corroborate the assertions. Although I believe he is correct to identify God's ultimate role as creator and sovereign as key facets of the "unique divine identity", Bauckham's attempts to deny that God shares these prerogatives with others fails to do justice to the evidence.

Bauckham seems to be right to claim that there is a distinctiveness about early Christianity's exalted portrayal of Jesus (p.231). But he is unwilling to entertain seriously the possibility that it is a difference of degree rather than kind. Believing that Jesus is not merely the Anointed One but the one through whom God will reconcile all things to himself, and believing that their salvation had been accomplished during their own time, it is not surprising that the earliest Christians depicted Jesus as God's superlative agent, claiming that Jesus does everything that any divine agent has ever done and more. But ultimately, if we are talking about New Testament times, monotheism is preserved not by including Jesus fully within God's identity (although eventually Christianity would indeed do just that), but by ultimately subordinating Jesus as God's agent to God (and to God alone). Thus in the Gospel of John, Jesus is the Word of God made flesh, the one who has been given the divine name before the creation of the world; but he still does only what he sees his Father do, and calls his Father "the only true God". In Paul, Jesus is exalted to the highest possible rank and given the name above all names; but this is still done "to the glory of God the Father" (Philippians 2:6-11), and in the end God is said to not be among the "all things" subjected to the Son, who in the end hands over the kingdom to the Father, so that "God may be all in all" (1 Corinthians 15).

It would be impossible even to attempt to address every detail of Bauckham's argument here (and I hope to spend some time in the near future working on the Scriptural echoes in key Christological passages and Bauckham's interpretation of them). But a key example should be highlighted, one that remains at the level of assertion. Bauckham says more than once that in 1 Corinthians 8:1-6, "Paul is not adding to the Shema` a 'Lord' the Shema` does not mention. He is identifying Jesus as the 'Lord' whom the Shema` affirms to be one" (p.101; repeated nearly verbatim along with much other material on p.213). Although Bauckham claims that "lord" was "a term which was, in fact, used in many pagan cults" (p.212), he cites no evidence, and thus it remains within the realm of possibility that the "lords" to whom Jesus corresponds in this passage may be those Paul alludes to as being "on earth", human rulers who underwent a post-mortem apotheosis and/or who claimed to rule humans as appointees of God. Moreover, Bauckham's approach often seems to be guilty of "prooftexting": however plausible his interpretation of 1 Corinthians 8:6 might seem in isolation, a glance at the book's index shows that he has made no attempt to take into account and address the subordinationist language Paul uses elsewhere in the same letter (1 Corinthians 15:24-28). This absence is particularly noticeable on p.216, where Paul's use of the language of "all things" is discussed apart from this Pauline clarification. Perhaps most important, however, is the difference between what most interpreters who wish to find in Paul a key step on the road to Nicene Trinitarianism understand Paul to have meant, and what Paul himself wrote. No one claims that Paul wrote that there is "one God, who is Father and Son (and Spirit), and one Lord, who is Son and Father (and Spirit)". And no one, to my knowledge, claims Paul meant that the Father alone is God and that Jesus alone is Lord (even Lord of the Father). And so unless one understands Paul to be adding to the Shema a Lord who is not mentioned therein, but who reigns on God's behalf as Lord of all things other than God himself, presumably the alternative is to say either that Paul is not always consistent, or that he did not express his meaning particularly clearly either here or elsewhere, or that he is indeed redefining monotheism in a radical way, without however ever having felt the need to explain or justify this in any of his letters.

In the final chapter Bauckham provides an example of the potential for theological appropriation of his understanding of who Jesus is and who God is. Much is said about the meaning of the language of Psalm 22 in Jesus' "cry of deriliction" from the cross that is helpful and insightful. Yet I believe the final chapter also illustrates precisely what work needs to be done if Bauckham is to offer a coherent and persuasive interpretation of the New Testament's Christology in terms of "divine identity". For while he says much about God's identification with the godforsaken in this chapter, he never explains what it could possibly mean for someone to be forsaken by another whose identity he shares. Those who have explored such questions within the context of classic Trinitarian theology, with its language of "essence" and "persons", have found much to say that is of interest, but also many difficulties and many aspects that had to be simply be left as mysteries. If it is not clear that the concept of "divine identity" makes better sense of the New Testament's Christological data than other concepts and terminology, the attempt to "take it to the next level" and make theological use of it seems to fare no better, and may in fact serve to highlight the difficulties of the concept more generally.

Having been extremely critical in this review, I nevertheless strongly recommend that anyone interested in questions of Christology and monotheism read this book. Bauckham's views are becoming very popular in many circles, and even those who are not persuaded by his case need to engage what he has written. As I said at the outset, I am persuaded that Bauckham is wrong in a number of important respects. But the texts (both canonical and extracanonical) that he discusses are key ones, and the interpretative possibilities he raises are interesting and provocative. For this reason, even those who in the end disagree with him will find few dialogue partners that are his equal.

Review written by Dr. James F. McGrath, Associate Professor of Religion, Butler University. Author of The Only True God: Early Christian Monotheism in Its Jewish Context. This review also appeared on the Exploring Our Matrix blog.

In this fascinating book, Richard Bauckham articulates his view about Jesus and the "unique identity of God." The book makes up a series of articles that serve as an expanded version of his 1999 work, God Crucified. In it, Bauckham analyzes a plethora of Jewish background material in establishing who God is. That is, he drifts from the traditional "Nicene" views of ontology and seeks to focus on identity. In fact, Bauckham seemed at times to express some level of uneasiness with regards to Trinitarian views of divine ontology. The reason being, according to Bauckham, the Jews were more concerned with who God is rather than what God is.

The author seeks to establish his case by appealing to a wide range of Jewish texts, both Scriptural and non-scriptural (though some might infer the inspiration of some apocryphal works). To many who read this work, including me, the non-scriptural analyses might appear to be awkward at first, given that so many monotheistic and Christological works have neglected this important background information. However, by the end of the book, the reader will likely understand how important these texts are in establishing how the early Christians would have viewed Christ in relation to God's identity. That is, if we seek to view the Christological texts through the lens of the modern eye, we may very well miss some very important key elements.

Of course, these key elements are in relation to what Bauckham has repetitively inferred as "the unique identity of God." As stated previous, where many Christological works focus on the ontological aspects of God and Christ, Bauckham builds his case in establishing who God is, as second Temple Jews would have understood him. Some of these elements of the unique identity of God to which Bauckham focuses on includes:

1. God is the sole sovereign ruler of all things
2. God is the sole Creator of all things
3. God is the sole possessor of the name YHWH

Though there are several sub-categories to these, Bauckham argues that these are aspects of God's identity which separate Him from all other reality. In drawing his conclusion on these matters, Bauckham then goes to argue that since Christ possesses these divine attributes of identity, he is to be included in God's unique identity.

In drawing this conclusion, Bauckham is careful to supply qualifications in that Christ isn't added to God's identity, but is included. Otherwise, he argues, the Jews would have had no basis for which to accept such a ditheistic view. In supporting his view of the inclusion of Jesus into the unique divine identity, Bauckham offers his exegesis of fair share of Christological texts. One of the most prominent in his discussion is the early Christian view of Psalm 110:1. Again, while many Christological works may focus on ontological aspects of Christ, Bauckham argues for this text as a key element in including Jesus into the unique identity of God as the sovereign ruler who sits at God's right hand. Other texts include 1 Corinthians 8:6, Philippians 2:10, Revelation 5, Hebrews 1, and more.

Jesus and the God of Israel also includes a fair share of interaction with the scholarly community who espouse different views than Bauckham. These critics range from liberal scholarship to conservative. One of the more prominent interactions to which Bauckham engages are those who advocate views concerning so-called intermediary divine figures; in particular, those from the Qumran texts. In interacting with these scholars and texts, Bauckham argues that though there are some interesting implications, they still do not place themselves as a parallel with the Christian texts as they include Jesus in the unique identity of God.

For those looking for a scholarly and insightful work on Christology and Christian monotheism, this work is a goldmine. Even if one finds disagreement in some of Bauckham's contentions as they relate to identity rather than ontology, the footnotes provide enough information and scholarly references for the student to do his own research and come to his own conclusions. Arguably, this is an important landmark work on Christology that will serve as a standard for years to come in the scholarly community. And personally, I could not recommend a better work on Christology and monotheism than what Bauckham has offered here.

In a collection of essays dealing with Christology of Divine Identity (CDI), Bauckham argues that Early High Christology, or CDI is the highest possible Christology. In saying this, he argues against two other Christological approaches developed later in the history of Christianity: functional Christology and ontological Christology. CDI has to do with including Christ in the identity of the one and only true God on the basis of the criteria of who God is as opposed to what God does or what God or divinity is, developed by functional and ontological Christology, respectively. Since the basis of divine identity approach is the Jewish monotheism of the Second Temple period, it is wrong to assume that NT Christology is a foreign concept and has no place in strict Jewish monotheism. On the contrary, many NT Christological passages, especially the epistle to the Hebrews, are rooted in the understanding of OT-based criteria of divine identity.

In the theology of divine identity, there are two characteristics that correspond to the unique identity of God: his relationship to Israel and his relationship to all other realities. In "Jesus and the God of Israel," there is more emphasis on the latter. Baukham begins the exposition of CDI by affirming two points. First, Jewish monotheism is indeed strict in making a clear distinction between God and other realities as evidenced in the Shema (Deut 6:4-6) and the first two commandments of the Decalogue (Ex 20:2-6). Second, despite the strictness, it is possible to establish the connection between NT Christology and Jewish monotheism, not by applying a Jewish category of intermediary figures that are subordinate or have semi-divine status to Jesus, but by identifying him directly to the one God of Israel. There are three themes that show up over and over again that form CDI criteria which are the basis of the inclusion of Jesus in the divine identity in the context of the separation or the uniqueness of God from all creatures. The point is if Scripture teaches that Jesus' identity matches all these three criteria, then he is God. First, God is the sole Creator of all things without any helper and everything else is created by him. Second, God is the sovereign Ruler of all things and all others are subject to his rule. Third, the reality of the first and second characteristics draws a response appropriate only to God in the form of monolatry, the exclusive worship of the one and true God by his creatures. He alone may be worshipped since worship is an acknowledgement of God's sole deity. Negatively, the principle of monolatry also prohibits the worship of other things and beings. In setting the stage for the inclusion of Jesus Christ in the divine identity on the basis of NT passages and their correlation to those of the OT, Baukham points out that an understanding of the uniqueness of divine identity does not rule out distinction within divine reality to show that the Second Temple Judaism is monotheistic, but not unitarian.

The epistle to the Hebrews contains perhaps a single most coherent and concentrated affirmation of the inclusion of Jesus in the divine identity according to CDI criteria. In his essay, Bauckham focuses on the sonship and lordship of Jesus in chapter 1, the high-priesthood of Melchizedek as a type of Christ in 7:3 and the immutability of Christ in 13:8, of which I will analyze only the first two sections. Hebrews attributes to Jesus three categories of identity: Son, Lord and High Priest. His divine sonship and lordship that fit CDI criteria in chapter 1 are evident from the following verses. That Jesus exercises his eschatological rule of all things from his exalted throne in heaven is given in verses 2a (heir of all things, cf. Ps 2:8; 8:6), 3b (sustaining all things by his powerful word), 3c and 13 (sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high, cf. Ps 110:1) and 8 (Your throne, O God, is forever and ever, cf. Ps 45:6-7). His participation as an agent of creation is taught in verses 2b (through whom he also created the worlds), 7 (He makes his angels winds and his ministers flames of fire, cf. Ps 104:4), and 10 (In the beginning, Lord, you founded the earth, and the heavens are the work of your hands, cf. Ps 102:25-27). The worship of Jesus by the angels and the name given to him being more superior than that of the angels are clearly shown in verses 4 and 6. Bauckham claims that this name that is superior to that of the angels is equivalent to the name that is above every name in Phil 2:9 that he believes to be the Tetragrammaton (YHWH). He also observes that angels "mark out the cosmic territory. To be above angels is to be God, to be below angels is to be human." The conclusion is then, since Jesus is more superior than and worshipped by the angels, and he fulfills the other two CDI criteria, he is God.

One concern at this point is the lack of coverage of the divine identity of Jesus in relation to the other two Persons in the Trinity, especially the Father. Bavinck notes, "The real NT equivalent for YHWH is Father." If Jesus takes on the divine name YHWH and he fulfills all the criteria of divine identity in his eternality, creative work and sovereign rule from the beginning of the world to eternity future, it is natural to ask if God consists of one Person only, namely Jesus. In other words, is Jesus the same as the Father? Bauckham is careful not to exclude the subject of the Trinity, especially the relationship between the Father and the Son, but considers this as a novelty consistent with Jewish monotheism. The problem is he simply points out that we cannot use the analogy of human identity when thinking about the Father and the Son because God transcends it and therefore, insists that nothing in the Second Temple Jewish understanding contradicts the possibility of interpersonal relationship within the divine identity. His further attempt to elaborate does not help much but makes CDI look potentially liable to the charge of Modalism or Sabellianism instead.

If this objection is true, it is perhaps the most serious defect of CDI as a consequence of excluding ontological Christology. This is where I think that while CDI is a powerful biblical Christology, it is not a perfect or complete Christology. There is value in resorting to ontological Christology from which we learn more clearly about the distinction between the Father and the Son, not as two Gods, but as two persons in the one and only true God. Unless we use other passages of Scripture that contain ontological devices to clear the ambiguity or confusion, it is easy to think that the Father and the Son are the same person. Without ontological Christology, Bauckham does not get very far in interpreting the Prologue of John's gospel, but he is only able to relate "God, who has never been seen by human eyes, (who) has been revealed in the human life of Jesus Christ, who reflects his Father's glory and is full of grace and truth" to the allusion of God's revelation to Moses as YHWH. Bauckham does not elaborate what "The Word was with God" means, 'o logos hn pros ton theon related to CDI that establishes a distinction between the Word and God; the latter usually refers to God the Father in the NT and the OT. There is no exegesis on "the Word was God," theos hn 'o logos either. The placement of theos without an article as a predicate nominative prior to the subject 'o logos is not an accident or arbitrary. This is exactly the structure John wanted to use to indicate who Jesus is in relation to the Father. Using Carson's rule and statistical analysis on the use of pre-verbal anarthrous predicate nominatives, Wallace believes that the anarthrous theos is qualitative. He writes that it tells us about "the nature of the Word, rather than his identity." theos was his eternal nature which we know in conjunction with "In the beginning was the Word," en archh hn 'o logos. The Word also has the quality of God, but is a distinct person from God the Father, as evident in the phrase immediately before theos hn 'o logos, 'o logos hn pros ton theon.

In regards to Jesus' role as high-priest, Bauckham can't help but incorporate functional Christology since Heb 7 talks about it. He correctly views Heb 7:3 as not about Melchizedek per-se, but what it is about the Melchizedek priesthood and its application to Jesus that qualifies Jesus to be included in the divine identity, namely that he is a fully divine high priest. Here Bauckham has to inevitably invoke ontological terms as well in his exegesis by applying a "Hellenistic true-god-language. A true deity is unbegotten or ungenerated (agennetos) - having no parents - and unoriginated, (agenetos) - having no other kind of origin - as well as being imperishable forever." He sees a parallel between agennetos and agenetos with the description in Heb 7:3 and apply these two terms to Jesus being the high priest in the order of Melchizedek. The point here is that since Jesus is the high priest in the order of Melchizedek, he is eternal and therefore, divine. Related to CDI criteria, the eternality of Jesus is required for him to be the Creator of all things and the eschatological Ruler of all things and therefore, included in the divine identity. But how can Jesus be without father and mother, when in his humanity he is the son of Joseph and Mary, though he does not have a biological father, and in his divinity, he is the Son of the Father? Ellingworth answers that the point the author of Hebrews is making is that Jesus' priesthood is "a priesthood different in kind from that of the Levitical priests, held by one who is superior to Abraham and thus to his descendent Levi." The OT Levitical priesthood is laden with genealogy marked with chronological sequences, but there is no such genealogy in the divine heavenly priesthood of Jesus and thus, he is agenealoghtos.

Bauckham applies the properties agennetos and agenetos to the Son again when exegeting Heb 1:5 (quoting Ps 2:7 and repeated in Heb 5:5). In this verse, God said to the Son, "You are my Son. Today, I have begotten you." This can be a problematic passage that the Arians would love to use as a proof text that the Son is a created being. The key words here are begotten and today. Baukham is correct in stating that this verse does not teach a temporal origin of the sonship of Jesus to the Father. The today of "Today I have begotten you" is "the eternal today of divine eternity." His interpretation of today is acceptable if we consider God here speaking in an anthropomorphic fashion, while in reality, God transcends time, and cannot be measured by means of the measure of time. As for God having begotten the Son, Bauckham explains that begotten refers to the Son being self-generate, self-produced (autophuhs) and self-originated (autogenhs), equivalent to agennetos and agenetos. But to say that God begetting the Son is equivalent to the Son being self-generate is to force a meaning into the verse contrary to what it clearly says that the Son is begotten by the Father. This may also dangerously lead to a conclusion that the Son is the Father. If the Son is begotten of the Father and the Son is self-generating, then the Son must be the Father. While Baukham is correct that the Son is agenetos, he is incorrect that the Son is also agennetos. The subtle difference between the two terms can only be understood in the context of ontological Christology, specifically in its relationship with the fatherhood of God.

According to Bavinck, agennetos is derived from the verb gennan (infinitive of gennaw, to beget or to generate), and agenetos from the verb ginesthai (infinitive of ginomai). He makes a distinction that "the latter is by far the broader term, and denotes whatever has beginning, whether it results from creation, generation or propagation." While the Son is uncreated, agenetos, he is not ingenerate, agennetos. Bavinck uses Heb 1:3 to interpret Ps 2:7 to explain what God begetting the Son means, "Christ as the Son of God was generated by the Father, that is, in which he was brought forth as the effulgence of God's glory and the very image of his substance," which I think is correct, contrary to Bauckham's view. Bavinck also differentiates between the Father being unbegotten or ingenerate (agennetos) while the Son is passively generated from the Father. While all three persons of the Trinity are eternal, uncreated, without beginning (agenetos), only the Father is ingenerate or unbegotten (agennetos).

He goes on to provide three characteristics of the generation of the Son being spiritual, out of the essence of the Father and eternal. Heb 1:5 speaks of the generation of the Son by the Father and therefore, covers all three characteristics that Bavinck mentions. The concept of generation is also consistent with the prolog of John's gospel that speaks of Christ being the epistemological logos, a revelation of who God is (John 1:18). But the use of today in Heb 1:5 particularly highlights the eternality of the generation that Heb 1:3 depicts most wonderfully that the Son is the radiance of God's glory, perhaps drawing from an analogy between the core of the sun and the sun beam. There is never a time where the former is without the later and vice versa.

Bauckham claims that CDI is the highest possible Christology. While I agree that it is a powerful and wonderful biblical Christology in its glorious exaltation of the divinity of Jesus, I believe the highest Christology ought to involve functional and ontological Christology. The NT does not exclusively reveals Jesus in terms of his divine identity, but also what he does and what he is, fully human and fully God, a distinct second person in the Trinity. A high Christology ought to also be one that displays the greatness and goodness of Jesus in his deity and humanity. He is not only great in his divine perfection, beauty and glory, but also in his flawless humanity, especially in his active and passive obedience to the Father. In CDI, Bauckam puts a lot of weight on the greatness aspect of Jesus. Though in this review I only analyze Bauckham's work on some portions of Hebrews, he does a compelling exegesis from a number of other NT passages as well about the divine transcendence of Jesus, particularly in relation to Deutero-Isaiah. This is not to say he doesn't cover the goodness aspect of his Christology at all, but there seems to be a lack of balance, specifically in the area of how the greatness of Jesus relates to creatures, especially believers. In other words, there is a great emphasis on his divine transcendence without adequate coverage on what this means for us, or to use Kapic's term, there is a lack of anthroposensitivity. An example of a more balanced Christology that still maintains a high view of Jesus, better than CDI in my view, is Jonathan Edwards' exposition of Jesus being the Lion and the Lamb from Rev 5:1-6. Quoting Edwards, here is what I mean by Christology that displays the greatness and goodness of Jesus, and has a powerful pastoral implication as well,

"In Christ infinite greatness and infinite goodness meet together, and receive luster and glory one from another. His greatness is rendered lovely by his goodness. The greater anyone is without goodness, so much the greater evil. But when infinite goodness is joined with greatness, it renders it a glorious and adorable greatness. So, on the other hand, his infinite goodness receives luster from his greatness."

To be fair, however, Bauckham makes some efforts to find some practical theology out of CDI. He relates what it means to us for Jesus to be a divine and human high priest, namely, that he may understand human weaknesses so that from the heavenly throne, he may exercise grace and mercy to sinners.

"It is no longer simply sovereignty he shared with his Father from eternity, but now a sovereignty exercised in human solidarity with humans. The cosmic throne is also, therefore, the throne of grace that sinners can approach with boldness (4:16). So the high priestly work of atonement is the way in which he comes to exercise his sovereignty in the way that he does - salvifically."

Since CDI is developed in the context of Jewish OT culture, Bauckham could have added that the Levitical priesthood including the pattern of animal sacrifices in the day of atonement follows the heavenly pattern of the priesthood of Jesus being the offerer as well as the offering that Heb 9 speaks of (Heb 9:23, cf. Heb 7:24, 12:24). He could have expanded the discussion with such a correlation not only to add credibility of his claim about OT and NT continuity of CDI, but also to include a deeper soteriology, such as the doctrines of propitiation and perseverance. The latter is an extension and application of the solidarity of Jesus with humans beyond merely the boldness and the confidence that believers are given in coming to God in prayer (4:16) that Bauckham speaks of. He should have written more on related verses such as 2:14-18, 4:15, 7:24-25 and 10:32-39, which perhaps are appropriate to be placed under "theological reflections" section like he does in his other essay "God's Self-Identification with the Godforsaken,"

In summary, as a general apologetic tool, while divine identity-based Christology is powerful in refuting Arianism and adoptionism, with the limited exposure I have with CDI, I have shown that it might be liable to the charge of Sabellianism since Bauckham doesn't seem to make enough effort to distinguish the personality of the Father and the Son. Another potential use of CDI is in the area of contextualized Jewish evangelism. As Bauckham points out, the Second Temple Judaism has no category of functional and ontological divinity, so it might be difficult to discuss Jesus with Jewish unbelievers in these contexts. My hope is that we can use divine identity approach with a more balanced emphasis on the divinity and humanity of Jesus in a way that is anthroposensitive, as a stronger point of contact in establishing the case for the gospel of Christ for the Jews. But to do this, we inevitably have to involve ontological and functional Christology alongside CDI, which might be difficult for Jews to relate, but something we can place under the novelty category as Bauckham does. Though the effectiveness or the result of evangelism does not ultimately depend on techniques, but on the sovereign operation of the Holy Spirit illuminating the mind and changing the heart, it doesn't mean that there is no need for a careful, thoughtful, compassionate and contextualized approach. As I studied the introductory section of Bauckham's work, somehow the first thought that came to mind was this topic of the gospel for unbelieving Jews and CDI being the apologetic basis for it. Despite some potential weaknesses, may the Lord be pleased to use CDI not merely in scholastic theology, but more importantly as an evangelistic tool to bring many, especially Jewish unbelievers to a saving relationship with him as promised in Rom 11:25-32.