Judging Science: Scientific Knowledge and the Federal Courts [Hardcover]

Kenneth R. Foster (Author), Peter W. Huber (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0262061929 | ISBN-13: 978-0262061926 | Publication Date: May 23, 1997

What is "scientific knowledge" and when is it reliable? These deceptively simple questions have been the source of endless controversy. In 1993, the Supreme Court handed down a landmark ruling on the use of scientific evidence in federal courts. Federal judges may admit expert scientific evidence only if it merits the label "scientific knowledge." The testimony must be scientifically "reliable" and "valid."

This book is organized around the criteria set out in the 1993 ruling. Following a general overview, the authors look at issues of fit—whether a plausible theory relates specific facts to the larger factual issues in contention; philosophical concepts such as the falsifiability of scientific claims; scientific error; reliability in science, particularly in fields such as epidemiology and toxicology; the meaning of "scientific validity"; peer review and the problem of boundary setting; and the risks of confusion and prejudice when presenting science to a jury.

The book's conclusion attempts to reconcile the law's need for workable rules of evidence with the views of scientific validity and reliability that emerge from science and other disciplines.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"Anyone, scientist, jurist, or layman, will better judge the reliability of scientific results from reading the mosaic of quotations from experts, with annotations and expansions by the authors, that make up the core of this important book.
—Robert K. Adair, Sterling Professor Emeritus of Physics, Yale University

"Foster and Huber brilliantly illuminate the landscape of courtroom debates about the consequences and uncertainties of using science and technology in society. This *tour de force* is both a practical guide for citizens and journalists as well as a path-breaking clarification for judges and policy analysts."
—Rodney W. Nichols, President and Chief Executive Officer, New York Academy of Sciences

About the Author

Kenneth R. Foster is Associate Professor in the Department of Bioengineering at the University of Pennsylvania.

Peter W. Huber is a Senior Fellow of the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research and serves as Counsel to the law firm of Mayer, Brown & Platt.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 333 pages
• Publisher: The MIT Press (May 23, 1997)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0262061929
• ISBN-13: 978-0262061926
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6.3 x 1.1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.9 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (4 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,300,441 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars For Everyone Interested In Truth and Decisionmaking, July 2, 2006

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The Dilettante "Dilly!" - See all my reviews

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This review is from: Judging Science: Scientific Knowledge and the Federal Courts (Paperback)

This is a very unique book and entirely appropriate for nonlawyers. This is not a "law book" on scientific evidence. The authors merely use Daubert -the case that announced the Supreme Court's current approach to scientific expert testimony- as the vehicle for an extended meditation on the nature of truth. There are very few case citations, and all jargon is thoroughly explained in advance.

Throughout the 20th Century, courts have been confounded by the question of how to regulate the use of science in the courtroom. Our system of law draws a distinction between "questions of fact" and "questions of law"; judges can generally only rule on latter. Questions of fact are up to the jury, and these are the questions to which scientific testimony is usually directed (e.g. "Did the defendant's pollutant cause the plaintiff's cancer?") But juries are generally no more scientifically literate than the populace at large, and the danger that they will be misled is great. Two questions arise: a) How can good science be distinguished from bad? and b) Who makes these quality judgments? The second question is a legal/policy question, but the first is just classic epistemology.

Before Daubert, courts took a hands-off approach, relying on the consensus of the scientific community - effectively on peer review. Daubert revolutionized the federal system by requiring the judge to make preliminary judgments of sound scientific method. But how?

This book examines the epistemological approach suggested by the dicta in Daubert, places that approach in intellectual/historical context, and then moves on to criticize it. All of this is done wonderfully, with lots of sidebars and examples. The authors sift the gems from a huge body of literature on law, epistemology and decision science. Brief, inexpensive, and lucid, this would make an excellent text for a college class in the philosophy of law, epistemology or jurisprudence. And don't be scared away by Peter Huber's polarizing reputation. This book's only political agendas are justice and accuracy.

5 of 7 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Highlights the problems of much "scientific evidence", March 27, 2000

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Tung Yin (Portland, OR) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Judging Science: Scientific Knowledge and the Federal Courts (Paperback)

Although non-lawyers can appreciate this book, it is really of use to lawyers in mass tort cases where scientific evidence is used to prove causality issues.

Foster and Huber use the litigation over the pregnancy drug Bendectin to explain the ways in which science is used and misused to "prove" cases. In the case of Bendectin, there was no conclusive medical evidence proving that the drug caused birth defects. Rather, there was a statistical association between the use of the drug and birth defects. Does this prove that Bendectin causes birth defects?

It might or it might not. The field of epidemiology attempts to answer the question by eliminating other possible explanations for the association. Various techniques of epidemiology include blind (or double-blind) testing, data analysis, and so on.

Foster and Huber demonstrate that the scientific techniques are not entirely conducive with the standards of modern litigation. For example, scientists generally do not speak of "proving" an assertion; rather, they "falsify" it. That is, they attempt to disprove it -- it is usually easier to show that something is not true, since you only need to find one example. When an assertion has withstood repeated attempts to falsify it, it becomes generally accepted.

This has important ramifications for litigation, however. Litigation -- particularly mass torts -- requires a "yes" or "no" answer: in the scientific opinion of the expert witness, does Bendectin cause birth defects? The expert will of course have explained his or her analysis, but in the end, that analysis must be boiled down into a yes or no answer, regardless of the suitability of such an intellectual liposuction.

In summary, this is a fascinating book if you are interested in these sorts of issues. Although the book covers science and scientific inquiry, it does not require a significant amount of scientific knowledge.

4 of 6 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Belongs in every critical thinker's library, March 28, 2001

By A Customer

This review is from: Judging Science: Scientific Knowledge and the Federal Courts (Paperback)

I disagree with the previous reviewer's comments that the book is largely of use to the legal professioin. I find the law case serves as a great backdrop to understanding science and judging scientific claims. Many great principles are explained in this book.