Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases [Paperback]

Tom Ginsburg (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0521520398 | ISBN-13: 978-0521520393 | Publication Date: July 23, 2003 | Edition: Student Edition

Where does judicial power come from, how does it develop, and what political conditions support its expansion? This book answers these important questions through an examination of three constitutional courts in East Asia, where law is traditionally viewed as a tool of authoritarian rulers. New democracies around the world have adopted constitutional courts to oversee the operation of democratic politics. Thomas Ginsburg argues that, while judicial review does put constraints on government, it is sought as a solution to the problem of uncertainty in constitutional design. By providing "insurance" to prospective electoral losers, judicial review facilitates democracy.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"Every serious scholar and student of constitutional politics and institutional design should read this book." The Law and Politics Book Review

"Ginsburg provides compelling empirical support in his three East Asian cases that judicial power increases when political power is diffuse. Because he is interested in highlihgting the conditions under which courts can constrain other political actors, compliance is an important indicator of judicial independence." - Shannon Roesler, Law and Social Inquiry

Book Description

New democracies around the world have adopted constitutional courts to oversee the operation of democratic politics. Where does judicial power come from, how does it develop, and what political conditions support its expansion? This book answers these questions through an examination of three constitutional courts in East Asia, where law is traditionally viewed as a tool of authoritarian rulers. Ginsburg argues that while judicial review does put constraints on government, it is sought as a solution to the problem of uncertainty in constitutional design. By providing "insurance" to prospective electoral losers, judicial review facilitates democracy.

Product Details

• Paperback: 312 pages
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press; Student Edition edition (July 23, 2003)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0521520398
• ISBN-13: 978-0521520393
• Product Dimensions: 6 x 9 x 0.7 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.1 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #658,207 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
  • #70 in Books > Law > Perspectives on Law > Comparative

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4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Judicial review as political insurance, March 4, 2006

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R. Price "caesar_42" (Liverpool, New York) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases (Paperback)

Since the fall of communism in the late 80s and early 90s, new democracies have embraced constitutional courts exercising judicial review. Given the vicious attacks upon courts in the US, one often wonders why anyone would adopt constitutional courts with the power to attack the result of the democratic process, and push its own policy. Ginsburg presents a compelling answer: new democracies turn to constitutional courts as a source of political insurance. When creating a constitution, parties will be more willing to create a court when the political future is uncertain, where they predict that they will likely be in the minority and thus may require extra protection to ensure that the other party(s) will not be able to abuse them. Where a party believes it will be in solid control in the future, the court will likely be weaker because the dominant party would not want to limit its own powers. Ginsburg examines this theory against three case studies of Mongolia, Korea, and Taiwan; the experience of these three countries strongly supports the political insurance theory. This interesting, original work presents judicial review as an integral part of democracy especially in countries without prior democratic experience. Additionally, Ginsburg examines courts in areas that have received little attention in the US, thus, anyone interested in non-western constitutionalism should check this book out.