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June 1941: Hitler and Stalin

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John Lukacs is a fine historian and a fine writer and in JUNE 1941: HITLER AND STALIN he has provided the casual reader with a glimpse into the minds of both Hitler and Stalin as they moved inexorably toward war. This may not be the definitive resource for the researcher, but for the general public this is an excellent summary of the cogent events and personality dances that resulted in Hitler attacking Russia.

Wisely, Lukacs keeps his writing style in the narrative, almost 'novel' manner, a technique that allows the reader to follow an enormous amount of information with complete ease. The focus he has chosen is to describe the events and the effects of those events on both Stalin and Hitler that began as a possible union for world domination but ultimately resulted in fierce hatred and battle between the two countries. Those surrounding the two men (Ribbentrop and Molotov being key players) are examined and their part in the erroneous decision toward war is carefully described. It is a story of power play: Hitler feared England and the United States; Stalin saw the urgency to protect his greed for domination of Europe by siding with Japan. When attempts were miscalculated and the various countries in Europe re-aligned, the Germans invaded Russia with dire consequences.

One of the more satisfying portions of this short book is Lukacs' depiction of how Hitler fell from power while Stalin grew in statesmanship, becoming the awesome force he was at the conclusion of WW II. In his discussion Lukacs unravels the mysteries around the power of Communism in the face of seemingly insurmountable foes. It is alarming food for thought.

For those who wish to understand the steps that lead to WW II this immensely readable book is most helpful. It is a starting point in probing deeper into the sources of megalomaniacal evil that disrupted the globe and nearly decimated Europe. Grady Harp, August 06

In his book "The Duel : The Eighty-Day Struggle Between Churchill and Hitler", historian John Lukacs compared the actions of Adolf Hitler to Winston Churchill during the 80 day period from the ascension of Winston Churchill to the office of Prime Minister on May 10, 1940 until July 30,1940. "The Duel" ends with the decision by Hitler to cease planning for a cross-channel invasion. Instead, Hitler began planning for an invasion of the Soviet Union. Lukacs' new book, "June 1941: Hitler and Stalin" is a rather brief study of the relationship between Stalin and Hitler in the month in which those plans, Operation Barbarossa, achieved fruition.

"June 1941" is not a monumental piece of writing, nor was it meant to be. Rather, as Lukacs notes, it is "less than a monograph but more than a narrative". Lukacs provides the reader with a coherent, concise summary of the events of that month. Lukacs does not inundate the reader with minutiae about the battle plans or the invasion itself. I think it fair to say that Lukacs is more concerned with fleshing out the attitudes of both Stalin and Hitler to the other than to the order of battle. In this, I believe he has done a good job.

In "The Duel" Lukacs indicated that by July, 1940 Hitler felt that a cross-channel invasion was not feasible. Hitler felt that if he could invade and defeat the USSR in a lightning strike that England would be compelled to negotiate an end to the war on terms favorable to Germany. In essence, "June 1941" takes up where "The Duel" left off. Lukacs makes some interesting statements about the nature of Hitler and Stalin's personalities throughout the book. The include Lukacs' belief that Stalin's personality was not that of a dogmatic Marxist but that of a Caucasian chieftain. As such, Stalin had a respect for Hitler's brutal real-politik and this respect colored his thinking and his seemingly irrational belief that Hitler would live up to his promsises.

I did note some direct criticism of other historians that seemed a bit jarring to me, all the more so because they were not really fleshed out but, rather, just left hanging in the air. He describes Alan Bullock's "Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives" as useless and Constantin Pleshakov's "Stalin's Folly" as being "inaccurate throughout". I have read both books and although I am willing to believe that their accounts are subject to dispute as are all historical accounts, I am not sure that unexplained and unexamined criticism such as this is fully warranted.

Depsite the seemingingly unecessary criticism I found "June 1941: Hitler and Stalin" to be a worthy addition to the wealth of material available for people with an interest in this era. Lukacs is an entertaining writer with a solid knowledge of his subject matter. The ability to communicate that knowledge in clear and precise tone is a gift and I have no hesitation in recommending "June 1941" to anyone with an interest in the beginning of one of the most brutal wars the world has ever seen.

This is an odd book that promises much more than it delivers, if one believes the editorial comments of such notables as Henry Kissenger, Strobe Talbott or Simon Sebag Montefiore. Despite high praise from those three individuals, "June 1941 Hitler and Stalin" never quite lives up to expectations.

I was somewhat confused as what exactly the author sought to convey to the reader that was new. Yes, Lukacs is a talented and experienced writer and historian. "June 1941" is well written and a good read for those who know little about Hitler, Stalin and events leading to the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. If this is the intended audience, the book is a useful, though somewhat shallow, primer. Those with a bit more historical knowledge, however, will find very little that is new or truly insightful in this book.

Others will find a great deal that is confusing and contradictory. For example, in the main body Lukacs suggests that, had Stalin not overstepped himself in the Baltics and Eastern Europe, Hitler might not have turned against Russia. Yet at the end of the book, Lukacs notes that an attack by Hitler on the Soviet Union had always been the German leader's intention. There can be little doubt, based on Hitler's own writings in "Mein Kampf" that the latter is true.

Finally, there is the matter of the length of this work. According to Lukacs, "June 1941" is less than a monograph and more than a narrative summary. Indeed, the book is only 145 pages long, not counting appendices and end notes. Perhaps a longer work would have allowed Lukacs to focus more on his very interesting analysis of the relationship between Hitler and Stalin. This would have made the book a much more compelling and historically important work.

John Lukacs has quite a reputation in some quarters. On my first exposure to him, I don't understand why.

"June 1941" purportedly covers the relationship between Germany and the Soviet Union, Hitler and Stalin in June, 1941. Lukacs' writing style is difficult: English written by someone who has taken it up in life as a second language. And English written by someone given to asides and parentheticals. Some sentences require several readings before meaning can be teased from them.

The content is also troublesome. This very slim volume adds nothing substantively new to our understanding of why Hitler invaded Stalin's Soviet Union. Lukacs' attempt at explaining the situation beyond the known falls flat on its face: Lukacs can force nothing new from what is known. He introduces specious arguments about long-discredited "secret" correspondence betwen Hitler and Stalin.

What is most bothersome is Lukacs' frequent carping and potshots at other historians. Alan Bullock's classic "Hitler and Stalin" is dismissed as "useless," for example.

As noted, Lukacs has a following, but I question what they are following. Lukacs strikes me as a strutting martinet who long ago passed his prime.

Jerry

June 1941 is a succinct essay on Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. The format is similar to his work "Duel: Churchill vs Hitler" dealing with the beginning of World War II in the West. The book is a good introduction to the motivations and men who monstrously led the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany.
Lukacs' posits his belief that Hitler attacked his erstwhile ally Soviet Russia in order to bolster the war against England. He thought that by destroying the Soviet Union the British would have no ally on the fringe of Europe to assist them in their battle against Fascism.
Hitler's army of over three million troops failed to seize Moscow and Stalin proved triumphant in the bloodbath that became war on the Eastern Front. Stalin was too trusting of Hitler, says Lukacs, refusing to believe that the German dictator was planning a massive invasion of the Soviet Union. When the German hordes assaulted Mother Russia the Soviets were unprepared. Stalin, however, and his leadership recovered and this brutal and evil man became a statesman who led his land to a costly victory. It was only after World War II that the alliance the Soviets had made with the West was broken by Cold War politics.
Lukacs is a fine historian who writes with elegance and grace. He is not afraid of stating his opinion. This book is short but would be a good book to assign in a college course on World War II. Lukacs sometimes says more in 100 pages than other academic historians whose books are much longer in length. This little book is worth your time.

As one of the previous reviewers have already stated, this book promises more than it delivers. However, it does cover in detail what happened in June, 1941. Stalin was deceived by Hitler and the Germans even though it was well known that those 185 divisions sitting on the Russian border were not there for the climate. The information was so well known that at least a dozen sources issued the alarm before the invasion actually occurred. The author does a good job detailing the state of Stalin's mind and why he was deceived. Both Stalin and Hitler had a healthy respect for each other.

This is an OK read about a fascinating event. The German invasion could have turned the pages of history, but other events (Japanese actions) actually sealed Hitler's fate. The author is a respected historian and offers some new insight on some minor details.

There is no new-history stuff about "the war from the point of view of the front-line soldiers" here, or the sort of analysis of broad econometric trends one might get from Paul Kennedy. No -- there are the two megalomaniacs in his subtitle, each portrayed on the dust jacket staring into the middle distance. One has to accept that focus to benefit from the book.

The style of this book is the use of accumulated pointed anecdotes. One of Lukacs' incidental observations -- one made while he works on setting the stage, before he reaches June 1941 -- will give a sense of this style. He tells us that November 1940 was "the first time that an American presidential election played a role in the great affairs of the world." Stalin told his foreign minister, Molotov, to delay a planned trip to Berlin until after the US election. It isn't clear from the reference whether Stalin thought such a trip would help Roosevelt or Willkie, but evidently it was thought unwise to remind the US public of the Nazi's alliance with the USSR.

Anyway, Molotov arrived in Berlin on November 12. He tried to get Hitler to agree that Finland and Bulgaria were within Russia's sphere of influence. Hitler tried to get him to look at a bigger picture -- how the four of "us" (Germany, the USSR, Japan, and Italy) can divide the globe. Molotov wasn't a big-picture guy, and Lukacs portrays him as "a wooden and unimaginative dolt" who kept "pecking and pecking away at Bulgaria and finland like a shortsighted woodpecker."

When we do get to June 1941, one of Lukacs' main concerns is to rebut the myth, put forward by David Irving and others among Hitlers apologists, that Germany's attack on its ally that month was preventative -- that Hitler had learned that Stalin was about to launch such an attack and simply acted first. Indeed, Stalin was almost pathetically eager to remain true to their alliance right to the end, and although Russian Ambassadors and ministers in capital cities around the world were increasingly privy to the fact that this attitude was hardly reciprocated, that a German attack on Russia was ever more likely, they knew their bos well enough not to communicate these facts to him.

"Almost without exception," Lukacs writes, these officials "were reluctant -- or, more precisely, afraid -- to tell Stalin what he, more and more obviously, did not wish to hear."

Imagine a noted historian sitting down one day with you to help you understand one of the great political/military questions of the last hundred years---Why did Hitler invade the USSR in June of 1941? John Lukacs gives his informed thinking on this and related questions in this short but highly interesting volume. This is not a tale of specific military movements but one of the deadly political motivations and purposes of two powerful world leaders.
The prose is clear, with opinions sharp and cutting.

I found this short book enlightening and a fascinating glimpse into the minds and characters of two of histories greatest villains, responsible for the deaths of tens of millions. Their interactions, and distrust of one another, led to the German invasion of the Soviet Union which surprised no world leader, except Stalin, who had been completely duped and made to look like a fool by Hitler. Fascinating read.

John Lukacs writes in a clear, elegant style and he has the charmingly old fashioned habit of censoring four-letter profanity when others are directly quoted. As this is a subject exhaustively covered, researched and analyzed for over sixty years it is unrealistic to expect many new facts here. New insights may arise even generations later, however and this slim volume has enough to make the reader stop frequently to ponder and say "Now, why didn't I think of that?" or take issue. Prof. Lukacs' fresh look at the term "isolationism" is by itself worth the price

As to taking issue, Prof. Lukacs is not shy about criticizing the work of other historians or biographers--even quite eminent ones and even in a cranky tone. He is a one-man school of historiography, neither right-wing nor left, European oriented or wholly American, ideological nor determinist.

This book is valuable.