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Most Helpful Customer Reviews
2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
A very useful reader,
By A Customer
This review is from: Justification of Induction (Readings in Philosophy) (Paperback)
A little out of date, but still a good place to gofor the standard and classic readings on the problem of induction.
3 of 6 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
The "problem" of induction is a pseudo-problem created for the self-preservation of logical empiricism,
This review is from: Justification of Induction (Readings in Philosophy) (Paperback)
Why is the so-called "problem" of induction, on which this book is based, a problem at all? Obviously justifications for scientific arguments must end somewhere with some basic principles that cannot be further reduced. Why is it a "problem" that induction is among these principles? I will tell you why: because everyone is a closet logical empiricist and induction is neither logic nor empiricism. Hence the "problem" of induction, which is to reduce induction to the only principles sanctioned by the logical empiricists. The sect cannot conceive of the possibility that the only "problem" is their stubborn insistence that science reduces to logic and empiricism. In other words, the "problem" is not with induction but with the logical empiricists' naive conception of science, which creates the "problem" out of thin air for the sake of its own self-preservation. This is also the reason why essentially no one spoke of a "problem" of induction until the 20th century. The now ever-so-popular attempts to pin the "problem" on Hume are of course pathetic pseudo-history fabricated by the sect to inflate its own ego.
To restate my point differently I quote from the introduction: "ordinary people and scientists use inductive arguments all the time, and in general men agree about when an inductive argument is correct ... but it remains a difficult matter to state the precise criteria which we use for judging inductive arguments" (p. 7). The natural conclusion is that induction is a primitive not further reducible and an unproblematic one at that. The only reason that this natural conclusion is barred is that philosophers have got it into their heads that science must be reducible to logic and empiricism. Now, it is a hallmark of a pseudo-problem that it gives rise to barren and inconclusive discussion, and especially so when the problem is to define a primitive in terms of less basic terms, i.e., to explain the obvious by means of the less obvious. Therefore the problem will "remain a difficult matter" not only at the end of this book, but for all eternity, no matter how much pointless ink is spilled on it. If I may add an additional speculation I would suggest that the current popularity of logical empiricism (denied of course, but not very believably) is in part a popularity of pseudo-problems. The current academic climate virtually screams for pseudo-problems. Pseudo-problems are perfect because you do not risk ever getting anywhere. Even pinheads who could never produce anything of substance can make voluminous contributions. And when older articles are forgotten one can pretend that "progress" has been made, even though the real explanation is that people comment on newer articles because it confers greater academic prestige. Indeed, the explicit goal of graduate education is often to introduce students to the "discussions of the field" rather than the insights of it: in other words, to focus on pseudo-problems since they are the ones being discussed ad nauseam.
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