Customer Reviews

Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941

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A few years ago I read a short book on the Pacific War written by H.P. Wilmott. For those who don't know of him, Wilmott taught at Sandhurst for many years, and is probably one of the top two or three historians of the Pacific War. At the end of the book there was an annotated bibliography. I always like this, as opposed to a regular bibliography, because the annotations tell you what the author thinks of various sources, and that in turn tells you something about his thinking. But sometimes the recommendation is more direct: you trust the author, and he tells you something is worthwhile. In this instance, he said that he wasn't sure how Pacific War historians got along before the book Kaigun was published. Needless to say I went out and got one. It's not a cheap book, there aren't used copies cheaper, there's no paperback available. It's still worth every penny, and I will tell you below why you need it.

There are, of course, a bushel and a half of books about the war in the Pacific during World War II. Many of them note that the Japanese fought the war in an unusual fashion, and most note differences in technology, strategy, tactics, and philosophy. Some of these things are vaguely explained by the differences in Western and Japanese society, but at best the explanations are vague. This leaves a huge gap in the history of the Pacific War.

Kaigun fills this gap. The authors basically explain every question of this type involving the Japanese Navy in World War II, from why their cruisers had long ranged torpedoes to why their navy's intelligence was so poor to why they insisted in planning as if the American Navy would act in particular ways (even after it had demonstrated that it would act in other ways). Much of the differences between the Japanese and American Navies stemmed from the fact that the Japanese had to modernize so quickly. This circumstance had background in that Japan had little naval tradition, and no ships really on which to base a modern navy. While this meant that Japanese Naval modernization had many pitfalls, it also had advantages, notably a lack of old traditions and hoary rivalries that plagued other nations' Naval modernization programs.

The authors spend a considerable length of time discussing Japan's wars with first China and then Russia in the early stages of their modernization. China proved little challenge in a Naval sense, but Russia was a much more formidable opponent, though the Japanese defeated them decisively. While the war itself is discussed at some length, a great deal of time is also spent discussing the aftermath, and the war's influence on Japan's strategy, tactics, and philosophy in future wars. As far as the authors are concerned, Tsushima was the principle reason the Japanese Navy spent most of the thirties planning for a major confrontation between the U.S. Navy and their own combined fleet. The latter confrontation was apparently modeled rather closely on Tsushima, which was pretty much the same strategically, though the directions and the scale were of course different.

This book is full of information, much of it not available elsewhere in English. Frankly, if you are interested in the War in the Pacific, I agree with Wilmott, adding my faint echo to his endorsement: this book is invaluable. It's also, as a side note, very well written. Highly recommended.

I did some of the illustrations for the book, so maybe I am biased, but this book will be read by people interested in this area of naval history for years to come. David Evans and Mark Peattie have researched this work meticulously, (including using previously untranslated Japanese primary sources from the Japanese Self-Defense Force archives) to construct a view of the changing inter-workings of technology, strategy, and tactics in the Imperial Japanese Navy. The writing is excellent, the layout is elegant, and the maps and illustrations (ahem) are superb. The book also contains excellent back-matter in the endnotes, bibliography, and index. A MUST for any serious student of the Imperial Japanese Navy.

Kaigun Strategy is a book that I had a lot of trouble putting down. This is perhaps strange for a book which discusses things such as the development of dry steam as a more efficient mode of propulsion, change in the composition of steel as it related to battleship construction and other very technical subjects. In a way the book said a lot about the Pacific War that had been said before. Yet in a way it was as startling revelation of the development of Japanese Society from the Meiji Restoration to the end of the second World War. The book is a discussion about the development of Japans Navy. Until 1945 the Japanese spent the staggering amount of 27% of their national budget on the navy. The reason for this lies with the now forgotten writings of Admiral Mahon.

Mahon was an American who in his day was as famous as Marx and Lenin. He wrote a history of sea power a book that argued that the reason for the wealth of great nations was the control of an empire through control of the sea. The Japanese were converts to his doctrines and being an island power thought that the key to the national destiny was the acquisition of empire. Kaigun Strategy is a study of how the Japanese Navy tried to develop a navy that would give them preponderance over that of the much stronger American Navy. The book goes into great detail about how the Japanese studied the most modern technology to develop a numerically inferior but well trained modern Navy. The belief in empire and the need to ensure oil supplies put Japan on a collision course with the United States of America.

The end of the war has led to Japan sheathing the sword and seeking to build up a strong economy. This has led to Japan becoming one of the richest and strongest countries in the world. How more productive that has been rather than putting most of the national wealth into a Navy which ended up on the bottom of the sea.

The book is fascinating at showing that whilst a large amount of Japans planning and development showed tremendous skill and intellect, at the same time ridiculous errors were made. Thus whilst Japan build up a modern fleet and air wing it failed to: · Adopt a convoy system during the war or to arm enough destroyers with sonar equipment to protect its merchant marine. · Did not realise till after the war started that there were not enough tankers in the possession of Japan to move enough oil from its new possessions to keep both the navy and industry going. · Made no attempts to develop code breaking in the way that its Axis Partner Germany and the Allies did. · Were not able to adopt the strategy once it became obvious that the war was evolving into one of attrition rather than a single decisive battle.

The book is a fascinating one and shows how the history of nations can be molded by the history of ideas.

In this day of asymmetric warfare, the history of the Japanese navy hardly seems relevant, but this book is so well-written it should be read by all strategists. It very effortlessly opens the eyes of the reader to the transformative processes that brought Japan out of the shadows of an antiquated feudal system into the forefront of military prowess in the span of less than 100 years. That alone merits the read of this book. But it clearly shows how Japan's military intellectuals adapted western thought and technology and fused western military and political rules with the classic ideals of Asian military strategy. There is a lot to be learned from seeing how the process worked in Japan. And in our ever-changing world, there is always a lot to be learned from the successes of others in adaptation and fusion of ideas and strategies.

Kaigun sets the stage of the Pacific war and essentially ends when the curtain rises in December of 1941 . It provides the context required to understand the actions of Japanese commanders and their weapons during subsequent naval battles .
The book is a wonderful blend of doctrinal and technical development . One is left with a clear understanding of advancements in technology and how they would be utilized in a naval conflict . The Japanese view of America as it's potential foe was extremely significant and can be seen as the dangers of a "self fulfilling prophecy" .
I loved the technical history and found it to be comprehensive without getting mired in too much depth or detail . A very readable book that is a vital resource to any fan of naval history in general or the Imperial Japanese Navy in particular .

This is a magnum opus to match S.E. Morrison's 14 volume History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, or Clay Blair's "Silent Victory" and 2-volume Hitler's U-Boat war, or Lundstrom's two "First Team" volumes. Such are volumes that a serious student of the Pacific War does not fail to read. Add this one. "Kaigun" is the perfect complement to Miller's "War Plan Orange." Why? First, Kaigun fills in the internal history of the Imperial Japanese Navy from its inception to the fatal decisions which led to its destruction. Second, it examines the strategic, doctrinal and tactical thought which drove, or was driven by the technological progress of the IJN. And finally, it explodes a number of cherished myths surrounding the IJN, most particularly its very active part in pushing Japan to war. What this volume can't answer and can't be held accountable for is why intelligent men leading the IJN made the incredibly bad decision to go to war, although it clearly illustrates the strategic calculus used to rationalize those decisions. "Kaigun" also shows (with the clarity of hindsight, or course) why Japan never had a chance of winning its war with the United States short of divine intervention. This is a seminal work and absolutely not to be missed. The technical detail may bore and quail the casual reader, but the serious student and the reader wanting the truth of the matter won't be put off. This is the best English language work available on the subject and should be read in conjunction with "War Plan Orange."

"Kaigun" traces the meteoric ascent of the Imperial Japanese Navy from its modest beginnings during the post-Tokugawa era to its apex at the outbreak of the Second World War. In order to obtain a comprehensive picture of how the Imperial Navy performed in the Pacific War, this book should be read in conjunction with Dull's "A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy," and Peattie's "Sunburst: The Rise of the Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909-1941."

In its struggle to attain naval parity with the United States, its notional enemy during the interwar period, the Imperial Navy emphasized qualitative prowess over material superiority; this was highly evident in the development of Japanese naval doctrine, tactics and equipment. The Imperial Navy pioneered many innovations in weapons and tactics, such as the development of the oxygen-propelled torpedo, the use of destroyers in offensive operations, and employing midget submarines to offset the material superiority of the enemy. But masking these undeniably vital innovations were many fatal shortcomings. Truly, the devil was in the details, and the Imperial Navy ignored what may be considered the less glamorous but arguably equally important 'back-end' of naval operations. For instance, in a pre-Deming Japan, shipyard efficiency was abysmal, especially in view of the efficiency levels attained by US yards. In constructing one class of Japanese destroyers, the Japanese took one year on average to complete one vessel, while US shipyards turned out one destroyer every six months on average.

The Imperial Navy was fittingly proud of its elite core of naval professionals, which was highly instrumental in allowing the Navy to win two major naval engagements in the first thirty years of its existence. The careers of prime movers in the Navy such as Togo Heihachiro, Yamamoto Gombei and Sato Tetsutaro are discussed in the book.

However, the presence of the crème de la crème might have actually blinded the Navy to the fact that its recruitment policies were intrinsically flawed; its elitism allowed it to become complacent and to overlook the need for a sizeable body of naval reservists. When the Navy undertook Operation Hawaii, it was actually undermanned by approximately two thousand officers, according to a study cited in the book. The laundry list of shortcomings included logistics, intelligence, electronics, cryptography and so on.

For me, a novice in military history, the book held many surprises. Foremost among them is that the Combined Fleet attained glory in the Russo-Japanese War only after so many initial foibles. The preliminary maneuvers involving destroyers can be likened to a comedy of errors if not for the fact that night fighting is inherently difficult.

The tome has many illustrations and tables, making it useful for citations and referencing. However, sticklers for good information design would undoubtedly be perturbed with some of the graphs, because they appear to have been amateurishly formatted on Microsoft Excel. Despite its graphical quirks, "Kaigun" should be a valuable addition to a history collection, primarily because of its reliance on many Japanese-language sources.

The authors present an analysis of the development of the Imperial Japanses Navy, the strategies, tactics and weapons developed to defeat supposed foes from 1887 to 1941. It covers the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars as well as the lessons Japan learned from Jutland during WWI. Japan prepared strategically for a great decisive battle against the United States in the Western Pacific (the avowed enemy since 1907) but failed to actually practice the tactics set forth in their tactical manuals. Contained in this book are fascinating ship plans, weapon specifications and aircraft performance data to underline the Japanese intentions. The Japanese planned to outrange the US Navy and strike from a distance on the surface, in the air, and underwater. The authors included the best detailed analysis yet of Japanese deployment against US Plan Rainbow Five. Ironically, even after the Japanese strike on Pearl Harbor, the Naval General Staff still sought the all out decisive battle in which the US Pacific Fleet would be finally annihilated. This was to be at Midway. I could go on and on. This book is the best analysis of how Japan built her navy and why said navy could never win. If I could give it six stars I would. It is a must read for historians, modelers, wargamers, anyone with an interest in the War in the Pacific in World War II.

This is a solid, comprehensively researched explication of strategic naval decisions that led Japan to WWII. It dispels the notion that Japan went to war against interest because of "victory disease" and "war fever." It corrects the idea that the navy was less culpable than the army, and documents the role that JIN posturing for appropriations played in the decisions that led to Pearl Harbor. It repeats familiar ironies, such as the fact that Japan would have obtained its goals if it had not attacked the U.S. But there are unfamiliar ironies, too--for example, Japan went to war to obtain oil, primarily for its navy, but diverted so much new construction into building its navy (70%) that it had little capacity to transport oil from Sumatra back to Japan. The book covers major failures in Japan's preparations--failure to put research on a war footing, to subject army and navy to central command, to use photo intelligence, to adjust strategy, to avoid a war of attrition with a foe more capable of carrying on such a war, to solve supply and logistics problems, and to use submarines effectively. It also notes Japanese successes--night torpedo attack, optics. It's scholarly: Who uses "inter alia" anymore, even in print? Nonetheless, its style, voluminous footnotes and extensive bibliography make it useful to those with armchair and scholarly interests alike. This book pulls many loose threads together; for that reason, it will be most useful to those who have read many other books about WWII in the Pacific.

My dad graduated from the US Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1938, just in time for the War. He commanded destroyers and destroyer escorts between 1939 and 1947. He was present for many of the famous island battles, Kwajalein, Iwo Jima, Tarawa, Phillipines, Marianas Turkey Shoot, etc. My uncles both flew fighter planes off big carriers, such as ..... I began reading about all this when I was a boy, at a time when the War was forefront in everyone's consciousness. Since then I have read hundreds of books about the War, across the whole spectrum from battle excitement to weapons engineering. It's only during the last few years that I've noted books from the Japanese side of the War. The Japanese don't write for us.

Kaigun presents an American Version of the Japanese Version.
Although written by Americans, Kaigun is about weapons technology, navy doctrine and strategy in the Japanese Navy, covering roughly the years 1875-1941. They cite Japanese sources, write about Japanese officers and staff, and they try to present the Japanese viewpoint as well as foreigners can. Americans, including me, have always found the Japanese largely impossible to understand. Even so, the authors speak Japanese, taught Japanese History, and they have worked in Japan for years. Let's give them the benefit of the doubt.

It's not a book for everyone. Most general readers will become quickly bored because there are no battles, no heroes, and the Japanese names are difficult to remember. Imagine, a book about the War in the Pacific that ends before the Pearl Harbor attack! To understand this book readers need to know their WW2 naval history, plus a little bit about naval weapons. So, this book might interest naval professionals, veterans of the Pacific War, and military historians. Perhaps engineers might like this book. They will use the book at the naval academy in Annapolis.

Some of their main themes:
1. Fixation on the climactic Fleet action. Both navies, Japanese and American, were fixated on big Fleet ideas. They expected Battleships and Heavy Cruisers ti meet in a climatic fleet action that would decide the War. Few commanders on either side could foresee the decisive role of aircraft carriers and naval air. As a result of this expectation, the Japanese built giant expensive craft, such as Kongo, Musashi and Yamato, which hardly figured in later fighting at all. This was perhaps ironic, because the big Japanese ships were faster, bigger, had more accurate guns, better trained crews, etc.

2. A Naval Arms Race. After the end of the Washington Treaty, the Japanese Navy was obsessed with the size and composition of the larger USN. Because they could not keep up with American building, they were forced to think about doctrines to successfully fight a much larger enemy. To defeat the larger, formidable USN, the Japanese worked on their fighting doctrines for decades, and they tried to build a technologically superior, better-trained force.

3. Fractured Japanese High Command. The Japanese Army thought Japan's enemies were China, Russia, and to a lesser extent England and Holland. The Japanese Navy thought the big enemy was the United States. The Japanese never sorted out their strategic priorities because they did not have their own equivalent of our Joint Chiefs. No one, not even Hirohito could make the Army and Navy sit down together to integrate National priorities. As a result, much of the Pacific War, at least the island part, only involved the Japanese Navy. Many of the island fortresses were manned by Jap Marines, not the Japanese army, which was largely intact at the end of the War.

4. Technological Advance. Much of this book focuses on the implications of weapons and weapons advances. For example, the Japanese long lance torpedo, the range, accuracy and control of big guns, the advances in naval aviation that made carriers dangerous, night vision and night fighting.... These discussions interest me because the authors show how the hardware interacts with the doctrine and how the two of those relate to strategy. For instance, The Japanese built many good subs but too many variants to permit economies of scale in building them The Japanese subs were expected to interfere with the progress of the USN across the Pacific. But the fighting doctrine - subs versus capital ships - failed with the advent of the destroyer escort screen. Moreover, Japanese command structures did not give their commanders room to change their tactics in the heat of battle. As a result, the Japanese sub force was largely irrelevant to the course of the War.

What it all means.

To Evans and Peattie, as well as previous writers, such as H.P. Willmott, The Barrier and the Javelin, Empires in the Balance; for Japan to start a major war against the United States (let alone England and China) in 1941 was reckless. I can't think of an example where such a poor country, as weak as Japan, has ever fought an aggressive War against such a powerful, advanced, and well-armed defender. Even if the Japanese had destroyed everything at Pearl, the United States could have beaten Japan with one arm tied behind its back. At the War's start, America had 17 times Japan's GNP, five times Japan's steel production, seven times Japans coal production, eighty (80!) times the production capacity for motor vehicles. Besides which, Japan did not have oil or iron. During the war, the human and productive superiority of the United States quickly asserted itself. For example, the United States built 141 aircraft carriers 1941-1945 versus Japan's nine carriers! During the War, America built around 1200 warships versus Japans 167. Japan, a feather weight, was attacking a super-heavyweight.. All in all, the Japanese were mad with unrealistic dreams for empire. Emperor Hirohito should have done something to put a lid on his crazy military commanders, especially the mad-for-glory officers in his Navy Staff.

My dad and my uncles used to get together every Sunday after the War. They'd sit talking in our kitchen. They wanted to hang Hirohito and they were angry that MacArthur had spared the Emperor. If the Japanese had any sense they would have hanged Hirohito themselves! It's amazing to see that Japanese historians, even today, rush to the defense of Hirohito, such as Ienaga, Pacific War, and Iriye, Origins of Second World War in Asia. Last but not least, there's a good looking website with pictures, drawings, and commentary about the Japanese Navy in WW2, [...]