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A Kant Dictionary (Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries)

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This book would be very useful to you if you are taking an undergraduate course in Kantian philosophy. If you're having trouble remembering what Kant means when he uses the words "transcendentalism" and "ethics" and "pure reason" and stuff like that, this book will be a good resource. And the definitions aren't just a few words, many are more than a page. The only warning I would place on this book is that many of the definitions provided are interpretive of the philosophy rather than just descriptive. So that could cause a problem if you have a professor who is fully persuaded in his own interpretation. But overall this is a good and helpful book to have to quickly reacquaint yourself with most of Kant's main philosophical ideas and terms.

From A to Z, here is a dictionary on Kant's philosophy which, surprisingly enough, is quite helpful. For someone who is trying to gain a better understanding of Kant's philosophy this text is an invaluable tool to have handy. It is easy to use (since it is an A to Z topical dictionary) and contains a few extra features such as an Introduction on Kant and the Language of Philosophy, an article on Kant and the 'Age of Criticism,' a very handy chronology of Kant's published writings, a section called "Works Referred to in the Text" which sites all the works used to put this dictionary together, a recommended reading list (quite nice feature), and an index of philosophers and philosophical concepts.

Thus, for a text dealing with Kant, the reader gets not only great information on Kant's philosophy, but on his actual works, his concepts, his time period, and information on those philosophers who preceded and followed him.

What is more, a student can use this text to branch out into deeper study on Kant's philosophy due to the recommended reading, but also by way of the text itself. What I mean is, the entries include cross references, text abbreviations where the information (or concept) can be found in Kant's work, and the German origin of the entry/word/concept itself.

Overall, this is a very nice edition to anyone's philosophical library. Moreover, it is one of the better reference works I have seen or used in my research of Immanuel Kant. I highly recommend this text.

I forget the exact words and who said them, but a more recent philosopher once observed that Kant wrote for the 'salvation of the ordinary man, in words that the ordinary man could not possibly understand'. This problem, compounded by the even more abstruse interpretations of Kantian terminology offered by contemporary analytic philosophers, exacerbates the notorious difficulties in following the meaning of the terminology employed by Kant in his arguments in the way that: 1) Kant intended them to be understood, and 2) allows one to meaningfully participate in contemporary discourse surrounding this essential work. Kant is a thinker, like Spinoza before him, whom one must come to terms with. Yet, to understand the terms he uses, one must have a quick, dictionary reference, ready to hand - immediate access to definitions of the terms as one reads. This need is met here. While excellent works like the widely acclaimed CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO KANT are wonderful aids in helping us understand these seminal and challenging texts, they are not ordered in the reference style format which is needed when reading Kant.
Caygill's excellent ancillary work, written in clear, unencumbered prose, is worthy of the highest approbation. I ask the prospective reader: Where else are you going to find explanations of all the terminology in Kant, and all the abbreviations used in the critical literature, critically juried by some of the top Kant scholars in the world, arranged in alphabetical order, all in one well-ordered, easily accessed volume?
Ironically, as Caygill informs us, in the entry for "definition", that, decribing definition as the presentation of the "...the complete, original concept of a thing within the limits of its concept", Kant "...goes to some length to show that, strictly speaking, there can be no philosophical definitions. Empirical concepts cannot be defined because it is impossible to know their precise limits, nor is it possible to be certain that they are original. They may be explicated by making their contents explicit, but they do not fulfill the criteria of definition. Nor do a priori concepts, since it is impossible to be certain that analysis has been completely effected: "the completeness of the analysis of my concept is always in doubt , and a multiplicity of suitable examples suffices only to make the completeness probable, never to make it apodeictically certain". (CPR A 729/ B 757)
Albeit, Caygill does well enough to warrant that there is no one approaching Kant's texts, regardless of their level of expertise (and most of us have relatively little, who would not be privileged to have this comprehensive reference ready-to-hand.

whether it's your first experience with kant, or you're revisiting him upon reading an essay about him: this book is very useful. it highlights kant's vocabulary in alphabetical order with a little definition of each word. BUT,more importantly, it has references to WHERE the word gets used. and the dictionary spans his entire career. so, it's an excellent reference.

the binding is a bit stiff.
but, still, really useful.

When it comes to a philosophical dictionary, the ideals of brevity and depth must be brought into harmony; this may not always be an easy task, and more often than not the one will come at the expense of the other. As an unconditional requirement, a philosophical dictionary should excel in at least one of the two aforementioned respects. A dictionary excelling in the former respect is Bernard Wuellner's Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy, whereas a dictionary excelling in the latter is Tim Bottomore's Dictionary of Marxist Thought. As for Mr Caygill's dictionary, one may safely state that it fails miserably on both scores. In the introduction to his dictionary, Mr Caygill formulates his aim: to compose a dictionary which treats of the philosophical concepts in an acroamatic rather than in an axiomatic fashion. According to the acroamatic approach, heed must be taken of the fact that philosophical concepts are dynamic are rather than static, viz., they are, in Mr Caygill's own words, "the discursive outcome of an open-ended process of reflection upon philosophical problems" (p. 2). This peculiar approach may assuredly have its merits, so long as it does not defeat the purpose of a dictionary. In this regard it will prove worthwhile to compare Mr Caygill's dictionary with the Kant-Lexikon of Rudolf Eisler. For the sake of illustration, let us look at their respective treatment of "apperception". Eisler has two entries on apperception, i.e., empirical and transcendental apperception, cross-referenced to "inner sense", "consciousness", and "apprehension". Furthermore, Eisler always offers a definition of the concept in question at the very beginning of the entry, so that the gist of it is conveyed to one instantaneously. If you wish to acquire a deeper understanding of the issue, you can read the whole of the entry, but that is not a strict necessity. Now to Mr Caygill, who treats of both empirical and transcendental apperception in a single entry, and it is difficult to see where the one ends and the other begins. Moreover, Mr Caygill, in accordance with his acroamatic approach, does not initiate his entry with a definition but with historical digressions about how Leibniz and Descartes understood the concept in question. Only towards the middle of this nearly two pages long entry does Mr Caygill come to what should have been stated at the very beginning. While Eisler's cross-references make immediate sense, it is difficult to understand the whole of the acroamatic logic behind Mr Caygill's cross-references, whose entry on apperception is cross-referenced to "combination", "consciousness", "deduction", "identity", "I think", "knowledge", "paralogism", "psychology", "spontaneity", "subject", "synthesis", and "transcendental". While Eisler's cross-references are in agreement with the rules of strict relevance, Mr Caygill tends to lump together concepts which are only remotely related. I am sure that such a strategy can be justified from acroamatic point of view, but from a properly pedagogical point of view it is anything but advisable. Lastly, it is a cause of great indignation to bear witness to Mr Caygill's deprecation of Rudolf Eisler's Kant-Lexikon as he attempts to promote his own dictionary. Eisler's dictionary, owing to its depth and breadth, is a tool of lasting value, whereas Mr Caygill's dictionary is likely to be rendered superfluous within two weeks of engagement with the writings of Kant.

In the area of pure intellectual thought, Kant occupies a unique place near the beginning of modern philosophy that shows to an amazing extent how much we have discarded his immediate predecessors, Leibniz (1646-1716, mentioned in 35 topics in this book) and Christian Wolff (1679-1754, mentioned in 44 topics). For comparison, consider my favorite expert on Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860, who is mentioned only in nine topics, some of them quite small words, like: "drive, duty, force, will" per page 443) who studied Kant intensely and produced an "Appendix: Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy" on pages 413-534 of THE WORLD AS WILL AND REPRESENTATION, Translated from the German by E. F. J. Payne in Two Volumes, Volume I.

Those who have no need to learn Kant for the college credit to be gained by passing courses in philosophy might still consider how useful A KANT DICTIONARY by Howard Caygill will be for them as intellectual underwear. Our modern world looks askance at anything that claims to be more absolute than underwear, but still allows revolutionary claims to be made for Kant by philosophers. The scope of thought included in A KANT DICTIONARY might be cited as support for the idea that Kant was great. However, he mainly placed himself on the political sidelines, far from ruthless political currents of the modern world, and staying close to home, much as Kris Kristofferson parodied the 20th century mainstream political mentality in his version of "Okie from Muskogee" with its humor about those patriotic heroes who don't shoot deadly marijuana, "and all we ever drop's our B.V.D.s." The comedy version of what goes around, comes around might seem more out of place applied to Kant than to anyone else, but this says as much about Kant as about our prime comedians, few of whom have the time to attempt to be as serious as those who teach Kant seem to be whenever they write a book.

As a serious work, A KANT DICTIONARY does offer information about the Copernican revolution in philosophy. This book is clearer than Kant on the importance of key words in this explanation, `revolution,' `Revolutions,' `revolved around the spectator,' " `tried whether he might not have better success if he made the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain at rest'. Yet while Copernicus's revolution" (p. 135) was found to conform to scientific laws, "Kant maintains that his CPR will go further than Copernicus by proving . . . that objects conform to knowledge, not knowledge to objects." (p. 136). This is a nice bit of knowledge to have, also available in the Preface to Second Edition of Kant's CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, pages B vii to B xliv as the pages of the standard edition are designated, running from Kant's discussion of the intuition of the spectator in metaphysics on page B xvi through a footnote on page B xxii, which made the claim, "The change in point of view, analogous to this hypothesis, which is expounded in the CRITIQUE, I put forward in this preface as an hypothesis only, in order to draw attention to the character of these first attempts at such a change, which are always hypothetical. But in the CRITIQUE itself it will be proved . . ."

The "List of abbreviations of Kant's published writings" on pages 5-6 is a key to understanding why letters like CPR and CPrR keep showing up, as well as "and the `Analytic of the Sublime' in CJ." (p. 348). What sustains interest in this book is the idea that these are all great works, as basic for philosophy as the medical kind of CPR is the immediate response necessary to revive patients who need to be brought back to life when vital signs cease. In the main section of A KANT DICTIONARY, the entry for death merely says "see Fear, Finitude, Immortality, Punishment, Time," (p. 151) but there is also an interesting comment in the account of Kant's life, "after the death of Frederick the Great in 1786. Frederick's successor, Frederick William II, initiated a counter-Enlightenment which sought, by means of censorship, to curb the freedom of the press and to extend obedience to precisely those arguments concerning Church and State permitted by his predecessor." (p. 10). Kant was not in trouble until he published RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE in 1793. There was a time when Kant promised not to publish what he thought, but he was sensitive to who was likely to read his work. "Kant considered himself released from his promise with the death of Frederick William II in 1797" (p. 11). A KANT DICTIONARY is not afraid to devote a page to "church [Kirche] see also God, State, Theodicy, Theology." (p. 110). But "Kant's ecclesiology has had relatively little impact upon modern theology." (p. 111). That might be true, unless you think he dropped its B.V.D.s.