Most Helpful Customer Reviews
|
|
36 of 37 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A revisionist reading of Kant, July 17, 2001
The author gives a sensitive, detailed, and very understandable overview of Kant's construction of transcendental idealism. He clearly is supportive of Kant's ideas, but he does approach them also with a critical analysis. Readers who disagree with Kant are encouraged to read this book, as it offers a fresh perspective on his ideas. Kant's philosophy has pervaded many fields, such as psychology, physics, logic, and ethics, and therefore an understanding of these fields and modern philosophy will need as prerequisite a study of Kant. Allison attempts to set straight the "standard picture" of Kant, which he argues does not fairly represent the Kantian view. The philosophers P.F. Strawson and H.A. Prichard are to be held mostly responsible for this mistaken picture argues the author. Allison's position is that the standard picture fails to distinguish between "ideality" and "reality" and between appearances and things in themselves. He attempts to defend Kant's thinking in terms of these distinctions. A reader really interested in an in-depth analysis of his arguments will need to have a thorough knowledge of the German language. Allison argues that there is a definite distinction between an empirical and transcendental sense of 'ideality' and 'reality'. Empirically, 'ideality' characterizes the private data of an individual mind, but at the transcendental level, it characterizes the universal, necessary, and a priori conditions of human knowledge. This is an interesting reading of Kant, for it refutes the main objection to his philosophy, namely that the structure of the mind precludes any real knowledge of things. A transcendentally real object is then a nonsensible object (noumenon). The (actual) existence of these objects need not be postulated at all when reading Kant. Calling an object 'ideal' is not making a statement about its existence; empirical objects are ideal only because they cannot be described independently of the "forms of sensibility". Again, one can see in this reading of Kant a definite refutation of skepticism, for at the empirical level, the appearances are mental and the things in themselves are physical; at the transcendental level, appearance means relative to the subjective conditions, while things in themselves are independent of these conditions. The conditions do not determine how things appear in the empirical realm, they give universal and necessary conditions for the capability of the mind to recognize an object. One can argue here that it is these very conditions that set the foundation for genuine knowledge of objects; or an even more minimal view that they serve as precursors to genuine knowledge. To elaborate on Kant in a more organized and rigorous manner, Allison introduces the concept of an "epistemic condition". These are conditions that establish the pure concepts of the understanding and also the forms of human sensibility. They are different form psychological conditions, which are unique to the human cognitive apparatus, and from ontological conditions, which are conditions of the being of things. According to the author Kant refutes Hume by showing that Hume confuses psychological and epistemic conditions, and also refutes Newton by showing that Newton confused epistemic with ontological conditions. The author also clears up the misreading of Kant that characterizes appearances as "mere representations". Kant's claim is not, according to Allison, that objects have no independent existence but rather that such existence cannot be attributed to them in the manner in which they are represented. It is here though that Allison slips a little and weakens his case against Kantian skepticism when he summarizes the Kantian position as stating that whatever is necessary for the representation of something as an object must reflect the cognitive structure of the mind rather than the nature of the object as it is in itself. He seems to be saying that the very structure of the human mind, and its required use in the attempts to gain knowledge, precludes such knowledge. The author also clears up the Kantian position versus phenomenalism. Whatever is actual must be an object of possible perception, but this is a consequence of actuality and not a cognition. Whatever can be connected with a given perception in accordance with the "analogies of experience" is to be deemed actual. This move by Kant removes the element of subjectivity in claims on actuality, distancing himself from Berkeley's purely psychological account of perception, defining the possibility of perception in terms of conformity to a priori principles. In addition, the Kantian position on conceptual knowledge is clarified by Allison. Kant contrasts the human capacity for conceptual knowledge versus the notion of an intuitive intellect, the later which is purely creative and requires no cognitive effort. Further, and central to the human capability for abstraction, is the Kantian notion that a concept is an organizing principle for consciousness. Sensible intuition provides the mind with only the raw data for conceptualization, not with the determinate knowledge of objects.
|
|
|
17 of 18 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Essential Reading Prior to K's CPR, August 19, 2002
This text is the most sympathetic reading of Kant's CPR in English. Allison is perhaps the ablest defender of Kant in the USA. Burge once said that Allison defends Kant a bit too sympathetically--perhaps believes that K. is right. I think Allison's defensive reading is crucial in understanding Kant's Transcendental Project, or the Critical Project. If one wants a clear notion of what Kant meant by "Transcendental Idealism," this text is required reading. Allison's prose is careful, clear, and cautious. He brings light to often obscure passages of 'the Master.' While I have the chance to plug it, I highly recommend Kuehn's biography on Kant (Cambridge UP), esp. for students new to the CPR. Also, the N. Kemp Smith translation of K's CPR is standard in the field, but the new Guyer-Wood translation (Cambridge UP) is certainly worth checking out. Many corrections. For an 'empirical' reading of Kant, see Strawson's Bounds of Sense. Also, his Individuals. For excellent readings and clear interpretations of Kant, see Allison, Guyer (K and the Claims of Knowledge), Strawson (not altogether sympathetic with K's 'T.I.'), and Collins (Possible Experience/ U CAL). On Kant and "Transcendental Arguments," see Stroud's articles (Human Knowledge/Oxford UP), A. Brueckner (articles), and D. Stern's anthology (Oxford UP).
|
|
|
10 of 11 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
best work I have found on T.I., December 14, 2002
I recently finished reading a handful of secondary sources on Kant's Transcendental Idealism/Critique of Pure Reason, and this was one of the most fair and most readable ones. .... While Allison could be criticized for sympathizing a bit too much with Kant, he is simply attempting to present Kant in a less idealistic light than that in which he is usually examined. While many scholars see Kant as a Berkeleian idealist who was too scared to admit his true beliefs, or who did not recognize his true beliefs, Allison takes Kant's statements rebuking Cartesian/Humean skepticism and Berkeleian idealism seriously.
Allison makes one of his most important points early on, that is, that Berkeleian idealist readings of Kant always interpret the transcendental ideality of space and time as meaning that space and time are a set of either ontological or psychological conditions for the possibility of the representation of objects, while in fact Kant only means that space and time are epistemic conditions of human knowledge. This is the basis for Kant's revolution, that objects have to be representable to be represented, meaning that they have to conform to a priori epistemic human conditions to be possibly experienced. This seems much easier to swallow than the contents of Transcendental Analytic, even though those contents have recieved so much acclaim from English scholars who write very boring books which get published only because they hold teaching positions at major overrated English univeristies. Anyhow, while critiques of Kant which represent him as an idealist and view his Transcendental Aesthetic as skeptical hogwash certainly gain some support from some of Kant's statements, these critiques are abundant and all say basically the same thing. For a fresh interpretation of Kant that takes statements Kant makes about the nature of his own philosophy seriously, and which shows the true merit in Kant's work, Allison's book gets the job done.
|
|
|
Most Recent Customer Reviews
|
by Sebastian Gardner
by Paul Guyer
See all Editorial Reviews
