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1.0 out of 5 stars
Follow the Arguments -- You'll Find They Don't Get You Anywhere, June 25, 2008
This review is from: Kashmir Saivism: The Central Philosophy of Tantrism (Hardcover)
It's important to keep in mind that this book does not claim to be a religious work, nor a dogmatic exposition of Tantrism; it claims to be a work of philosophy, a fully logical and rational justification of Kashmir Saivism. Thus, it must be judged as a philosophical work. Mishra does not, as many practitioners do, hide behind the claim that "Reason" cannot describe "Ultimate Reality" and that therefore no philosophy could explain or justify Tantrism. After all, if Kashmir Saivism is a "science," as it claims, then its conclusions must be verifiable by reason -- a point Mishra repeats over and over again (e.g., p. 79). He goes so far as to write, "Reason is itself a manifestation of ultimate Reality, so it has the full right to demand Reality to condescend to the level of reason and reveal itself in a way in which reason can understand it" (p. 109).
By any "rational" (logical, philosophical) standard, however, the arguments contained in Mishra's book are horrendously awful. And when I say awful, I mean textbook awful: whole paragraphs could be pulled out and used as excellent demonstrations of faulty reasoning. Throughout, Mishra makes what are called "circular" arguments, that is, an argument in which the premises assume the truth of the conclusion. For instance, if I set out to prove that chocolate is the best ice cream ever, I can't be said to have established my conclusion if a central component of my argument necessarily depends upon the assumption that chocolate is the best ice cream ever. Mishra does this sort of thing constantly: the premises of the arguments he propounds to "prove" the truth of various propositions regarding Kashmir Saivism invariably assume the truth of Kashmir Saivism! Thus, the argument assumes to be true the very thing it sets out to prove. As philosophical work, this book is simply embarrassing.
Ironically, as a philosopher Mishra remains trapped in what Western philosophers call "subject-object dualism." Subject-object dualism is a pernicious though common trap, and it gives rise to all sorts of difficulties and absurdities. (A thumbnail sketch of subject-object dualism: There is a radical separation between our inner world and the external world such that we are unable to access the external world directly but can only do so via "mental representations" [typically, sense-data]. Thus, we never see "the table," only our mental representations of the table. But if that's true, how can we ever know anything about the table in itself, independent of our mental representations?) The fact that an Eastern philosopher committed to non-dualism would propound arguments that presuppose the framework of subject-object dualism -- and, moreover, that he would treat the framework as though there were no alternative but to accept it -- is surprising, to say the least.
Briefly, the biggest weakness of the book is that it skips over THE crucial point: it moves directly from establishing that the "higher experiences" of the yogins and seers, which form the foundation of Tantrism's "experiential" claims, cannot be definitively disproved to expounding the Tantric system based upon those experiences. That's quite a leap! I'm equally unable to disprove (definitively) the claim that world was created by the Flying Spaghetti Monster and that in a recent mystical experience a friend of mine touched His Noodly Appendage, but it hardly follows that I should take the claim seriously. All Mishra does is appeal to authority, i.e., the yogins and seers themselves, yet without seriously considering the myriad reasons why a modern person might be suspicious of the seers' claims.
Tantrism claims to establish its grand Idealistic metaphysics on the basis of induction from experience, in an analogous fashion to how scientists base conclusions on empirical experimentation. This picture, however, seems to depend on a wildly naive understanding of experience and its role in generating knowledge. Not all experiences are epistemic, that is, knowledge-generating. Just because someone has had an experience does not prove the truth of the interpretation given to that experience, especially when the experience is removed from ordinary empirical experience. Consider drug-induced hallucinatory experiences: these do not generate knowledge about the world (except for knowledge about the drug's effects). Tantrism depends on maintaining a sharp distinction between empirical experience and the experiences of yogins and seers, yet it treats the latter as substantially the same as the former, in terms of their epistemic import. Mishra acknowledges that not all "non-empirical" experiences are "genuine," but fails to make a non-circular argument in defense of the validity of Tantric experience. To illustrate my point, let's look briefly at the text:
"What is the guarantee that the so-called higher experience is not a mere illusion?" Mishra asks, quite reasonably. His response is twofold: (1) "Higher experience... carries with it its own clarity and guarantee" (pp. 74-5). (2) "In Self-realization [i.e., higher experience] there is no possibility of illusion, as it is the realization not of an object but of the subject itself."
It's easy enough to see that both of these arguments are circular in the sense described above. Point (1) amounts to the claim that the higher experiences validate themselves, which is an awfully convenient claim coming from someone attempting to rationally validate the experiences -- turns out he doesn't have to! How nice for him! Furthermore, it fails to distinguish Tantric experience from run-of-the-mill insanity, for surely most paranoid schizophrenics feel the same regarding the experiences that "justify" their conclusions. As for Point (2), it is blatantly circular: notice how the argument depends on the truth of the higher experiences. The argument really amounts to a conditional claim to the effect that if the higher experiences are of a particular kind, then they could not possibly lead to illusion. But the nature of the higher experience is the very thing in dispute! This is just bad philosophy, folks. Really bad.
There is much more I could say about this book's wild and misleading claims (especially its nonsense about science), but I've run out of room.
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