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16 of 16 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Good, but appears to gloss over US tactical mistakes, July 27, 2005
This review is from: Kasserine Pass 1943: Rommel's last victory (Campaign) (Paperback)
The battle of Kasserine Pass in February 1943 is typically remembered as both the initial baptism of fire of US troops in Europe in the Second World War and as a US tactical defeat that led to much-needed reforms - a theme that was well covered in Rick Atkinson's excellent "An Army at Dawn" in 2002 . However, in Osprey Campaign #152, veteran author Stephen J. Zaloga argues that, "contrary to the popular image, Kasserine Pass was in the end an Allied victory." This is a very hard-sell argument and if it was not a historian of Zaloga's caliber making it, this thesis would probably be dead on arrival. Zaloga argues that the tactical setbacks in the opening days of the campaign caused Eisenhower to heavily reinforce the US II Corps in Tunisia and then ordered it to adopt a more offensive posture than had been contemplated before the German attack, which then led to the quick collapse of the Axis position in southern Tunisia. Zaloga makes a decent case, but in the end it is not that convincing - the plain fac ts about US and German comparative losses in the campaign are rather difficult to get around and still claim that the affair was a US triumph. Indeed, Zaloga's subtitle - "Rommel's last victory" - seems to refute his hypothesis that Kasserine was a US victory. Nevertheless, Zaloga's narrative is clear and well argued as usual, and this volume deserves its place on the bookshelf with Zaloga's earlier volumes.
Zaloga's opening section on the background to the campaign in Tunis and Operation Torch is clear and succinct. The section on opposing commanders - never Zaloga's forte - is a bit weak, particularly in that the focus is mostly on army-level commanders, rather than the actual tactical commanders (for a campaign that essentially only involved a couple of divisions on each side). However, the section on opposing armies is very good and Zaloga covers a great deal in these eleven pages (although the Allied OB is only 5 lines - Zaloga might have listed some of the non-divisional tank destroyer units at least). Zaloga's section on opposing plans is also excellent and highlights both the arguments and disunity in the Axis command that led to a muddled operational plan as well as the failure of Allied intelligence analysis that predicted a German attack elsewhere. Indeed, Zaloga highlights that the availability of Enigma-derived information about German planning led Allied intelligence officers to discount other tactical reporting - today, we would call this a problem in intelligence fusion, where information from one preferred source is allowed to drown out other equally valid sources. Poor intelligence analysis about the location of the expected German attack, combined with inadequate forces and a faulty US tactical doctrine meant that US forces would fight under severe handicaps when they first met the Wehrmacht. The volume also includes five 2-D maps (the strategic situation in Tunisia, 10 February 1943; preliminary moves in central Tunisia, Jan-Feb 1943; rival Axis plans; Operation Wop, 16-23 March 1943; US II Corps in northern Tunisia, April-May 1943) and three 3-D maps (Sidi Bou Zid, 14-15 February 1943; Kasserine Pass, 20-22 February 1943; El Guettar, 23 March 1943). The volume also includes three excellent battle scenes (the charge of 2/1st Armored at Sidi Bou Zid, 15 Feb 1943; 10th Panzer Division at El Guettar, 23 March; Operation Flax: the Cap Bon Massacre, 22 April 1943) by Michael Welply.
Zaloga's coverage of the initial fighting around Sidi Bou Zid is a bit skimpy and he seems to avoid any criticism of the extremely inept US tactical leadership in this first battle. Zaloga notes that German panzers moved to "silence" US artillery - in fact they overran and destroyed the 2-17th Field Artillery. He says senior US commanders "were wary" of the first reports of the attack - in fact, Eisenhower was goofing off with his staff at the time. Nor does Zaloga mention the fate of the 168th Infantry Regiment which was left isolated in the hills near Sidi Bou Zid - both battalions attempted to escape but about 1,800 US troops were captured in the process. In a matter of one day, the Germans had eliminated virtually an entire US reinforced brigade, at slight cost to themselves. Furthermore, Zaloga makes little mention of the uneven performance of US troops in this first fight - with some fighting heroically but others running or refusing to fight. All in all, the US performance at Sidi Bou Zid was very poor - but this is not entirely evident in Zaloga's account.
The section on the actual fighting in Kasserine Pass is good, emphasizing both Rommel's failure to settle on a single tactical objective and the chaotic Allied efforts to stem the German breakthrough. At this point, Zaloga probably should have started to wrap the volume up, since he had covered the actual Kasserine Pass fighting, but instead he chooses to cover the US role in the final stages of the Tunisian Campaign in the last third of the volume. Zaloga essentially ignores the Commonwealth forces in this last stage - they actually formed the bulk of Allied forces in Tunisia - and focuses only on the US II Corps, which presents an incomplete and rather unnecessary wrap-up to the campaign. In particular, Zaloga points to Patton's success at El Guettar on 23 March 1943 as the "US Army's first victory over the Wehrmacht ." However, Zaloga does not mention that the US 9th Infantry Division suffered over 3,000 casualties in the next week around El Guettar without achieving much and Major General Ward, commander of the 1st Armored Division, was wounded in close combat. If El Guettar was a victory, it didn't trouble the Germans much. Zaloga seems to want to avoid criticizing the US conduct in this campaign, but that is rather difficult and the idea that it was a victory is a stretch.
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2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
The fight for Kasserine Pass, July 6, 2010
This review is from: Kasserine Pass 1943: Rommel's last victory (Campaign) (Paperback)
This campaign by noted author, Steven Zaloga, is really more than the battle for Kasserine Pass. The author begins his introduction with history concerning the Anglo-French friction caused by issues of June and July 1940, of Rommel arriving in Africa in Feb, 1941, of the German defeat at El Alamein in Oct 1942 and moves on to discuss the American landing in Western Africa in Nov 1942. Though this intro takes up five pages, it will give the new student a good foundation from which to learn of the campaign that leads to the surrender of the Germans in May 1943.
In traditional Osprey format, a one page chronology follows this background info and it covers the time when Rommel arrives in Africa until the German surrender.
Of the next three chapters the "Opposing Commanders" was the shortest and weakest. Mr Zaloga covers the top people on each side but not any of the lower officers which will take part in the campaign. On the German side Rommel, Arnim and Kesselring are discussed. There is much friction between Rommel and Arnim and it will have a major negative impact on their offensive. On the American side Eisenhower, Patton, Fredenhall and to a less extent Bradley are covered. Giraud and Juinis are discussed for the French forces.
Opposing Armies has more space and is more informative. It contains coverage of the German, Italian, American, French forces and includes brief Orders of Battle. Though the British played a secondary role in this campaign, it was an important backup role but they are not covered in this chapter. Their coverage is part of the campaign.
I liked the Opposing Plans chapter the best. Eight pages are devoted to it and it gives the reader a clear understanding of what is trying to be accomplished on both sides and it transitions smoothly into the Campaign. The Allies were holding defensive positions on the Eastern Dorsal with intentions of waiting until spring when Patton and Montgomery coordinate the final offensive to stop the Axis. As usual Rommel and von Arnim were arguing with each other and couldn't agree on strategy. Being more conservative, von Arnim wanted to campaign in the Fondouk and Pinchon sectors while Rommel wanted to attack further south by clearing Kasserine and then moving on to capture the Allied depot at Tebessa.
The campaign coverage is pretty good; all the key engagements are discussed: Arnim's panzers defeated the 1st AD at Sidi bou Zid forcing the Americans chaotically back to Sbeitla and eventual withdrew from Sbeita as well. Also discussed is the tough British defense of Thala, the German capture of Kasserine and then the Pass as well as the stopping of the Germans in front of Tebessa are just some of engagements that took part in the middle two weeks in Feb, 1943.
The first few days for the Americans at Sidi bou Zid, its outposts and at the Kasserine Pass were costly and ungratifying. The author presents this sequence of events in a most lenient way. Some accounts of these first few days is quite critical of II Corp and General Fredendall. American intelligence had painted an incorrect picture of German intent and the American deployment was wrong. The Germans had far superior forces in the Sidi bou Zid sector, easily capturing it but von Arnim was not aggressive and did not exploit his initial success. Rommel was in charge of the forces attacking further south at Kasserine and he too didn't take full advantage of his initial success, splitting his forces, weakening them to the point that the regrouped Americans with the help of British and French were able to prevent Rommel from taking Tebessa. When Rommel saw his offensive was failing and with his supplies running low he withdrew. By the end of the month the Americans had recaptured the Pass. Mr Zaloga doesn't end here but continues the coverage to May when von Arnim surrenders.
The coverage for March, April and May is included but its not complete.
To help follow the narrative, there are five 2-D maps and three 3-D maps. These maps are good and cover the key engagements but do not cover all the action in this Feb, March period. There are some great photos that show the hard terrain the combatants had to overcome. Even the Kasserine Pass was difficult terrain; I'm surprised tanks and trucks could transverse it.
There are several color illustrations and a small reading list if further study is desired.
The chapter, "The Campaign in Retrospect" was very good and clarifies the author's position on the campaign. He admits the initial days of the German offensive penetrated the American's first defense line, inflicting heavy casualties but in the end the 2nd Corp regrouped and with the help of the British and French were able to prevent the Germans from attaining their major objectives. Mr Zaloga admits these conclusions are debatable but since the Germans could not pass through the Western Dorsals and were forced to stay in Eastern Tunisia the Allies could call that a victory.
This campaign which was fought on a small scale in a peripheral theater also allowed Eisenhower and the US Army to see the weaknesses in US Command, US War Doctrine including the low training levels of its soldiers. It was also proven that US weaponry, especially the M3 tank had to improve if Germany was to be defeated. They would have over a year to correct those shortcomings before the Normandy invasion. The defeat was relatively small and not as costly as if the American first engagement of the war had been Normandy. It was also shown the problems with the Axis forces in dealing with Chain of Command and lack of unified strategy or logistic stablity would have a major influence in the coming months.. The future of the Axis in North Africa looked pretty bleak.
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14 of 20 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Good Narative of the Battle, September 1, 2005
This review is from: Kasserine Pass 1943: Rommel's last victory (Campaign) (Paperback)
At the beginning of the movie Patton he is shown at the site of an American defeat. This was Kasserine Pass. This was the first time that American forces came into contact with the Germans in World War II, and a lot of the American ideas were found wanting.
The battle itself was really quite simple. The Germans under Rommel were retreating from the British. The Americans intended to cross through Kasserine and block his retreat. Rommel decided to teach the upstart Americans a lesson and sent a force to attack the advancing Americans. This is sometimes called Rommel's last victory. The Americans were hurt badly, but because of Arnim's refusal to help and the advancing British, Rommel's forces could not exploit his victory.
The critical points about Kasserine were in the aftermath of the battle.
General Fredendall, the commander of the American II Corp had established an excellent reputation in training his men. Taking them into combat proved to be a different proposition. He was releived and replaced by Patton.
The British generals, especially Montgomery looked at the American defeat and developed the opinion that the American army was not good. At that time they were not as good as his 8th Army. But he forgot that his own introduction to combat had been at a place called Dunkirk. British General Anderson's performance was also found wanting and he was sidelined for the rest of the war.
Some American equipment, the 37 mm anti tank gun and the M3 medium tank were definitely found to be obsolete. The M4 Sherman tank was found to be the equal to what the Germans were using and the decision was made to put it into high volume production. The Army was very slow about improving the Sherman, the Germans went on to the Panther and Tiger.
A lot of the American armies organization, training and doctrine was found to be wanting and was changed. The American army in Normandy in 1944 was not the same as the one at Kasserine.
This small book is an excellent description of the battle. It's maps and drawings clearly illustrate what happened. Mr. Zaloga concludes that this was, in the end, not a defeat for the Americans. It's true that the Americans eventually stopped the Germans, but I think he is a British writer being gracious to the Americans. How about we conclude that this was an American defeat but not a disaster?
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