Customer Reviews

Kharkov 1942: Anatomy of a Military Disaster

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This book is for the serious student of military history only. If you want a very detailed study of the battle of Kharkov, told mainly from the Soviet side, complete with orders of battle and a day-by-day retelling of the battle from the divisional level then this book is for you.

I very much enjoyed Glantz's "Clash of Titans," which is probably the best single volume history of the war in the East, and I was hoping this book would contain more of Glantz's excellent analytical scholarship only more sharply focused on a single battle. "Kharkov 1942" is definetly analytical; but the majority of the book is not original scholarship. It's mostly Glantz's translation of a Soviet study of the battle which explains its very dry style. Glantz fleshes out some details, and mentions some parts of the battle that were ignored for political reasons. Glantz really does not provide much of his own analysis on the battle. Where he does provide analysis is on the Soviet study itself. "Kharkov 1942" is as much of a study of how lost battles of "The Great Patriotic War" were viewed within the Soviet political system as it is a study of the battle itself.

This is an excellent work. It's probably the best book I've read devoted to a single battle. The analysis is almost entirely from the Russian perspective, but the other side can be gleaned from other sources. The author gained access to recently available Soviet documentation to tell the Russian side of the confrontation. This is not to say the German side is ignored, however. There is very extensive use of quotations from the Soviet General Staff Study of the battle, yet the author counters any bias. The book covers everything you'd want in an analysis: terrain, force structure, order of battle, tactical and strategic decision making, etc. The maps are better and more numerous than in those in most works of this type. The only real problem I have with it is that the author doesn't really explain why the Russian 9th Army attacked at Maiaki. This was on the southeastern end of the Barvenkovo bridgehead. It was against this southern flank that the Germans launched their counterattack that doomed the Russian offensive and the Maiaki attack weakened the Russian forces on this flank. Except to say the attack was conducted and it was a bad idea, the book fails to explain what led the Russian commander to conduct it in the first place. Nevertheless, this is a very minor complaint with what is a very excellent book.

The book attempts to describe the battle of Kharkov by using both Soviet and Germans sources. Particularly interesting is the use of a hitherto-classified Soviet study of the battle, written a few years after the war. Both what the study says and what it ommits are very revealing. This book is a masterpiece in its genre and recommended to anyone with an interest in the Eastern Front, but I confess I would like both a more thorough OB, like the one in "Operation Mars", his other book, and better maps.

I have heard rave reviews of Glantz's works on the eastern front of WW2. How he gives great insight and has the newly accessable russian side of the war that had been buried for years by the Soviet leaders. I have seen him on the military channel on Tv and was ready for the book of my life on a topic that is of great interest to me, the Kharkov 1942 russian spring offensive and the German response.

What a ripoff is all I can say. When I started to read with great anticipation what this scholar had uncovered from the declassified Soviet sources and his opinions on the ebb and flow of this battle, and found it to be dry reprint of a soviet post war analysis of thier failed operation I couldnt believe it. It would be like if I was to write a book on Adolph Hitler and then but a forward on to reprint of Mein Kampf and called it my own work. I am amazed the Russians havent sued him over this but I guess he has done just enough to avoid charges of plagerism.

I so looked forward to this book and couldnt have felt more let down when I started to read it. My brother for one, another huge east front WW2 history buff, and life long war gamer, has raved to me repeatedly about Glantz. So I was so depressed that I had wasted any money at all on this. I guess if I had known before hand what I was purchasing I wouldnt have been so let down (because I wouldnt have bought it).

The good thing is that once I got past the let down and finished reading it, was that I had thankfully purchased two other books by Glantz. I also bought his Kursk book (which I loved) and his book on the Mars 1942 operation (another book that I loved).

I am so glad that I decided to read the second two books and didnt let the Kharkov book leave me jaded towards his works for life. I plan on reading other books by him (but not the Battle for the Ukraine, which sounds great to me until I read the reviews saying it was another reprint of soviet general staff case study).

I perfer books that provide insight, facts, and the authors opinion. I am not into dry case studys reprinted and sold as a Glantz or anyone elses original works. If these apeal to you by all means purchase them. If on the other hand you are like me and want to read an original work by an east front expert, avoid Kharkov 1942 like the plauge.

An excellent book which gives an insight into how the Red Army's strategic thinking evolved after the German invasion of the Soviet Union. For the first time we do not only get the German side of the picture but the Russian one. Moreover, this episode is usually only dealt with very briefly in most histories. This book offers a wealth of detail on this almost neglected period which is usually only described as a footnote in books on Fall Blau. I especially liked the fact that we first read the Soviet official report which is then followed by a critical comment. The only criticism I have concerns the maps. One: I hate computer generated maps of this kind, two: I would have added arrows indicating directions of attack and lines reached (I have added them in my copy in red).

Although David M. Glantz has earned a reputation as the preeminent Western researcher on the Russo-German Conflict 1941-45, his role in the book Kharkov 1942 are more akin to editor and translator, rather than researcher and analyst. The bulk of Kharkov 1942 is based upon a formerly classified Soviet General Staff study published in 1951, which is expertly translated and interpreted by Glantz. Essentially, this is similar to a Landmark-style treatment, with the Soviet study dusted off, explained and presented with 37 nice sketch maps. Indeed, the maps are far better than the ones in most of Glantz's other books, although they still benefit from liberal highlighting with colored markers. As Glantz points out in his introduction, the Soviets spent decades covering up their debacle at Kharkov in May 1942, which cost them over 200,000 troops and made it much easier for the Germans to reach the Volga River a few months later. The study upon which this book was based was written while Stalin was still alive, but later Soviet histories changed the official line several times until the collapse of the USSR. Glantz does liven up Kharkov 1942 with some anecdotal accounts here and there, although German input is minimal - he makes clear that this is the Soviet view of the battle. Overall, Kharkov 1942 is one of Glantz's better books, although he actually only wrote about one-third of it and the rest is the translated Soviet study. This is a must-have book for Eastern Front aficionados.

The book consists of seven sections, most of which follow the structure of the Soviet study (all translated sections are printed in a gray tone box). The author provides a brief introductory section on how the tactical situation around Kharkov developed as a result of the Soviet Winter Counteroffensive in January 1942. The first 64-page section of the Soviet study covers the planning of the Soviet spring offensive at Kharkov, and it is fairly frank about the unfavorable circumstances surrounding the genesis of this operation. Soviet intelligence on German reserves in the area was incorrect, weather conditions were poor, supplies were limited and Timoshenko (the operational commander) was forced to rob forces from other sectors because the Stavka did not provide him sufficient reinforcements to conduct an attack - which would come back to bite him later. Glantz also makes clear that the motivation for the Soviet offensive was dictated by political, not military logic. Preparations for the offensive were rushed, with less than half the Soviet artillery in place by the time the offensive began. Five tables detail the amount of artillery, tanks, aircraft and ammunition on hand.

A brief 6-page section covers the area of operations, although it does not effectively explain the influence of terrain on the battle. This is followed by a 72-page section which covers opposing forces. Every Soviet Army/corps/division involved in the battle is discussed in detail, although German forces are covered more in aggregate. The heart of the book lies in the 137-page section on the course of operations, which is bifurcated into the northern and southern sectors, and covers each day of combat in considerable detail. This section is probably the most appealing and it goes into considerable detail, with accompanying maps and provides a blow-by-blow narrative on ground operations (although air operations are discussed in more general terms). Unlike other books by David Glantz, there is considerable tactical detail down to regimental/division level and occasionally lower. Although the Soviet narrative is generally sound, it includes claims about large numbers of German tanks destroyed that Glantz fails to question or verify. One can sense that the original Soviet writers were trying to cover up the scale of the disaster in some sections by putting a positive spin on tactical actions (e.g. "the xxx Rifle Division was forced to retreat and suffered heavily but the Germans lost 50 tanks..."). The Soviet-heavy focus is ok, but one area on the German side that needed more elaboration was the stubborn defense of the town of Ternovaia, which held until relieved - Glantz never bothers to mention that name of the unit or commander that conducted this epic defense. In essence, the Soviet offensive had a narrow window of opportunity and came close to scoring a major breakthrough but the Germans were more agile and once their reserves swung into action, it was all downhill for the Red Army. Instead of surrounding the German forces in Kharkov, it was Timoshenko's forces that were surrounded and annihilated in a matter of a week. As Glantz points out, the inability of the Soviet commanders to recognize the mounting threat to their flank and German intentions was a fatal liability. In essence, this comes down to a study of faulty Soviet command and control practices and how they learned from this military debacle.

I was less than satisfied with the 32-page section on costs and consequences which details Soviet losses but barely mentions German losses. It is clear that the Germans succeeded in inflicting about 13-1 losses and regained the strategic initiative in the East. Although Glantz mentions that some Soviets escaped the German encirclement, he makes no mention of which units were reconstituted or which leaders survived. In the final 12-page conclusions, Glantz assigns primary blame to Soviet command and control for the disaster (the Stavka on the strategic level and Timoshenko's staff on the operational level). He also concludes that although the Soviet weakness after Kharkov made it easier for the Germans to push to Stalingrad, it made little difference on the eventual outcome. I'm not so sure on that, since if Timoshenko had captured Kharkov in May 1942, German plans for the summer of 1942 might have been radically altered. Yet Glantz makes a good case that the Soviets learned from this disaster and adopted a more professional approach to operational-level warfare which improved their later performance.

This history is well researched, well documented and written with style as well as analytical depth. It addresses one of critisims that I have with many military histories: it does have plentiful maps, but not sufficiently detailed. If I were to venture a suggestion, I would include a supplimental map (3' X 3') sufficiently detailed to assist the reader to follow the material.

This work is devoid of usual strong German orientation, and concentrates on the new evidence which this work introduces. This book uses both Russian and German sources and maintains a balanced and intellectual approach to the campaign. Glantz's account provides a comprehensive picture of this epic battle. A great book for novices and experts alike.

Another well researched addition by Glantz which cuts though much of the mythology of the Eastern Front even though it centres on a single battle.

Its easy to see why Glantz has challenged mainstream interpretations of the War in the East, and why some seem uncomfortable with his findings and analysis.

If your normal WW2 fare comes from the likes of "Osprey" or Kurowski etc then "Kharkov" is an essential read

First, this book is not a nice historical novel.

This book is the dry recollection of the decisions, orders, order of battle and development of the Russian offensive in the Southwestern Front by General Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko and the following counterstrike by the German forces led by Marshall Fedor von Bock and General Kleist near the city of Kharkov in May 1942. This battle was a great defeat for Russian forces that lost close to 300,000 soldiers and officers.

An invaluable historical document. A delight for all military history buffs.

This battle is a favorite and when I ordered this book my expectation was high but was quickly disappointed due to the author's predilection of clearly favoring the Soviet side. He clearly didn't research this battle very well or put enough effort in writing this book. He did his normal good job covering the Soviet side but when it came to the Axis side there was much left out. Glantz relies too heavily, almost exclusively, on after action reports and diary entries of Soviet officers to explain the campaign. Its OK to have these entries as a supplement to your story but it shouldn't be used as the primary aspect of your story. For me, it made the book awkward to follow. I also didn't like the propaganda or excuses used by the Russian generals to cover oneself in these reports to Stavka or the language used by the Russian commanders when talking about the enemy.
A second thing that was disappointing is that the tactical coverage was dominated by Red Army actions. Maybe its understandable in the early days when they were gaining ground but by the 17th, the coverage should have swung to the Germans with their successful counterattack and it didn't appreciably.

Mr Glantz included 37 daily maps which helped support the story. It clearly showed the Russian advance and the subsequent German counter offensive. These maps are clearer, better than the ones in his later books. The battle coverage stops in May but the author does provide an additional map that shows the German progress after Kharkov that extends to October when Operation Blue was being fought. The book also has a few photos, mostly of Soviet generals.

After the battle, Mr Glantz provides his conclusions but just like the rest of the narrative, the Soviet side dominates the discussion. He sums up the results militarily and politically. This reversal for Stalin, Timoshenko and Zhukov was a real shock that forced them to look for greater assistance from their Allies and to be more cautious on the battlefield. Its this thinking that made the Russian Army continue to fall back during Operation Blue, drawing the Germans deeper into the country, away from their supply lines and making Hitler think his enemy was defeated which caused him to fatally change his battle plans.
The book closes with an impressive Notes section, an extensive Appendix, Bibliography and a helpful Index.

This success for Paulus and the Germans in this counter offensive was a great motivator for the upcoming Operation Blue but little was said about it.
I know Mr Glantz is a Russian specialist but this book is just too one sided and doesn't convey nearly enough of the German perspective in this stunning turnaround. I'm glad reading it for there is not a lot of coverage of this key battle but this is my least favorite of Mr Glantz's books. Somebody like George Nipe who did a nice job on Kharkov 1943 should write this battle to counterbalance Mr Glantz's effort.

I still recommend this book for the insight provided on the Soviet side. In addition to showing Soviet strengths, Mr Glantz does a good job of covering the Soviet poor intelligence gathering, the inadequate planning, preparation and execution and the slow realization of the strength of the German counter-attack.
Its sort of ironic. Timoshenko was so confident of victory and if the Germans weren't prepared for their own assault, the Soviets probably would have won. A German loss would have had extensive repurcussions on the summer offensive and even the war. Instead, the Axis inflicted heavy casualties, temporarily demoralized the Soviet Army and had an excellent start to their summer offensive - Operation Blue.