Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary [Paperback]

Aleksandr Fursenko (Author), Timothy Naftali (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: October 17, 2007

“Contains unsettling insights into some of the most dangerous geopolitical crises of the time.”—The Economist

This acclaimed study from the authors of “One Hell of a Gamble” brings to life head-to-head confrontations between the Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev and Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. Drawing on their unrivaled access to Politburo and KGB materials, Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali combine new insights into the Cuban missile crisis as well as startling narratives of the contests for Suez, Iraq, Berlin, and Southeast Asia, with vivid portraits of leaders who challenged Moscow and Washington. Khrushchev’s Cold War provides a gripping history of the crisis years of the Cold War.

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

In the crowded field of Cold War historiography, Fursenko and Naftali continue to unearth valuable gems from newly available Soviet government documents, a portion of which were first put to use in their history of the 1962 U.S.-Soviet standoff over Cuba (One Hell of a Gamble). Building on increased access to such material, they develop a fascinating picture of the inner dynamics of the Soviet state and its leadership during the Khrushchev era that far surpasses anything U.S. intelligence could manage at the time. They make a convincing case that Khrushchev's major, post-Stalin reorientation of Soviet foreign policy was rooted in competition on the global playing field (and a policy of social regeneration at home), along with a need to cloak the U.S.S.R.'s weaknesses in arms and resources vis-à-vis the U.S. This volatile combination reinforces a strategy of bluffs and brinkmanship in several Cold War crises between 1956 and 1962—in the Middle East, Central Europe and the Caribbean. Yet perhaps most surprisingly, Khrushchev's foreign policy—despite an energy that, when unchecked, "tended toward recklessness"—came with a genuine desire for peaceful coexistence between the superpowers not seen again until Gorbachev. (Oct.)
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

Review

"Magisterial... a fascinating tour of foreign policy." Moscow Times "Deeply researched... indispensable for anyone hoping to understand the Cold War's most dangerous phase, and how the world managed to survive it." The New York Times Book Review "[Contains] unsettling insights into some of the most dangerous geopolitical crises of the time." The Economist "...enthralling... I find this book instructive and very dispiriting." Jonathan Mirsky, The Spectator"

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Paperback: 640 pages
• Publisher: W. W. Norton & Company (October 17, 2007)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0393330729
• ISBN-13: 978-0393330724
• Product Dimensions: 6.1 x 1.5 x 9.2 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.8 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.8 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (12 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #352,907 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

19 of 20 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Khruschev - A most Amazing Mixture of Mercuriality and Idiosyncrasy Brought Vividly to Life March 7, 2007

By Dr. Gerhard Volz

Format:Hardcover

If - and that is a big if (the book is fully 600 pages long - it helps to fall ill when you read it - I did!) - you have the time and want to invest it for obtaining a first class overview over the great power play during the decade between 1955 and 1965 - the Khruschev era - this definitely is the book to read! Its authors not only provide a refreshingly new perspective to the (more or less well-) known events of, i.a., the first Israeli-Egyptian war, the (Soviet) occupation of Hungary and the Cuban missile crisis, they fully succeed in transforming this period of history into a most plausible and very exciting "story", in fact, into something of a "thriller" (in the best sense of the word). It is the story of a great power desperate to come up to its claim to possess or at least to be accorded equal status with the other - even greater - super-power, the United States or, more generally, the "West". In order to achieve that one goal, almost anything would do, even extreme brinkmanship that several times brought the world close to thermonuclear war. Khrushev is shown as a man to have carried within himself the dominating characteristics of the Soviet Union itself, viz., an enormous inferiority complex, trying to combine it with catching any opportunity that would present itself to bring pressure to bear on the other side, even using or better: threatening the use of force, wherever it seemed this might bring political advantage. Fortunately for the world, this mercurial leader who disposed of the means to blow up the world (or at least: great parts of it) was restrained enough (be it on his own reason, be it by his more risk-averse colleagues within the Presidium) not to actually let the world go "over the brink" but to withdraw each time at the last moment. It is the humiliation of these retreats as well as the sense of responsibility displayed by him in making them which, if anything, ultimately cost him his job and earns him the status of a statesman (rather than merely that of a cunning politician).

Against this background, only two - very minor - criticisms:

First, there is a really unwarranted "blank space" in the book as regards the European Economic Community (today`s "European Union") whose very creation was decisively triggered by some of the events described in it (Suez; Hungary), by making the European states mercilessly feel their own palsy vis-à-vis the super-powers. It is ironic - and should clearly have been mentioned in the book - to see how the very institution for whose creation Khruschev bore no minor responsibility - would become one of the cornerstones of the West's economic superiority and thus a decisive factor for the eventual downfall of the Soviet Empire.

Second, even though this would admittedly go slightly beyond the clear scope of the book (Khruschev's Cold War, restricting its topic to his role as politician), it might have been interesting for the reader to be permitted at least a brief peep behind the veil of this astounding politician's official role into his private life, if only to underpin/corroborate some of the conclusions regarding this most Mercurial character!

This leaves only one thing to be hoped for: at least I, for my part, am dying to read PART II: "The Breshnev Years", by the same authors, should it ever come out!

13 of 13 people found the following review helpful

4.0 out of 5 stars History in the Raw March 7, 2007

By Republius

Format:Hardcover

Aleksandr Fursenko & Timothy Naftali's KHRUSHCHEV'S COLD WAR is an account of the major incidents of the Cold War from 1955-1964 told primarily from the Soviet (and specifically Khrushchev's) perspective. What distinguishes this book is that instead of relying on interviews and memoirs and third-party reporting, the authors have accessed contemporaneous notes and minutes taken at the meetings of the Politburo (Presidium), that handful of men who actually made the decisions guiding Soviet policy during this time. In other words, they get their data straight from the horse's mouth, untainted with revision and wishful thinking.

This makes for startling reading. For those of us used to seeing history in broad terms as a somewhat logical result of competing forces (political, military, moral, economic and cultural), this book provides a bucket of icy water in the face. The drivers of policy were all too often not reasonable responses to existing circumstances but irrational, thoughtless, ill-considered and unrealistic reactions based on hubris, petulance and plain stupidity. Khrushchev was clueless (perhaps we already suspected this). But so too was the entire Politburo (less predictable). And so too were the Western leaders--de Gaulle and Eden in particular; Adenauer also; Ike and JFK come through a little better, although far from unscathed.

This last is especially troubling. In authoritarian regimes thugs and idiots rise naturally to the top, but in developed Western democracies the system should inculcate a certain rationality in leadership, something mandated by the need to respond to the will of the electorate.

Which of course brings us to today. The Suez debacle and Iraq have obvious parallels. The incredible operational incompetence of the Soviets in building the missile sites before getting the weapons to Cuba (thus allowing the blockade) makes one think of the removal of troops from Afghanistan for the Iraq war, right when we had the Taliban cornered. The poor quality of intelligence brings to mind our own failures (WMD in Iraq, apart from others). And the consistent inability of Khrushchev to judge the consequences of his policies, as well as the failure of the remaining Soviet leadership to check or challenge him, brings to mind the current administration and the entire post-War Iraq strategy.

In this book, the blunders were Soviet (or English of French). Today, they are ours.

10 of 12 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Nikita, the Wizard of Red Square April 30, 2007

By Christian Schlect VINE™ VOICE

Format:Hardcover|Amazon Verified Purchase

A solid history of the always probing, somewhat erratic, but ultimately war-adverse reign of Khrushchev during the 1950s and 60s. Those wanting to acquire direct insights into the thinking and motives of the leadership of the Kremlin during some of its most important Cold War confrontations with the U.S.--Suez, Berlin, Laos, and Cuba--should buy and read this book.

It is a wonder that a hot war was avoided when you are confronted by the authors, Fursenko and Naftali, with the gamesmanship, often played during this period in a vacum of real knowledge, on both sides of the Iron Curtin. It is a further wonder that the bankrupt political and economic system that was the USSR lasted as long as it did.