Customer Reviews

Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary

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If - and that is a big if (the book is fully 600 pages long - it helps to fall ill when you read it - I did!) - you have the time and want to invest it for obtaining a first class overview over the great power play during the decade between 1955 and 1965 - the Khruschev era - this definitely is the book to read! Its authors not only provide a refreshingly new perspective to the (more or less well-) known events of, i.a., the first Israeli-Egyptian war, the (Soviet) occupation of Hungary and the Cuban missile crisis, they fully succeed in transforming this period of history into a most plausible and very exciting "story", in fact, into something of a "thriller" (in the best sense of the word). It is the story of a great power desperate to come up to its claim to possess or at least to be accorded equal status with the other - even greater - super-power, the United States or, more generally, the "West". In order to achieve that one goal, almost anything would do, even extreme brinkmanship that several times brought the world close to thermonuclear war. Khrushev is shown as a man to have carried within himself the dominating characteristics of the Soviet Union itself, viz., an enormous inferiority complex, trying to combine it with catching any opportunity that would present itself to bring pressure to bear on the other side, even using or better: threatening the use of force, wherever it seemed this might bring political advantage. Fortunately for the world, this mercurial leader who disposed of the means to blow up the world (or at least: great parts of it) was restrained enough (be it on his own reason, be it by his more risk-averse colleagues within the Presidium) not to actually let the world go "over the brink" but to withdraw each time at the last moment. It is the humiliation of these retreats as well as the sense of responsibility displayed by him in making them which, if anything, ultimately cost him his job and earns him the status of a statesman (rather than merely that of a cunning politician).

Against this background, only two - very minor - criticisms:

First, there is a really unwarranted "blank space" in the book as regards the European Economic Community (today`s "European Union") whose very creation was decisively triggered by some of the events described in it (Suez; Hungary), by making the European states mercilessly feel their own palsy vis-à-vis the super-powers. It is ironic - and should clearly have been mentioned in the book - to see how the very institution for whose creation Khruschev bore no minor responsibility - would become one of the cornerstones of the West's economic superiority and thus a decisive factor for the eventual downfall of the Soviet Empire.
Second, even though this would admittedly go slightly beyond the clear scope of the book (Khruschev's Cold War, restricting its topic to his role as politician), it might have been interesting for the reader to be permitted at least a brief peep behind the veil of this astounding politician's official role into his private life, if only to underpin/corroborate some of the conclusions regarding this most Mercurial character!

This leaves only one thing to be hoped for: at least I, for my part, am dying to read PART II: "The Breshnev Years", by the same authors, should it ever come out!

Aleksandr Fursenko & Timothy Naftali's KHRUSHCHEV'S COLD WAR is an account of the major incidents of the Cold War from 1955-1964 told primarily from the Soviet (and specifically Khrushchev's) perspective. What distinguishes this book is that instead of relying on interviews and memoirs and third-party reporting, the authors have accessed contemporaneous notes and minutes taken at the meetings of the Politburo (Presidium), that handful of men who actually made the decisions guiding Soviet policy during this time. In other words, they get their data straight from the horse's mouth, untainted with revision and wishful thinking.

This makes for startling reading. For those of us used to seeing history in broad terms as a somewhat logical result of competing forces (political, military, moral, economic and cultural), this book provides a bucket of icy water in the face. The drivers of policy were all too often not reasonable responses to existing circumstances but irrational, thoughtless, ill-considered and unrealistic reactions based on hubris, petulance and plain stupidity. Khrushchev was clueless (perhaps we already suspected this). But so too was the entire Politburo (less predictable). And so too were the Western leaders--de Gaulle and Eden in particular; Adenauer also; Ike and JFK come through a little better, although far from unscathed.

This last is especially troubling. In authoritarian regimes thugs and idiots rise naturally to the top, but in developed Western democracies the system should inculcate a certain rationality in leadership, something mandated by the need to respond to the will of the electorate.

Which of course brings us to today. The Suez debacle and Iraq have obvious parallels. The incredible operational incompetence of the Soviets in building the missile sites before getting the weapons to Cuba (thus allowing the blockade) makes one think of the removal of troops from Afghanistan for the Iraq war, right when we had the Taliban cornered. The poor quality of intelligence brings to mind our own failures (WMD in Iraq, apart from others). And the consistent inability of Khrushchev to judge the consequences of his policies, as well as the failure of the remaining Soviet leadership to check or challenge him, brings to mind the current administration and the entire post-War Iraq strategy.

In this book, the blunders were Soviet (or English of French). Today, they are ours.

A solid history of the always probing, somewhat erratic, but ultimately war-adverse reign of Khrushchev during the 1950s and 60s. Those wanting to acquire direct insights into the thinking and motives of the leadership of the Kremlin during some of its most important Cold War confrontations with the U.S.--Suez, Berlin, Laos, and Cuba--should buy and read this book.

It is a wonder that a hot war was avoided when you are confronted by the authors, Fursenko and Naftali, with the gamesmanship, often played during this period in a vacum of real knowledge, on both sides of the Iron Curtin. It is a further wonder that the bankrupt political and economic system that was the USSR lasted as long as it did.

ALEKSANDR FURSENKO'S and TIMOTHY NAFTALI'S KHRUSCHEV'S COLD WAR is one of the best books written on the Soviet leaders life in recent years and incorporates many newly declassified documents to present a new and detailed account on the Soviet leaders life. It is mostly a book about his time in charge during the cold war. The authors do not go back into his childhood or spend much time following his leaving power. It is a political and diplomatic history of his life looking at his failures and accomplishments while in charge of the Soviet Union. It furthers what most researchers on Russia have found recently that if ever the term paper tiger applied, it was to Soviet Russia. Khrushchev made the best of his lack of economic resources and tired to compete as a power on the world stage with few economic developments and a falling standard of living for the Russian people which he constantly worried about. From Hungary to the Cuban Missile Crises with Berlin, southeast Asia and the middle east inbetween this book covers the salient moments in his career with lucid detail and thoughtful analysis. For those who want to learn more about this time in the Soviet Union's history and more about the man who dominated it this is an excellent book to start with.

This book is a gripping read, and it contains new insights into the Cold War, and the authors add some interesting brushstrokes to our historical portrait of Krushchev.

Khrushchev has always been a minor hero of mine. I call him a minor hero because one cannot talk about heroism in an unqualified way with a major figure of an absolute government. Beethoven angrily re-titled the dedication of the Eroica symphony, and I agree with his sentiments in doing it, yet it remains possible to admire some aspects of Napoleon's career.

All individuals must be judged with an appreciation for the constraints under which they operated, and Khrushchev did some very important things and maintained a kind of idealism, despite its rough peasant expression. Khrushchev did want his people to achieve a better life; he cared a great deal about improving agriculture; he was a sincere believer in the ultimate benefits of socialism; he did not want war; and he did want peaceful coexistence with the West before that phrase became commonplace. Above all, Khrushchev was and remains a very human figure, something that cannot be said of a great many absolute leaders.

Khrushchev's role in changing the operations of the Soviet government after decades of Stalin - perhaps the most terrifying dictator of the modern era - was heroic, something I believe he has never been adequately recognized for in the West.

But the same man was ready to crush revolt in Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

The title of the book is absolutely accurate: this is Khrushchev's Cold War. Other actors enter and leave the stage, but Khrushchev shapes the story. In that sense, it is necessarily incomplete as a history of the Cold War.

The new insights in the book come from Soviet archives not opened until well into the 21st century. They include who knew what when; the impact of certain events on the Soviet leadership; the real reasons for certain Soviet positions in international affairs; and some of the misunderstandings of American analysts and leaders at the time.

In a few cases, the authors indicate that materials are missing yet, so the book cannot be taken as definitive.

But the book is indispensable to understanding the Cold War, aspects of how the Soviet Union worked, and the Cuban Missile crisis. It is recommended to all with interest in these subjects and to anyone just wanting a good historical read.

I'm about 2/3 done with it. I'm reading it slow because i'm busy, but I'm enjoying it.

Having been born in late 1955, as a kid, we saw Khrushchev as a very scary, evil, intimidating man. This book gives me a much more balanced view of the man. Not that it makes him or the USSR foreign policy into heroes, but at least it reveals some of the inner workings of what went into that foreign policy, for better and worse.

One of the best parts of the book is that it describes how badly the West could estimate Soviet capabilities, and how that affected negotiations. Also good is the chapter on the downing of the U-2 plane.

Other reviewers are correct. The book doesn't seem to be just about Khruschev; rather it is more about the motivations and battles within the Soviet government.

All in all, i'm enjoying this book, and learning a lot that I didn't know.

With the increasing availability of formerly classified Soviet documents, the authors' have compiled a dramatic re-examination of Khrushchev's pivotal role during
the Cold War. From his emergence to a shared role of leadership in the Politburo
after Stalin's death, to his rapid rise to almost complete political dominance, to his remarkable reading of his nation's crucial position as a developing world power,
Khrushchev's insights into the strenghs, weaknesses and special needs of his country proved central to the world events of this unique period.


Anyone interested in a deeper understanding of this highly intelligent, complex and
resourceful but ultimately self-destructive Soviet leader and the ramifications of his policies, will find much that is
new and thought provoking in this well researched book. It is the compelling story
of how this formidable leader changed the course of history both for the former
Soviet Union as well as the United States and its allies. This dramatic read serves as a cautionary tale for those policy makers who currently act on the world's stage.

Khrushchev was a fascinating character. He is one of the few Soviet leaders, which had humanity and warmth.

However if there is one issue that Khrushchev stands out for it is desalinization. I found it disappointing the book did not cover this part of him better.

I would also have liked a more extensive section on the Soviet people and economy and how it affected his leadership.

However it is a terrific study of USSR's foreign policy during his era. While reading the book, It was surprising just how aggressive he was in his foreign policy. I had read it before but I thought that several cold war warriors (historians and politicians) were overdoing it. But it was interesting to read that they had not. His pressure tactics brought the world several times close to a major conflict and was the author of the closest call to a nuclear war that we ever had.

I look forward to Aleksandr Fursenko next book.

The book is very detailed and examines the critical 1955 to 1963 period of the Cold War largely from the viewpoint of the Soviets. The authors had access to documents not before released, including minutes of the Presidium meetings. The authors portray the Soviet leadership in a new light with most members of the Politburo seeking to avoid any conflict with the United States and unwilling to follow Khrushchev on his more dangerous adventures in Cuba and Egypt. It is evident that neither the Soviets nor the communist block were unified in seeking world domination. Rather, the communist leaders were largely constrained by the same political concerns as American leaders. There is also very interesting information towards the end regarding the CIA's role in bringing the Baath party to power in Iraq.

THIS IS ONE OF THE BEST BOOKS THAT HAVE BEEN WRITTEN LATELY ON ONE OF THE MOST CRUCIAL PERIODS IN HISTORY: THE COLD WAR.
THE AUTHORS HAVE USED NEW DOCUMENTS FROM THE FORMER USSR AND HAVE SUCCESSFULLY BUILT A FASCINATING NARRATIVE ABOUT THE BAD GUY, KHRUSHCHEV.
IT SEEMS THAT HE HAS MADE USE OF ALMOST EVERY POSSIBLE RUSE IN ORDER TO INTIMIDATE HIS MAIN ADVERSARY- THE USA.WE HAVE TO REMEMBER THAT HAD HE SUCCEEDED, THE WORLD WOULD HAVE CERTAINLY BEEN CONDEMNED TO SUFFER THE AGONIES OF A THIRD -AND NUCLEAR- WAR.I REFER TO THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS WHICH HAD BEEN AVERTED THANKS TO THE SERENDIPITY FACTOR : THE CIA FLIGHTS OVER CUBA HAVE DISCOVERED AND SUPPLIED THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT AND HIS STAFF THE NECESSARY EVIDENCE ON THE (NUCLEAR) MISSILES IN CUBA.
THE AUTHORS ALSO DIVULGE KHRUSHCHEV'S MODES OF THINKING ABOUT OTHER COLD WAR FOCI , NAMELY:ASIA(LAOS) AND AFRICA( CONGO).
HOWEVER, ALBEIT HIS BRINKMANSHIP TACTICS , KHRUSHCHEV PAID A HEAVY PRICE AND WAS ULTIMATELY MADE TO RESIGN( ALTHOUGH WE ALSO READ ABOUT A SINISTER PLOT TO REMOVE HIM EARLIER- A PLOT THAT FAILED BECAUSE HE FOUND OUT IN GOOD TIME).
THE AUTHORS' STYLE IS LIVELY AND VIVID, AND THEY MAKE USE OF MANY PRIMARY MATERIALS -INCLUDING NEW DETAILS ABOUT THE INTERROGATION UNDERGONE BY GARY POWERS AFTER HIS PLANE WAS SHOT DOWN.
THEY ALSO POINT OUT AND SEND A ( HIDDEN ) MESSAGE TO US ALL: IF A COUNTRY OR A SUPERPOWER DOES NOT HAVE ENOUGH HUMINT SOURCES-AND RELIES MAINLY ON ELECTRONICS OR HIGH- TECH IN ORDER TO GET RAW INTELLIGENCE- THE CHANCES OF GETTING IT ARE SLIM INDEED.
LET IT BE A WARNING TO THE USA THESE DAYS WHILE IT IS FIGHTING TERRORISTS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THIS GLOBE.