Customer Reviews

The Killing Zone: How & Why Pilots Die

5 star:		(10)
4 star:		(10)
3 star:		(6)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

Author Paul Craig's thesis -- that low time pilots face special risks
due to their lack of experience -- is generally unremarkable. After
all, the aviation community has long regarded experience as the single
most important factor in flight safety.

While the author's basic
premise is well known, his thorough examination of the `killing
zone' -- his term for the statistically risky period between 50 and
350 total flight hours - is well handled. With thorough analysis
of NTSB data combined with his own research the author presents a
survey of aviation's "best practices". Pilots will find this
material familiar, but will appreciate the author's detailed, in-depth
approach.

Where `The Killing Zone' stumbles is in its practical
advice for new pilots. The author's suggestions are too general, and
differ little from those found elsewhere. Controversial remedies such
as requiring the flight schools to be more forthright about flying
risks, or implementing mandatory ongoing training for low time pilots,
are avoided altogether. Stronger editing - describing an accident
as having occurred in a "Money M20C" (sic) seems a little sloppy
- would also have helped.

"The Killing Zone" is a worthy
read for all pilots, and new pilots in particular will benefit from
this ambitious, if slightly flawed, examination of flight safety.

As a pilot who had already made it through the "Killing Zone" and past the 350 hour hour mark, I was doubtful that this book would have much new insight for me.

I was very pleasantly surprised, however, for two reasons. First, Paul Craig did an excellent job describing how each of many procedures should be performed properly AND what the common pitfalls were. So many books tell you how to do it right and then do not mention what the common traps and errors are.

Second, while many of the several hundred suggestions and stories in the book were not new to me, quite a few were, and I learned more than I expected.

For example, the case of a pilot who took off in the morning on a cold day having drained the sumps diligently. 45 minutes into the flight the ice in the tanks (due to improperly replaced fuel caps) melted and caused the engine to stop. The moral here is that if you find loose fuel caps and the temperature is below freezing, it is not enough to simply drain the sumps. You need to put the plane in a hanger (or let the sun warm it up) until you are confident that there is no ice inside.

Another example is LAHSO operations and how they work and that the controllers will tell you how much distance you have if you ask. After reading that I memorized my home field dimensions and am prepared to visualize whether 3000 feet is enough for me to safely LAHS.

Perhaps the best concept he explored was complacency and our natural tendencies as pilots to extrapolate. We miss an item on the checklist once and nothing goes wrong so we think we do not need it. I was sad to read how many people learned this lesson the hard way when they missed a simple yet crucial checklist item that could have prevented a terrible crash.

As long as there are any planes crashing due to human error, this book is relevant and worthwhile.

The use of statistics is pretty questionable -- the author cites the absolute number of accidents at different experience levels, but not the *rate* of accidents.

Are there more accidents between 50 and 350 hours because those pilots are less safe, or just because there are more pilots with 50-350 hours experience? The Killing Zone may actually exist, but the numbers in this book don't prove it; in fact, they may give a false sense of security to pilots with more than 350 hours experience, because their accident rates may be relatively higher than they think (how many private pilots give up before 350 hours?).

When you strip away the number games, what's left? This book does contain good safety information and a selection of accident reports, but that information is no different that what you will find in a typical flying magazine or online article: don't fly VFR into IMC, don't turn back when the engine fails just after takeoff, etc. etc. By all means, read it, but read STICK AND RUDDER and THEY CALLED IT PILOT ERROR first -- they'll give you far more for your time and money.

When I first read the book, my confidence level dropped because I am in this "Killing Zone". In the begining it does make you think that no matter what, if you have less than 350 hours, your chances of getting killed are pretty good.

What I do like about the book is - it is a great review of basic aviation knowledge. He breaks down the the reasons of why pilots die. It's all about the basics and not becoming complacent. It gets you thinking. It reminds you that like a car you don't have the opportunity to pull over and evaluate the situation.

I recommend the book to all pilots and especially student pilots. It is a good reality check for all pilots and students. Above all it is the type of book you keep on the side as a reference.

The statistics need to be updated.

My CFI recommended this book a while back, and I've recently passed my PP-ASEL checkride. The wet weather this December has kept me grounded, so I picked this up in order to do a little "chair-flying".

Like the other reviewers, I also had some concerns about the validity of the statistics used to define "the killing zone".

However, once I got past the marketing hype of the title, I had a hard time putting this book down. The author has nicely organized the most common ways GA pilots have killed themselves, collected case studies of relevant aviation incidents from the NTSB and NASA/ASRS archives, and provides advice on avoiding these scenarios from his personal experiences as a pilot and a CFI.

The NTSB reports are summarized, but the incident numbers are provided so you can read the reports in their entirety online: http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/query.asp

I picked up a few pointers, and I expect I'll be re-reading it several times. This book demonstrates the importance of staying current, continuing on with IFR training, and challenging yourself vs "boring holes in the sky" to build hours.

The first part of the book shows the statistics gathered to define the killing zone. This first part of the book is really boring and seems as if Craig is trying to say that you are more likely to get killed flying, than driving.
The body of the book is where it gets interesting. As a student pilot that has not yet flown through the killing zone this educational section of the book was really helpful. Crag breaks the body chapters in to 12 problem areas, each chapter explaining how to prevent and recover from each problem.
The one major thing that Craig did not refer to very much in the book is human factors or human errors. I was told from a ground school instructor that 65% of all general aviation accidents involved some type of pilot error. Something this significant should have been mentioned in the book.
Over all this is a really good book for student pilots. It will be one of my many reference materials as I fly through the killing zone.

Unfortunately the central thesis of this book is not proved. Two previous reviewers, "Canuck" and the anonymous reader who posted the review on November 25, 2003, pretty much nailed the problem with this book: a failure to normalize the raw accident totals. Do low-time pilots have a higher fatal accident rate per hour flown than high-time pilots? It's impossible to say with the data provided. For example, given the following accident statistics covering a 17 year period:

120 fatal accidents recorded for pilots who had accumulated 100 to 149 flight hours at the time of the accident.
13 fatal accidents recorded for pilots who had accumulated 950 to 999 flight hours at the time of the accident.

Can one conclude that pilots with 950 to 999 hours of experience are less likely to crash per flight hour than 100 to 149 flight hour pilots? No, because the number of active pilots in each group is unknown. For example, if there were exactly 1000 active pilots in the 100-149 group each time one of their members had a fatal crash, and exactly 10 active pilots found to be in the 950-999 group when someone in that range fatally crashed, then ironically the more experienced group would appear to have a 10 times worse accident rate on a per pilot basis.

One reason the author may not have normalized is because the data needed is not easily available - probably requires original field work (i.e. time and money consuming surveys).

There may be a "Killing Zone" but it may not be as pronounced as the author erroneously implies. People stop flying for lots of reasons - many pilots probably never leave Craig's killing zone simply because they moved on to less expensive pursuits.

As long as the reader keeps in mind the above apparent problem, there is still enough useful material in this book for me to rate it with three stars.

1) We like to think it won't happen to us...and it probably won't if we consistently make good choices. Here are some examples of bad ones in predictable circumstances.

2) Landing decisions do not kill...its the take off decision.

3) Know your limits, don't be tempted to go past them, and work hard to improve your skills.

These are the major themes I took from this very good book. Don't be put off by the "shock value" of the title. This book is a thoughtful discussion of disastrous results and how to avoid them. It is a review of pilots who have made bad choices in critical areas and they (and even more tragically sometimes their passengers) have not lived to learn. Who better to teach us? As the old cliché goes..."learn from the mistakes of other pilots as you will never live long enough to make them all yourself".

As a pilot just coming out of the killing zone (450 hours) I can give a testimony to one point made in the book. If you survive your mistakes (and every pilots has them) you should learn from them. If not you have wasted the good luck at having lived to tell about them.

If you are a pilot who has had good instruction you probably will encounter very little brand new information here (other than the statistical analysis) but I still found GREAT VALUE in the review, focus, and breadth of the topics covered. Other than a tendency to drag a little at a very few points it is well written and presented. The last chapter about the press is probably not relevant to the purpose of the book (but I still agree with everything he says!!).

If you care about a pilot or are a pilot who cares about his passengers THIS is a great book purchase.

There is some interesting information in here, but the book could have been half as long. Much of the book repeats basics that we all know from our student pilot training (or at least should know). The crash reports and summaries are a good reminder of some basic pilot errors that cause accidents, but I was hoping for more practical advice on risk management.

The author hardly says anything new, since lack of experience - as well posed by another reviewer - is a well known cause of accidents. However, I appreciate the book for providing an overall and reasonably concise summary of the prevalent accident causes and for pointing out in no uncertain term when pilots are mostly liable to have accidents. Also I found very informative the tables at the end where the author shows how and what flying skills degrade with time. This is not only a powerful argument for continuous training, but also gives good ideas to pilots doing it - through programs like the FAA Wings - on training topics. Risk management though is given only a very shallow treatment and this is a pity. Nonetheless I would reccomed the book to any pilot and to anyone interested to be a pilot. The title is somewhat upsetting for non-pilot relations that may see a loved one reading it. This is not necessarily a bad thing. It brings some realism into the matter and forces the reader to think in terms of risk management even if one's aviation activities are limited to short summer flights in good VFR.