Customer Reviews

Kinds Of Minds: Toward An Understanding Of Consciousness (Science Masters)

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I got started on Dennett's many books when a friend recommended Consciousness Explained and I haven't been able to put the topic down ever since. Dennett continues his clear, straightforward style in this book which is much more readable than Consciousness Explained, but still provides ample challenge for the reader.

Dennett starts with the statement, "I am a philosopher, not a scientist," yet his command of what is going on in the sciences is most impressive. His ability to make incredibly complex ideas of evolution understandable to the lay person is amazing and consistent. Through the use of words and diagrams, we are brought up to date on the latest thinking on what mind is and how it is evolving.

Kinds of Minds tackles very emotional and controversial topics such as "are we so sure that all humans have minds? . . . Could it be that all animals and even plants and even bacteria have minds?. . . What kinds of minds are there?" The reader is then lead through a series of logical steps, replete with information on the latest scientific and philosophical thought, and left to finally decide these big questions on his or her own.

This is definitely a must read book for those interested in the human mind, consciousness, and ethical treatment of our fellow beings in this interconnected web of all existence.

If you aren't familiar with the works of Daniel Dennett, this is the starting point of choice. This American philosopher's ability to pose thought-provoking questions is unmatched. In this collection, the focus is on "what is a mind?" How do we define "the mind" and are humans the sole possessors of it? Dennett is not only deft at posing these posers, he presents the questions and his explanations with philosophy's finest prose and wit. His other advantage over his fellow cognitive scientists is his use of Darwin's "dangerous idea," evolution by natural selection. As products of that process, humans are not exempt from its rules. That framework raises the issue of whether other creatures can be said to have "minds." Dennett explores this issue with skillfully chosen examples. These are part of the list of "kinds of minds."

Dennett is famous among philosophers for devising the concept of "the intentional stance." The intentional stance is interpreting the behaviour of an entity." The range of entities is extensive - a simple thermostat has predictable behaviour - when the room is cool, the device closes a circuit turning on the heat. According to Dennett, the simplest creatures exhibited similar "robotic" behaviour, but as life evolved, more complex patterns developed. Dennett argues that "adopting the intentional stance is not just a good idea but the key to unraveling the mysteries of the mind - all kinds of minds." In his view, intentional systems have progressed along the course of evolution in ever complex steps. Humans, with the development of language, have achieved the highest level of cognitive abilities.

Dennett addresses what many philosophers call the "mind-body" question. Those who feel the mind and body must be considered separately will face some challenging assertions here. Perhaps more importantly, those who may not feel disposed to read philosophy, will find much stimulate thinking about who they really are. Dennett keeps his presentation clearly formulated and easily readable. Quick, simple answers to questions about thinking are not Dennett's style. This is a slim tome, but the few pages are packed with rigorously conceived concepts. The words flow easily, but the content will bear repeated readings. As Dennett reminds us, there are countless questions about what a mind is, with many answers remaining to be derived. This book provides the starting point for that quest.

Dennett's input into the 'sentient machines' debate continues to be compelling. This book focuses on animals, and on understanding the kind of consciousness that may exist in different classes of creature. Dennett travels the animal kingdom, drawing pertinent examples to help refute poor hypotheses. In the tradition of the best philosophy, it leaves one with better questions, rather than better answers. The book is very approachable, and free of complexity. Highly recommended

After being reasonably impressed with Dennett's thoroughly researched treatise supporting evolution in his book Darwin's Dangerous Idea, I was motivated to read Kinds of Minds. Sadly, I am left with the impression Dennett had a book contract to honor and filled 168 pages with off the cuff rhetoric rather than substantive, concrete science. For most, it will be no great surprise that the development of complex language and our use of symbols and tools to help us arrange and "offload" data that might otherwise saturate our brains, gives us humans a great advantage over this planet's other inhabitants. Even here I was disappointed, finding not even speculation as to the evolutionary forces driving such advantage. If Dennett tells us anything, it is that our search to explain consciousness raises far more questions than answers. It is fortunate that Kinds of Minds was not my first exposure to Dennett. Otherwise, I would have had no reason to undertake his considerably longer offering, Darwins Dangerous Idea.

I could feel my brain stretching as I read this book. It is philosophical but readable.

The main focus of this book is, as implied by the title, the notion that there are several qualitatively different ways that organisms adapt to their environments -- it isn't simply a matter of one organism being "more intelligent" than another. He presents a succession of clear models, increasing in sophistication, for how an organism's behavior can be modulated to improve its chances of reproductive success. I had never thought about these qualitatively different "levels of sophistication," but they make perfect sense to me -- kind of an "Aha!" experience.

I liked it.

To the question, "Where does human consciousness come from?", somebody (I think it may have been William James) answered, "From animal consciousness." Unless one accepts some non-naturalistic explanation, I think that has to be right, and Dennett, who is a philosopher not a biologist, goes squarely up that Darwinian road. Not enough is known to make the whole journey without any gaps, but his account of evolutionary development from Darwinian creatures, to Skinnerian, to Popperian, to Gregorian ones, and of how those transitions might have occurred, is extremely suggestive about the major aspects of the route that has culminated (so far) in the human kind of mind. Exciting stuff, no doubt about it.

The book is very well-written, but not an easy read in a few sections, where steps in the argument are more suggested than explicitly stated. I think that's to be expected at the frontier of any science -- and everything about this subject matter lies at the ragged edge of knowledge and speculation. That problem no doubt is exacerbated by the space constraints that this series of short science books imposes. But the overall explanatory approach and framework are clear and persuasive. Dennett's recommendations for further reading are especially good.

Highly recommended.

If you've read anything written within the past 20 years on 'philosophy of mind' or the mystery of human consciousness, you've no doubt come across the name Daniel Dennett. Dr. Dennett is a noted expert in the field of mind and consciousness. Dennett is not just another armchair philosopher, as he frequently collaborates with psychologists and neuroscientists in the design and evaluation of empirical studies. He has published a great number of articles and books, many of which are readable by the interested layperson. Unfortunately, most of these works are quite voluminous. "Kinds of Minds" is a relatively short summary of Dennett's paradigms and ultimate contentions regarding the conscious brain. It's great for those like myself who want to experience Dennett but don't have the time to digest a few thousand pages of dense, technical prose.

You should approach Dennett in two different ways; in philosopher talk, Dennett requies an epistemological dualism. On the one hand, Dennett provides a wide range of extremely useful interpretation of neurological and psychological data; he masterfully interweaves the human mind with the brain, body and social environments that support it. Dennett is a brilliant scholar, and even in a short book like this he manages to provide amazing insights on what our minds are doing and why they are doing it. At some point, however, Dennett crosses a hazy boundary between analysis and personal interpretation, and you need to invoke the second approach, a cautious stance toward his strong but not universally accepted opinions.

This second aspect of Dennett is actually what he is best known for outside of professional circles. At the start of this review, I spoke of the "mystery" of human consciousness. Dennett has made his reputation denying that mystery, contending that our conscious self-awareness and sentient experience of the world surrounding us is no more beyond our understanding than is the flexing of our arms, the beating of our heart, or the digestion of what we eat. Dennett vigorously denies the dualist contention that "something more" is metaphysically involved in human sentience, something beyond what our scientific paradigms can currently explain and predict.

"Kinds of Minds" wavers back and forth between Dennett I and Dennett II, although as the book progresses the first aspect wanes as aspect II waxes. Thus, by the middle of the book you will be greatly impressed by the breadth and depth of Dr. Dennett's understanding of the known facts, but you will also see where he wants to go. Will he make it? He appears to have momentum, enough to convince you that all of our ideas, feelings, inspirations and impressions are the workings of complex machinery, and can ultimately be broken down to the operation and interaction of organic machines within the bigger machine that is nature itself. You brace yourself for the evisceration of all hope that there exists something more to our lives than this. And then you reach the end and nothing like that has happened, even though Dennett repeatedly claims that it has.

What actually happens is that Dennett provides plenty of reasons why the dualist paradigm cannot be called "science". Sentience as it is described by Dennett is too fuzzy, too patchy, too inconsistent. But then again, so were lightening and magnetism and chemistry, once upon a time. Perhaps our intellectual paradigms are not yet powerful enough to explain the difference between pain (i.e., electro chemical processes in the brain and the nerve system when a part of the body experiences traumatic injury) and suffering, the usual - but not entirely predictable - mental response to pain. Strangely enough, it is Dennett who points out this difference in the final chapter, just as he claims triumph over any remaining dualist 'superstition'. He admits that the pain-suffering distinction is a "blurred notion", one found in everyday "folk thinking"; and yet he terms it "valuable and intuitively satisfying", after mocking and rejecting the similarly blurred and yet satisfying concept of experiential "qualia" (satisfying to me anyway).

The personality of a book's author often seeps through when discussing the mind, and Dennett leaves plenty of evidence as to his own ironic, pessimistic views regarding nature and humankind. His existential cynicism become apparent in his reference to sexual frustration, in his fascination with baby cuckoos destroying eggs and other hatchlings so as to win all of the food that their "adopted motherbird" can provide, and in his citation of fraud and deception as key motivations for the development of complex language abilities in humans. This final notion is at odds with 18th Century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid and his conjecture that innate veracity and credulity are the cornerstone of language and effective social interaction. Both philosophers would admit to both veracity and deception as human social traits, but as to which represents the horse and which is the cart . . . obviously Daniel Dennett takes the darker view.

Once the dust settles, Dennett is seen to have tackled the Cartesian straw man without erecting anything new to support a monistic mental paradigm using available scientific concepts. Sure, we can now explain why we THINK without reference to unknown metaphysical realms; but can we really explain why we FEEL (i.e. why we have "qualia", including suffering but also including joy)? Dennett offers simplicity as the reward for denying dualistic insistence upon sentience. But what if Plank, Bohr and other turn-of-the-previous-century scientists had clung to the mantra of simplicity when faced with challenges to classical electromagnetic field theory? Quantum physics was certainly not a simple solution, but it was ultimately the right (or at least "righter") one.

So read Dennett, by all means, and benefit from the broad, sweeping vistas he provides regarding the vexing question of "mental intentionality" and other difficult topics along the border of philosophy and neuroscience. But beware as he beckons you towards the edge of what we now know about the mind. The drop-off into mental nihilism that Dennett invites is severe, consequential and not yet intellectually required. It may not ever be.

Dennett strikes out to explore the question of what exactly is a mind. Early in the book, he points out that your mind is the only thing that you can observe from within, while others can only observe from outside. It is the only thing in this reality that is like that. Dennett attacks the problem of definition with examples from robotics, molecular biology, daily-life anecdotes, and philosophical introspection. The book touches on evolutionary concepts a la Dawkins' Selfish Gene. And there is plenty of resonance with Minsky's Society of Mind ideas, where the mind is seen as a whole that emerges from the sum of its parts. The book is quite concise, to the point, but with a perfect amount of detail and analysis for anyone from the novel to the advanced philosopher, cognitive scientist, or any human being who ever wondered what's going on inside of their head.

Dennett is methodical when defining terms and constructing his arguments for the `intentional stance'. His arguments and comparisons are crystal clear and mount slowly towards a scheme of differentiating levels of consciousness. This cautious and approach works for most of the book. Suddenly Dennett's thesis jumps forward to address much more elaborate mental capabilities and the comparison of these - I skipped back to see if I missed something - perhaps this is a gap in our understanding, but it needs to be stated. His references to previous work and the reactions of others give the impression that a sequential reading of his books is desirable. The insights I have gained from Kinds of Minds are such that I am inspired to chase up Dennett's earlier and later work.

The weight he puts on the human mind's capacity to offload tasks onto the environment, such as using tools, is justified and his argument is compelling. One wonders where this ability will take us in the future. Overall, this is a good and certainly painless introduction to the work of Dennett.

Dennett makes excellent points throughout this little book, especially from an evolutionary standpoint. But at the end, it appears that Dennett holds that nothing is a mind untill someone adds language, as if a brain was kool-aid and language water. Things are not so simple. For example, Dennett tries to conclude that since minds are made up of what he calls little "machines" then a mind is just a machine until proven otherwise. His proof seems to be language. But I fail to see if that is the logical conclusion from his early arguments. Isn't language at the end also made up of "machines"? Dennett does not only use an emergent theory in support of his conclusions, but I doubt that would make a difference.
So at the end, humans are conscious because of language and direct evidence for individuals, but animals are not because thay do not have language and we cannot directly see what is like to bo one. There are times in the book where Dennett even puts into question wether deaf-mutes would really have a trult human mind! There is a trend among theorists that holds that language tranforms inert matter into conscious matter. Now, truly, language separates human consicousness from other kinds of minds, but it does not follow that language is a necesary condition for consciousness itself. Dennett, who is a strong A.I supporter, should know this. I mean, does a computer has to have language to be conscious? Or for that matter is language then also a sufficient condition for consciousness?
Dennett also fails to discuss many important things that should be considered when talking about animal minds- language studies in higher primates, working memory in animals, etc...- Granted, these are all inconclusive, but should not be ignored. I think Dennets view of consciousness is really strange and confused...He once denied the existence of qualia! But this is no argument. I can confidently say that one does not emerge knowing much about minds after readind this book.