The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow [Hardcover]

William Burr (Editor)

Book Description

Publication Date: February 1999

Brought to you by the Freedom of Information Act: Never-before-seen transcripts of Henry Kissinger's most sensitive conversations with world leaders. The Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon tapes fascinated and shocked Americans with their revelations of the real goings-on in the Oval Office. Now we have the unvarnished record of Henry Kissinger's high-stakes diplomacy during the world-shaping events of the Nixon years. Here are the transcripts, formerly classified "Top Secret / Sensitive / Exclusive Eyes Only," of Kissinger's talks with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Leonid Brezhnev, Andrei Gromyko, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, George Bush, and others. When Henry Kissinger left the State Department in January 1977, he took with him his "personal papers" as well as copies of government papers he had worked on and reviews, and attempted to close off all access to them until five years after his death. However, transcripts of some of his most important conversations found their way into other files, where National Security Archive staffers tracked them down. These transcripts of Kissinger's conversations span the period of Nixon and Kissinger's greatest triumphs -- the opening of China culminating in Nixon's meeting with Mao Zedong in February 1972 and the success of the Nixon-Brezhnev Moscow summit in June of that year -- and most dramatic defeats -- Watergate and the decline of detente. The transcripts expand our understanding of Kissinger's diplomacy during that time -- and set the record straight. Far from the even-handed approach toward the USSR and the People's Republic of China depicted in Kissinger's public rhetoric, the Kissinger seen here is trying assiduously to curry favor with Mao and Zhou and to forge what he secretly characterized as a "tacit alliance" with Beijing. Revelations include the fact that Kissinger offered Zhou Enlai an intelligence hotline if the Soviets were ever poised to attack China, and that he provided Beijing with full accounts of his meetings with the Soviets. We also get a fly-on-the-wall perspective on Kissinger's talks with an often bemused Brezhnev on such issues as arms control, the Middle East, and Jewish emigration; and the first insider accounts ever of Kissinger's last meeting with Mao in 1975; US-Soviet clashes over Africa; the Salt II talks; and more. Supplementary materials include Kissinger's reports to President Nixon and US officials and his "back channel" cables from Beijing. The Kissinger Transcripts offers an unparalleled view of American diplomacy as conducted by one of the most controversial Secretaries of State in modern US history. With the record unmediated by Kissinger's spin, readers can begin to make up their own minds about the merits or flaws of a major effort to transform US Cold War strategy.

Editorial Reviews

Amazon.com Review

Henry Kissinger brought a near-obsessive sense of secrecy to the execution of his duties as secretary of state during the administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, and took steps to ensure that this secrecy would continue even after he left office. Much of his paperwork is under seal at the Library of Congress, making use of a loophole in the Freedom of Information Act to keep the material away from prying researchers. The Kissinger Transcripts is based, then, on files obtained from the National Archive and the State Department.

The conversations with Soviet and Chinese officials reproduced here do not contradict the accounts in Kissinger's memoirs so much as they show just how much he omitted in his version of events. For example, Nixon and Kissinger, willing to bend U.S. foreign policy in a pro-China direction, made a stunning offer in 1971 to the Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations: "We would be prepared at your request, and through whatever sources you wish, to give you whatever information we have about the disposition of Soviet forces. I don't have it with me, but we can arrange it easily wherever you wish and in an absolutely secure way."

There are some interesting human touches, which, along with the historical data, make an invaluable contribution to our understanding of Kissinger's role in world politics. In 1972, he tells the Chinese UN ambassador that (then UN ambassador) George Bush needs "more backbone;" in sporadic appearances throughout the transcripts, the future president doesn't do much to nullify that appraisal. In a Beijing meeting, Mao tells his American audience that he enjoys his reputation for troublemaking:

"You must say that Chairman Mao is an old bureaucrat and in that case I will speed up and meet with you. In such a case I will make haste to see you. If you don't curse me, I won't see you, and I will just sleep peacefully.... I will only be happy when all foreigners slam on tables and curse me."

And then there's Nixon's appraisal of his globetrotting diplomat and ladies' man: "the only man in captivity who could go to Paris 12 times and Peking once and no one knew it, except possibly a couple of pretty girls."

Review

Burr succinctly summarizes Kissinger's cagey but admiring pursuit of cooperation with the Chinese and his earnest but mistrustful search for agreements with the Soviets. -- The New York Times Book Review, Max Frankel

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 515 pages
• Publisher: New Press; First Edition edition (February 1999)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1565844807
• ISBN-13: 978-1565844803
• Product Dimensions: 9.2 x 6.2 x 1.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 2 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 4.6 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (10 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,155,535 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

6 of 6 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Necessary material for students of international relations, August 1, 2001

By 

Christopher D Blandy (Santa Monica, CA USA) - See all my reviews

This review is from: The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top-Secret Talks With Beijing and Moscow (Paperback)

Individuals indeed can change the world, as evidenced by some of the transcripts in this excellent collection of original documents. William Burr has delivered an important record of the actions of the principle actors during the United States' shift from Kennan-inspired containment policy to balance-of-power politics.

Reaping the benefits of the Freedom of Information Act and declassification projects at the federal agencies responsible for U.S. foreign policy, Burr and his colleagues at the National Security Archive project at George Washington University have brought us the raw, unadulterated truths surrounding the diplomacy behind Nixon's detente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China. Gems such as the momentous first meeting of Nixon and Mao with Zhou Enlai and Kissinger in attendance cannot be missed.

Excellent primary source material with copious notes from Burr. A must-have for anyone interested in Kissinger and his relationships with Nixon, Mao and Brezhnev.

10 of 12 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Essential reading on Foreign Policy, March 6, 2002

By A Customer

This review is from: The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top-Secret Talks With Beijing and Moscow (Paperback)

The lengths to which Kissinger went to recruit the Chinese on the American side in the Cold War are instructive to those who believe that America played its cards well on the international arena in the Cold War. Much of the story that William Burr has pieced together--quite admirably in my opinion--is sad reading from the American point of view. Less so, of course, from the Chinese perspective. At points, it is easy to forget which of the parties was the superpower, and which the third world nation rising from internal turmoil, economic collapse and a severely hostile international situation. It is particularly instructive to read this book in context of the question of dealing with China, a problem which America has grappled with fitfully over the past two decades. The roots of Chinese suspicion of "peaceful evolution" and "engagement" lie in their recollection of the avid wooing of China in the 1970s.

On a local note, for the Asian reader, Kissinger's views on dealing with the Indian subcontinent are also instructive, including his open willingness to pressurise India in the Bangladesh crisis. In general terms, the Nixon administration's bias was perceived in India, and has been one of the reasons for the difficult relationship between India and USA in the 1970s and early 1980s. This book only provides proof of that less-than-subtle 'tilt'.

This book is invaluable reference material to all students of international relations, even if it is used as a "how-not-to" manual. The only gripe is the shoddy proof reading, with typos and inconsistent romanisation of Chinese names. But that is a small price to pay for this excellent piece of research.

Buy this book, you won't regret it.

2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars A wonderful research tool, sloppily edited, February 19, 1999

By 

Dave Hull - See all my reviews

This review is from: The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow (Hardcover)

At first glance, his looks like it could possibly be one of the most exciting finds of recent time. Who of those even remotely interested in the back-channel workings of cold war diplomacy would take a pass at an opportunity to be a fly on the wall at some of the most top secret discussions between Kissinger and Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Brezhnev, and others. The scripts themselves are very illuminating, from off the wall comments like Mao's suggestion that China export thousands of women to the United States to sow discord (a prophetic refernce to the horror soon to be commited by his wife, Jiang Qing) to the detailed secret haggling of hotlines, warheads, and political cannon-firing that would be the cornerstone of Kissinger's triangular diplomacy. Kissenger is shown in a sometimes harsh light, but the forces attacking him are also evident, wearing him down and diminishing his effectiveness. My only real complaint about this book is the very sloppy editing. Silly errors like pound signs instead of dollar signs sit side by side with mispellings and inconsistant pinyin romanizations of Chinese names (after a note in the forward marking the special care taken in this area). The rolling commentary is useful, giving background to the upcoming script, but at times is nothing more than a prehash of things you are about to read, similar to a Greek chorus. The book, although suffering from many gaps (transcripts not yet declassified and foriegn transcripts, perhaps never to be seen) is a fine tool for researchers who can overlook the distracting flaws. I'm sure those who are interested enough to wade through the diplomatic fudging of MIRV's and Backfire bombers can muddle through the morass of poor editing.