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The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top-Secret Talks With Beijing and Moscow

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Individuals indeed can change the world, as evidenced by some of the transcripts in this excellent collection of original documents. William Burr has delivered an important record of the actions of the principle actors during the United States' shift from Kennan-inspired containment policy to balance-of-power politics.

Reaping the benefits of the Freedom of Information Act and declassification projects at the federal agencies responsible for U.S. foreign policy, Burr and his colleagues at the National Security Archive project at George Washington University have brought us the raw, unadulterated truths surrounding the diplomacy behind Nixon's detente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China. Gems such as the momentous first meeting of Nixon and Mao with Zhou Enlai and Kissinger in attendance cannot be missed.

Excellent primary source material with copious notes from Burr. A must-have for anyone interested in Kissinger and his relationships with Nixon, Mao and Brezhnev.

The lengths to which Kissinger went to recruit the Chinese on the American side in the Cold War are instructive to those who believe that America played its cards well on the international arena in the Cold War. Much of the story that William Burr has pieced together--quite admirably in my opinion--is sad reading from the American point of view. Less so, of course, from the Chinese perspective. At points, it is easy to forget which of the parties was the superpower, and which the third world nation rising from internal turmoil, economic collapse and a severely hostile international situation. It is particularly instructive to read this book in context of the question of dealing with China, a problem which America has grappled with fitfully over the past two decades. The roots of Chinese suspicion of "peaceful evolution" and "engagement" lie in their recollection of the avid wooing of China in the 1970s.

On a local note, for the Asian reader, Kissinger's views on dealing with the Indian subcontinent are also instructive, including his open willingness to pressurise India in the Bangladesh crisis. In general terms, the Nixon administration's bias was perceived in India, and has been one of the reasons for the difficult relationship between India and USA in the 1970s and early 1980s. This book only provides proof of that less-than-subtle 'tilt'.

This book is invaluable reference material to all students of international relations, even if it is used as a "how-not-to" manual. The only gripe is the shoddy proof reading, with typos and inconsistent romanisation of Chinese names. But that is a small price to pay for this excellent piece of research.

Buy this book, you won't regret it.

At first glance, his looks like it could possibly be one of the most exciting finds of recent time. Who of those even remotely interested in the back-channel workings of cold war diplomacy would take a pass at an opportunity to be a fly on the wall at some of the most top secret discussions between Kissinger and Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Brezhnev, and others. The scripts themselves are very illuminating, from off the wall comments like Mao's suggestion that China export thousands of women to the United States to sow discord (a prophetic refernce to the horror soon to be commited by his wife, Jiang Qing) to the detailed secret haggling of hotlines, warheads, and political cannon-firing that would be the cornerstone of Kissinger's triangular diplomacy. Kissenger is shown in a sometimes harsh light, but the forces attacking him are also evident, wearing him down and diminishing his effectiveness. My only real complaint about this book is the very sloppy editing. Silly errors like pound signs instead of dollar signs sit side by side with mispellings and inconsistant pinyin romanizations of Chinese names (after a note in the forward marking the special care taken in this area). The rolling commentary is useful, giving background to the upcoming script, but at times is nothing more than a prehash of things you are about to read, similar to a Greek chorus. The book, although suffering from many gaps (transcripts not yet declassified and foriegn transcripts, perhaps never to be seen) is a fine tool for researchers who can overlook the distracting flaws. I'm sure those who are interested enough to wade through the diplomatic fudging of MIRV's and Backfire bombers can muddle through the morass of poor editing.

Although much of Burr's analysis leaves a lot to be desired, this book is a must have for a first hand look at Kissinger's diplomatic legacy. There is still much information that has not been declassified and therefore _The Kissinger Transcripts_ presents only a partial picture at best, but Burr's compilation is well worth the effort to see Kissinger's many different diplomatic faces show themselves as he deals with different characters such as Mao, Brezhnev, Zhou Enlai, Gromyko, Deng Xiaoping and others. It is truly fascinating to examine the different rhetorical tactics employeed by Kissinger to suit his particular audience. Incidentally, this bit of genius appears to be lost upon Burr, and others too, who view these many Kissinger faces with a seeming lack of understanding and even think of it as somewhat contradictory. The guiding theme when examined as a whole, however, is that Kissinger worked toward the improvement of the position of the United States in the world power structure. There is no doubt that the opening of China, coupled with Kissinger's deft Middle East diplomacy, did just that. These transcripts shed some much needed light on the operations of perhaps the United States' greatest executor of foreign policy.

Mao's greatest talk is in this book, from page 183 to page 203.

When this book came out it caused a bit of a stir. However, as the editors note, a careful review of the material actual tends toward moderation. Supporters can see a bit to criticize and the critics can see things aren't quite as black as they had supposed. I found the transcripts to be fascinating because we get to read conversations that were the subject of much debate and speculation for the past several decades.

However, transcripts are subject to several issues. First, they are all in English. We do not know what the original Russian, Chinese, or what have you in order to see what the translation may have missed in nuance or simply gotten wrong. Second, transcripts are only as good as the transcriber and some of the conversations were put together well after the fact, so the question stands, do we really have an exact transcription of the conversations. Third, while the editor does his best to provide very good context for the transcript and compares what is said to other sources such as Kissinger's memoirs, we do not have all of the context that went into setting up the meeting and the private thoughts of the parties prior to and after the conversations transcribed. So, what is said is still subject to misinterpretation by inferring incorrectly the intent of the various parties to these conversations.

These concerns aside, I find this a very valuable and useful reference to certain key events during both Nixon administrations. The cover photo is a bit too cute. A black and white photo of a somber Kissinger with, what, rose colored glasses (the Red of the communists coloring his world? A too optimistic view of the communists?) with one lens displaying a faint hammer and cycle of the Soviets and the other the Chinese star.

Study and enjoy.

The revelations that the many clandestine, covert and self-serving foreign policy "misadventures" that Kissinger and Nixon engaged in on behalf of the world's supposedly greatest free society are bewildering. The legacy of that devious and deceptive approach to foreign policy continuous even to this day - as the world learns of the indefensible US support of the ultra right mass murderers in Central America. How did such an amoral national security and state department apparatus come to pass in a nation that purports to defend human rights and promote open and democratic societies? Kissinger and Nixon may be brilliant, but, obsessed with the cold war politics, the two did an immense damage to the credibility of the people of the United States who want a just and free world. Their unabashed sucking up to the communists dictators in China must have shocked even Mao and Zhao.

These top secrets talks between Washington, directed by Kissinger at all, China and Rusia are like those ( not at all) that took place in the 19th century Europe to build what was known as the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and also created the so called "balance of power" that kept all power nations out of war. Kissinger as Secretary of State in the Nixon-Ford era took in his hands the priority to create that "balance of power" between China, Rusia and USA, that was called "detente" and kept out the fear from a possible nuclear war all over the world. These transcrips show how the negotiations that conducted Kissinger during that time were conducted between China and Rusia, and also show how well he kept the fear out from a confrontation from the foreign policy of the United States.

It's important that this kind of information is published, and not kept secret.

Another fact not mentioned in the reviews is how China was given a free hand by Kissinger against India. This enabled China to pass on nuclear secrets and missiles to Pakistan. Now the world is trying to figure out how other Mid Eastern Moslem nations can be denied such technologies.

It goes to show how short sighted Nixon/Kissinger's foreign policies were. They allowed two monsters to arise in Asia - china and pakistan.

None of the star diplomats grasped that China plays 'go', not chess. Now that major urban centers on the Canadian and US West Coasts are being re-populated by ethnic Chinese, it might be time to wake up. Because the same thing is happening in Siberia, and in Western European cities. Emigrants from China (100s of millions strong) are re-mapping the world.

Is the Chinese restaurant history's greatest Trojan horse? Is Peking behind the population shift, as favouring the export of surplus labour and potential unrest? Has the the end game begun? We await the definitive inquiry.