Customer Reviews

Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America's Soviet Experts

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This is an entirely fascinating book that is masquerading as a dull study of those unique scholars, mostly social scientists, who in the wake of WWII and in the early Cold War developed and participated in Soviet studies. Engerman with the narrowness which is characteristic of modern academic research only vaguely mentions that in point of fact the post-WWII period saw the creation and growth of the area studies concept for all regions. Although he focuses only on Soviet experts much of what he recounts of their experiences, particularly their involvement in national policy, was replicated by area studies experts in general.

The use of academic expertise to understand complex and different, but hostile societies began in WWII particularly with Japan, when cultural anthropologists, such as Ruth Benedict, were asked to examine Japanese culture and society. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) had a research and analysis division along with a host of academic experts began various Russian studies programs at first to better understand an important ally and towards the end of the war a potential enemy. Although far from perfect the application of various social science disciplines to `real world' problems during WWII proved useful enough in strategic planning that the newly created U.S., Department of Defense and CIA wanted this sort of work to continue. Also various private foundations, such as the Ford Foundation, recognized the need for the U.S. to become much more aware of foreign affairs that was the case prior to WWII so were willing to fund scholarly research into the social, political and economic details of the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics (USSR), as well as other foreign countries. The U.S. Air Force was particularly interested in such studies for strategic planning purposes and CIA in its early days used scholarly research to supplement its production of finished intelligence. All this gave Soviet Studies both the financing and relevance to blossom across the country although Engerman focus primarily on the Centers established at Harvard and Columbia Universities. This also was the halcyon days for the Rand Corporation which served principally as the semi-private think tank of the Air Force and from which a good deal of good scholarship emerged on Soviet issues. Interestingly enough when CIA produced a controversial 1974 National Intelligence Estimate of Soviet strategic capabilities it was subjected to a competitive review by an outside group (a "B Team") that included Academic Soviet Experts who effectively questioned its accuracy.

According to Engerman Soviet Studies not surprisingly came to an end when the USSR collapsed. Although he implies that Russian studies have ceased to be important, many scholars would disagree and would argue that the opening up of Russian archives have opened entirely new vistas to scholars.

It is astounding to realize how few Russian experts (barely beyond single digits) there were in the United States before the 1917 revolution and even before World War II. Indeed, in 1948, when the war with Hitler was won and the Cold War just begun, the U.S. government only had about a dozen Russian speakers in its employ.

What followed was an explosion of government funding for academic programs and institutes around the country, the development of Soviet Studies and Kremlinology, and a strenuous effort to "know thine enemy."

Engerman shows that this effort forged a unique relationship between government and academia. It was a relationship not limited to the hard or social sciences, as it bled over into literature, creating a web of interaction between spies, academics, generals and politicians that somehow linked Pushkin to the Pentagon, yet mostly failed to predict, half a century later, the sudden collapse of the organism under study.

Deeply researched, well-written, this is an important chronicle that explains much about how government and academia still interact, and it should be read not just by Russophiles, but by anyone interested in new academic initiatives to focus on "Islamic Studies."

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I'm interested in the subject, but I found the book pretty dry. Everything seems well documented but reads pretty much as a recitation of facts. This is probably better suited for the more "hard core" student of this area of history, and not the general history buff looking for a little more insight into this era.