Knowledge in Flux presents a theory of rational changes of belief, focusing particularly on revisions that occur when the agent receives new information that is inconsistent with the present epistemic state. It brings together, systematizes, and enlarges upon an already influential body of work by the author and his colleagues on the dynamics of theories and epistemic states.
The problem of knowledge representation is one of the most important current research problems in philosophy, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science in general. While most of the research has been devoted to analyzing the structure of epistemic states, this book is unique in describing the dynamics of knowledge and belief, and in presenting models of knowledge that focus on expansions, revisions, and contractions of epistemic states.
The problem of knowledge representation is one of the most important current research problems in philosophy, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science in general. While most of the research has been devoted to analyzing the structure of epistemic states, this book is unique in describing the dynamics of knowledge and belief, and in presenting models of knowledge that focus on expansions, revisions, and contractions of epistemic states.
