The Korean War (Da Capo Paperback) [Paperback]

Matthew B. Ridgway (Author)

Book Description

Series: Da Capo Paperback | Publication Date: March 22, 1986

In December 1950 General Matthew B. Ridgway replaced General Walton Walker as commander of the Eighth Army, and in April 1951 he succeeded Douglas MacArthur as supreme commander of the United Nations forces in Korea and supreme commander of the United States Far East Command. In this spirited book, General Ridgway describes how he took a dispirited army and rebuilt it in a few short months, leading it into battle against the Chinese and North Korean forces, forcing them back over the 38th parallel and ”victory.” It is a book that takes a close look at MacArthur, his failings and brilliance, and a hard look at the idea of limited war. Infused with a humane leader’s appreciation for the ordinary fighting soldier, Ridgway’s history also teaches important lessons about Vietnam and any future conflict. Above all, he emphasizes: We should not involve ourselves in escalating warfare without a specific and attainable goal.

Editorial Reviews

About the Author

Matthew B. Ridgway, General, U.S. Army, is retired. In December, 1950, Ridgway replaced General Walton Walker as commander of the Eighth Army, and in April, 1951, he succeeded Douglas MacArthur as supreme commander of the United Nations forces in Korea and supreme commander of the United States Far East Command.

Product Details

• Paperback: 362 pages
• Publisher: Da Capo Press; New edition edition (March 22, 1986)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0306802678
• ISBN-13: 978-0306802676
• Product Dimensions: 8.5 x 5.4 x 0.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 13.8 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.1 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (9 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #816,231 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

18 of 19 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Ridgway and Limited War, May 18, 2001

By 

Carter A. Malkasian (Huntington Beach, CA) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: The Korean War (Da Capo Paperback) (Paperback)

Matthew Ridgway is a fairly unknown general in US military history. This is unfortunate because he was incredibly insightful and capable. In fact, he was probably the United States' best general of the Cold War.

_The Korean War_ is an account of his experiences commanding first the Eighth US Army and then the entire United Nations Command against the Communists. He entered the war at a time of catastrophic defeat. The Chinese Communists had forced the Eighth Army into a disastrous retreat, the longest in US military history. Ridgway took command of the Eighth Army and forged it into a more capable weapon. By doing so, he was able to halt the Communist advance and retake much lost ground.

_The Korean War_ explains how Ridgway did this. Moreover, though, the book demonstrates his ability to grasp how the Cold War meant that the US needed to fight different kinds of wars. Total war was now very dangerous because it could result in a Third World War with the Soviet Union or a much larger war with China. Ridgway, therefore, endorsed the necessity of fighting limited wars. He developed this stategy as well as an operational approach of attrition. He wanted to wear down the Communists and force them to concede in negotiations. He focused on reducing the risk of escalation and minimizing his own losses in order to form a sustainable strategic and operational approach. As such, Ridgway played a formative role in the development of US strategy in the Cold War. This book explains how and why he did so. It is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand conventional military strategy during the Cold War.

12 of 13 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars The commander tells how he saw the war in Korea, September 7, 1999

By A Customer

This review is from: The Korean War (Da Capo Paperback) (Paperback)

Matthew Ridgway was arguably the finest general officer to serve in United States forces in the 20th Century. Whether one agrees with this ranking or not, no one can dispute that he performed a feat of leadership unmatched by any senior general in American military history - he took an American army that had suffered the greatest defeat in its history and rebuilt it through the force of his personality and gifts of leadership and turned it around and had it successfully on the offensive in only one month. Had he done nothing else, his fame would be unmatched, yet he additionally kept the United States out of the Indochina morass that ten years later would be Vietnam - when there were no Ridgways to warn of the dangers of commitment there.

12 of 14 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Excellent book for a military perspective of the Korean War, November 9, 1999

By 

Richard D. Nelson "Ozzie" (Fayetteville, NC) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: The Korean War (Da Capo Paperback) (Paperback)

General Matthew Ridgway commanded the U.S. Eight Army in Korea from December 1950 until April 1951 when he succeeded General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander of the United Nations forces in Korea and Supreme Commander of the U.S. Far East Command. The Korean War is his personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and his view of the implications the Korean conflict would have on future U.S. foreign policy.

Ridgway does a fine job of explaining the impetus for U.S. involvement in a war on the Korean peninsula, a war in which America was incredibly unprepared and downright disinterested. Ridgway's analysis of the U.S. failure to anticipate the invasion is insightful. The U.S. believed the next war would be another global conflict similar to World War II in which Korea would play very little importance. Ridgway states that the U.S. was not concerned with Korea mainly because it was beyond the traditional U.S. defensive perimeter that would be protected against the next global conflagration. Furthermore, Ridgway points out that the U.S. had faith in the United Nations to forestall any serious aggression and, in the event of a failure, the U.S. felt confident in the power of its nuclear deterrence. Ridgway claims confidence in these factors left America believing in a psychological Maginot line in Korea.

Little fault can be found with Ridgway's analysis of the North Korea's invasion of South Korea and subsequent unprepared U.S. entry into the Korean War. Ridgway states "diplomacy is only as strong as the military muscle willing to be put forth." The amount of military muscle put forth is driven by the resolve of the American populace and with Korea there was little. Had the U.S. demonstrated or even indicated a resolve to protect the South Korea, the invasion probably could have been averted. Ridgway dedicates much time to the civil-military dispute between General MacArthur and President Truman during which MacArthur was eventually relieved and replaced by Ridgway. Ridgway claims that the outcome of this dispute settled once and for all the debate over military versus civilian supremacy when determining the course of U.S. policy.

From the beginning of the Korean War, MacArthur had his sights set on a victory that was not the limited to South Korean liberation but included to global destruction of Communism. President Truman on the other hand was mindful of the politics at home and abroad and did not support MacArthur's calls for the isolation and destruction of China and all of Communism. Truman knew what MacArthur refused to recognize -- that America would not rise to fight World War III as it did to fight World War II. Additionally, Truman was very aware that the new dynamics of the Cold War and of nuclear proliferation were changing the face of warfare and bringing to light a new concept of conflict, limited war.

Ridgway does a superb job of analyzing the conflict between MacArthur and Truman as only someone who was intimately involved at that level could. MacArthur was a military officer trained to fight the wars of the nation, and he was perhaps unmatched in his prowess; however, Ridgway argues, in a democracy the politics of war should be left to the civilians. MacArthur believed that with the right resolve the U.S. could defeat China, but America did not posses the necessary resolve. Ridgway blames MacArthur for much of the confrontation and paints MacArthur as narcissistic. While this may be true, MacArthur's personal failings cannot be the sole cause for the abrupt end to his career. More importantly it may be the failings of the civilian leadership that did. MacArthur had to be relieved to protect the tenets of American democracy, but had the civilian leadership intervened earlier, as it is empowered to do so, perhaps MacArthur could have departed with the dignity he earned and deserved.

One area where Ridgway does miss the mark is in his evaluation of the Korean War's final outcome. Ridgway sees the armistice in Korea as a U.S. victory, not a total victory, but as the first resounding defeat for Communism, and the "battle that began to turn back the tide." Korea may have been a military victory against Communism, but it was foreign policy failure. The U.S. created the Korean War by neglecting Korea as a nation and its strategic importance. Moreover, the U.S. failed to anticipate North Korean and Chinese intentions even with substantial intelligence, and it failed to convey to these countries U.S. resolve in the region.

Written in 1967 near the height of the Vietnam War, Ridgway's book takes lessons learned from a superb historical account of the war and uses them as a basis for critical evaluation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. In modern warfare, Ridgway sees no room for open-ended warfare. He states U.S. objectives of world policy should be defined with care, should lie within the range of (U.S.) vital national interests and that their accomplishment should be within (U.S.) capabilities. He believes U.S. objectives in Vietnam at the time were "not set within this frame." History eventually proved him correct. Most importantly Ridgway addresses the impact that nuclear weapons had on the Korean conflict and what they will have on future warfare. The U.S. had only two choices in Korea - truce or broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons could have brought the U.S. victory, but that would have forced America to cede the moral high ground. Ridgway questions this cost and uses this as the basis for accepting the concept of limited war and the fact that traditional victory may be a thing of the past. He states, "we had finally come to realize that military victory was not what it had been in the past. It might even elude us forever if the means we used to achieve it brought wholesale devastation to the world or led us down the road of international immorality past the point of no return."