Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis (Soviet (Russian) Study of War) [Hardcover]

Anders Frankson (Author), Niklas Zetterling (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: June 29, 2000 | ISBN-10: 0714650528 | ISBN-13: 978-0714650524 | Edition: First

The battle at Kursk in 1943 is often referred to as the greatest tank battle in the history of warfare. This volume makes extensive use of German archival documents as well as various Russian books and articles. As well as an account of the battle, it addresses methodological issues.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 288 pages
• Publisher: Routledge; First edition (June 29, 2000)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0714650528
• ISBN-13: 978-0714650524
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6.3 x 0.9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.3 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.6 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (7 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #3,064,668 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

14 of 14 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Excellent statistical analysis, December 17, 2001

By 

steven c. johnson (york, pa United States) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis (Soviet (Russian) Study of War) (Hardcover)

I found this to be an excellent compilation of hard data on the July,1943 Battle of Kursk. Huge amounts of data is presented in a manner that makes it easy(relatively speaking)to understand the largest tank battle of WW2. The author begins by presenting a concise background that allows the reader to understand the overall strategic situation on the Eastern Front in the spring of 1943. He then presents an astonishing amount of material that shows in great detail the manner in which the opposing forces were organized,the structure of the units involved (both Soviet and German),the types of tanks and assault guns employed by both armies,a chapter on the impact of both combatants air forces on the battle ,and a chronology of the battle,including a seperate chapter on the armored clash at Prokhorovka.The final three chapters of the book are devoted to the costs and consequences of the battle and an analysis of the battle. Each of these chapters is extensively footnoted. Finally,there are 16 appendices covering just about every conceivable facet of Operation Zitadelle including what may be the most detailed order of battle ever presented on this battle. There are also a large number of tables and figures that further illuminate the size and composition of the opposing forces. I am very impressed by this book and can heartily recommend it.

16 of 17 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Excellent data, little context, July 13, 2004

By 

Michael Licari (Cedar Falls, IA United States) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis (Soviet (Russian) Study of War) (Hardcover)

As its title implies, this book is primarily a collection and presentation of data - hard numbers - about the battle of Kursk. Zetterling and Frankson do an impressive job of compiling orders of battle, unit strengths (particularly on all sorts of armored vehicles, and not just tanks), casualties, air sorties, equipment losses, ammunition expenditures, and the like. Unit structures for both the Germans and Soviets are presented in detail. An entire chapter is devoted to airpower and its effects on the battle. With the all the data, the authors present a relatively brief chronology and overview of the battle, limited to a re-telling of the facts. This drives home the point the authors are trying to make: we can better understand how the Battle of Kursk went through data on the forces involved and what happened to those forces.

This book is incredibly useful to those wishing to reconstruct opposing forces, for those who study combat via empirical methodology, and for those looking to test other authors' assertions and conclusions of the battle. By itself, however, the book is not particularly valuable. Zetterling and Frankson choose to mostly let the numbers speak for themselves. As such the book is devoid of analysis of German and Soviet planning, decision making, leadership, or tactics. These, of course, are the factors that drive the generation of the statistics presented by the authors. Casualties, ammunition expenditures, equipment losses, etc. are the direct result of planning, decision making, leadership, and tactics. Furthermore, historians search for the meaning and implications of these statistics. They ask and try to answer the question of "so what"? Numbers rarely speak for themselves. Thus, Zetterling and Frankson's book is quite valuable, but not as a stand-alone, and only as a companion to other material (e.g. Glantz and House). Wargamers will also find the book useful, as detailed tables of organization and equipment along with very thorough orders of battle are plentiful.

9 of 11 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Re-evaluation of history's greatest armour battle, February 4, 2005

By 

isala "Isabel and Lars" (London, England) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis (Soviet (Russian) Study of War) (Hardcover)

What the author try to tell in this book is that it was the heavy German losses at Kursk that turned the tide in the east against the Germans - it was the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Soviets and there ability to absorb losses both in men and materiel due to supply of manpower and western allied material help that turned the tide. Despite the forward warning of the German attack and a meticulous planning by the Stavka the Germans made good headway and suffered light losses compared to the Soviets. Instead, it was the Soviet couterattacks at other sectors of the front that forced the Germans to break of the offensive. The Germans simply did not posses the manpower necessary to attack on one sector and defend against massive Soviet attacks on another.

There is a companion volume, unfortunately in Swedish only still, that deals exhaustively with their re-evaluation of the battle on the basis of the statistics. Their conclusion is that the German more flexible organisation and command system was far superior to the Soviet system, but with the numbers turning against them it did not help.