Customer Reviews

Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis (Soviet (Russian) Study of War)

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I found this to be an excellent compilation of hard data on the July,1943 Battle of Kursk. Huge amounts of data is presented in a manner that makes it easy(relatively speaking)to understand the largest tank battle of WW2. The author begins by presenting a concise background that allows the reader to understand the overall strategic situation on the Eastern Front in the spring of 1943. He then presents an astonishing amount of material that shows in great detail the manner in which the opposing forces were organized,the structure of the units involved (both Soviet and German),the types of tanks and assault guns employed by both armies,a chapter on the impact of both combatants air forces on the battle ,and a chronology of the battle,including a seperate chapter on the armored clash at Prokhorovka.The final three chapters of the book are devoted to the costs and consequences of the battle and an analysis of the battle. Each of these chapters is extensively footnoted. Finally,there are 16 appendices covering just about every conceivable facet of Operation Zitadelle including what may be the most detailed order of battle ever presented on this battle. There are also a large number of tables and figures that further illuminate the size and composition of the opposing forces. I am very impressed by this book and can heartily recommend it.

As its title implies, this book is primarily a collection and presentation of data - hard numbers - about the battle of Kursk. Zetterling and Frankson do an impressive job of compiling orders of battle, unit strengths (particularly on all sorts of armored vehicles, and not just tanks), casualties, air sorties, equipment losses, ammunition expenditures, and the like. Unit structures for both the Germans and Soviets are presented in detail. An entire chapter is devoted to airpower and its effects on the battle. With the all the data, the authors present a relatively brief chronology and overview of the battle, limited to a re-telling of the facts. This drives home the point the authors are trying to make: we can better understand how the Battle of Kursk went through data on the forces involved and what happened to those forces.

This book is incredibly useful to those wishing to reconstruct opposing forces, for those who study combat via empirical methodology, and for those looking to test other authors' assertions and conclusions of the battle. By itself, however, the book is not particularly valuable. Zetterling and Frankson choose to mostly let the numbers speak for themselves. As such the book is devoid of analysis of German and Soviet planning, decision making, leadership, or tactics. These, of course, are the factors that drive the generation of the statistics presented by the authors. Casualties, ammunition expenditures, equipment losses, etc. are the direct result of planning, decision making, leadership, and tactics. Furthermore, historians search for the meaning and implications of these statistics. They ask and try to answer the question of "so what"? Numbers rarely speak for themselves. Thus, Zetterling and Frankson's book is quite valuable, but not as a stand-alone, and only as a companion to other material (e.g. Glantz and House). Wargamers will also find the book useful, as detailed tables of organization and equipment along with very thorough orders of battle are plentiful.

What the author try to tell in this book is that it was the heavy German losses at Kursk that turned the tide in the east against the Germans - it was the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Soviets and there ability to absorb losses both in men and materiel due to supply of manpower and western allied material help that turned the tide. Despite the forward warning of the German attack and a meticulous planning by the Stavka the Germans made good headway and suffered light losses compared to the Soviets. Instead, it was the Soviet couterattacks at other sectors of the front that forced the Germans to break of the offensive. The Germans simply did not posses the manpower necessary to attack on one sector and defend against massive Soviet attacks on another.

There is a companion volume, unfortunately in Swedish only still, that deals exhaustively with their re-evaluation of the battle on the basis of the statistics. Their conclusion is that the German more flexible organisation and command system was far superior to the Soviet system, but with the numbers turning against them it did not help.

I feel I have to make some serious correction about Mr. Gawne's review. This book has NOTHING TO DO with the German Army in Normandy. Rather, it is a statistical analysis of the battle between the German and Soviet armies in the region of Kursk (Western Russia) in the summer of 1943.

This book rather than being narrative history is analytical history. The general histories of the was in German Russian war tell a similar story. In 1941 the Germans were able to launch an offensive all along their line. They tried to defeat the Russians in a war of annihilation. This effort failed despite inflicting enormous Russian casualties. In 1942 the Germans were not able to build up their army to the levels of 1941 as they had also suffered combat losses. Instead they aimed a more limited offensive with the strategic aim of destroying Russian oil production. This failed and in 1943 the Germans could no longer win the war and any offensive they launched would be limited. In fact a spoiling offensive at Kursk was launched. The offensive has as a primary aim in causing Soviet casualties and preventing them launching significant offensive operations. The traditional story goes on that the Germans lost the battle of Kursk, suffered significant casualties to their armor and were not able to defend against Russian attacks which followed up the battle.

This pattern of history is shown by this short book of only some 143 pages(of narrative the rest is appendices) is simply wrong. In 1943 the Germans lost the assistance of most of their allies. Italy had left the war and large numbers of the Romanian and Hungarian troops had been killed in the Stalingrad operations. However they were able to replace the allied troops with freshly recruited Germans. They were also able to replace most of their lost tanks and other vehicles. In 1943 the quality of their armor was superior to what it had been the previous year. They had about 3 million troops available which was a bit higher than in 1942.

Thus the reason for how 1943 played out was nothing to do with attrition of the German forces. The reality is that in 1942 the Russians launched offensives around Kharhov and the Kerch peninsula in the Crimea. These offensives were costly failures with the Russians losing some 600,000 men. The loses were also concentrated in the southern part of their defensive system. The success of the Germans in 1942 was made possible by these losses. The defeat of the Russians meant that it was easy to break through their weakened defensive system.

In 1943 the Russians failed to commit suicide by launching such costly pre-emptive actions. Instead they fortified their line, kept troops in reserve and waited for the German onslaught. Even then the losses that were inflicted on the attacking German forces at Kursk were minor. The big German losses occurred in the subsequent offensives after Kursk was called off. One of the books strengths is the detailed figures which show exactly what losses occurred and when.

A number of other myths have also been exploded. Kursk used to be considered one of the biggest tank battles of the war. However a detailed examination of the forces employed showed that no real big tank battle actually occurred.

One of the key debates is whether the Germans should have launched the Kursk offensive. Manstien the German commander had at the beginning of 1943 launched a series of battles known as the backhand blow which blunted and defeated the Russian attempts to take the Ukraine. Should the German's in 1943 attempted to fight a similar defensive battle. One of the interesting things explained in the book was the problems that the German's might have with a mobile defense. Whilst in the south they a reasonable ration of mobile or motorized divisions at the front in the north and the centre of the line most of the divisions were infantry ones. The ability of the Germans to fight a mobile defence was limited to one part of their defensive system. In addition Hitler did not want to give up production centers close to the front.

The book is a fascinating discussion of military history which is richer for not being a simple narrative.

I guess the book that Mr. Gwane reviewed is "Normandy 1944", another book written by Niklas Z. and published by J.J. Fedorowicz in 2000.

I like both "Kursk 1943" and "Normandy 1944". This is the first time I can read data generated from systematically statistic analyses on the strength and losses of involved forces in WWII. The result of the statistics, rather than personal opinions or recollections, tells the truth of these campaigns. These books clarified many long-standing errors and misconceptions, though readers should still keep in mind that the authors could make mistake or use unreliable reference too. Highly recommended.

Thank God - a decent and scholarly book on the German Army in Normandy. About tinme!

This is an interesting book. For people like me, that need to know correct facts about the war, it is quite valuable. I would; however, point out is more of a reference book than something for the casual reader. If you "really like" Steven Ambrose books this is not your cup of tea.

If you want good details about the actual organization and strength of German units in Normandy it is invaluable. I am SO happy the author has done all this work, as it means I no longer have to squint at tiny, poorly copies microfilms. For that he has my endless thanks.

Now, there are a few other reason why serious military historians will talk about this book. He makes some very interesting claims about the German Army in Normandy. These range from more accurate casualties rates, to a very surprising claim (that I agree with) about losses to Allied air power. For the serious type, the book will make you think. Most of the arguments are well thought out and logical.

He also attempts to add a new chapter to the argument that the German soldier is/is not superior to the Allied Soldier. This is long standing argument that has entered the realm of statistical analysis. While I think those involved in the argument are starting to get a bit too personal, and thus might have a harder time seeing the facts clearly, his claims at least make some interesting points. I do not agree with all of them, but they are certainly something worth considering.

So to recap: this not a big picture book of the super human German Army. It is a wonderful reference book about the German forces in Normandy. Every 'serious' student of the campaign needs to read through it. I suggest taking the statistical arguments with a grain of salt, and use them as what they are best for: a basis for an ongoing discussion and exploration into what happened in WW2.