Kursk: The German View [Hardcover]

Steven H. Newton (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: March 25, 2003

The battle of Kursk, fought in the summer of 1943, involved six thousand German and Soviet armored vehicles, making it the biggest tank battle of all time and possibly the largest battle of any kind. Students of military history have long recognized the importance of Kursk, also known as "Operation Citadel," and there have been several serious studies of the battle. Yet, the German view of the battle has been largely ignored.After the war, U.S. Army Intelligence officers gathered German commanders' post-war reports of the battle. Due, in part, to poor translations done after the war, these important documents have been overlooked by World War II historians. Steven H. Newton has collected, translated, and edited these accounts, including reports made by the Chiefs of Staff of Army Group South and the Fourth Panzer Army, and by the Army Group Center Operations Officer. As a result, a new and unprecedented picture of German strategy and operations is made available. The translated staff reports are supplemented by Newton's commentary and original research, which challenges a number of widely accepted ideas about this pivotal battle.

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

This compilation of German material on the Battle of Kursk (1943) is about as user-friendly as a Tiger tank, but just as indispensable in the right place. Newton has assembled a variety of primary source material from high-ranking German participants either not previously available in English or found only in translations of dubious value. The first part of the book goes to a new translation of a study of Operation Citadel (the great tank battle of Kursk) edited by General Theodor Busse, which offers the perspectives of key tank, infantry, and air commanders. The rest is devoted to essays, mostly by corps commanders facing the Soviet offensive that followed the German defeat at Kursk, but with one perceptive set of comments by a senior railroad officer who throws light on the role (and limitations) of the Soviet partisans in the general logistical nightmare that was the Eastern Front. Both the introduction and the conclusionary third section, which Newton pens, add insightful editorial comments with a tendency to debunk the German myths of "we almost won," and support the characterization of Kursk as a battle the Germans should not have fought because they could not have won it at an acceptable cost. Largely inaccessible to the beginning student of the decisive campaign of World War II, the book may be hailed as invaluable by the serious one. 4 maps and 20 b&w photos not seen by PW.
Copyright 2003 Reed Business Information, Inc.

Review

"[Newton] is to be congratulated on discovering the original texts of the essays concerning Kursk...and providing a fresh translation." -- Journal of Slavic Military Studies December 2003

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 592 pages
• Publisher: Da Capo Press; annotated edition edition (March 25, 2003)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0306811502
• ISBN-13: 978-0306811500
• Product Dimensions: 9 x 6.3 x 1.6 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.9 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.1 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (8 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #668,954 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

27 of 28 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Unique Perspective, Well Presented, May 23, 2003

By 

T. P. S. "Savas Beatie LLC" (California) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Kursk: The German View (Hardcover)

Author Steve Newton, who is well known to many Civil War students for his books like "Lost for the Cause: The Confederate Army in 1864," and "Seven Pines," is also a scholar of high merit when it comes to German and Soviet WWII operations. I believe he speaks/reads both languages, and is a firm believer in writing history from the manuscript sources. "Kursk: The German View," is the result of this high standard of excellence he has set for himself.

Students of Operation Barbarossa will find this collection of German material on Kursk indispensable to their study of the campaign. While Glantz and others have carved out a large niche describing the entire action, Newton has opted for a more limited approach, pulling together various high-ranking primary German sources rarely if ever used in their original form.

After a detailed and thoughtful Introduction, Newton presents the edited "papers," adding priceless footnotes and commentary from his deep well of knowledge on the subject. Every German perspective is corps level or close to it. The last 30% or so of the book is a collection of valuable chapters on a wide variety of subjects, all penned by Newton. He is clearly less enamored with German apologists who claim that a few more days would have scored a major tactical and strategic victory. The battle was completely avoidable and should never have been fought. (His insightful chapter on Hoth's orders/intent is worth the price of the book.)

The book's quality of production, editing, etc. is very high. This is a book to buy, read, and put on your shelf. It is definitely a keeper.

Beware: The book is not for neophytes. The detail is deep and the going is often tedious. The maps at the back of the book help wade through the chapters. Stick with it. When you close the book, you will feel a real sense of accomplishment--and know a lot more about Kursk then you knew going in. And the battle will never look quite the same.

23 of 24 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars What the German generals were thinking, July 13, 2004

By 

Michael Licari (Cedar Falls, IA United States) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Kursk: The German View (Hardcover)

This is a unique book. Newton has collected, translated, and extensively annotated reports of Citadel written by German commanders (mostly corps-level). He also provides extensive footnotes, where he offers analysis, corrections, and insightful commentary.

As such, it is a valuable collection of primary source material and sheds light on many of the command decisions that went into the battle. The primary contribution of the book is to completely strip away any lingering portions of the myth that had the Germans kept pressing they would have won the battle. In fact, the reports plainly show that the Germans were never even close to achieving victory.

Additionally, Newton's notes, analysis, and the reports themselves demonstrate that many of the German failures were due to bad tactical decisions. This convincingly strips away some of the sheen from German tactical commanders, who generally are portrayed in histories as being of uniform excellence. Newton's book shows that some commanders, particularly on the south face, made some extremely poor decisions. The attack of the Panthers in Grossdeutschland's sector gets attention in other sources mainly due to the popularity of that tank and its teething troubles. Newton instead focusses on the poor tactical handling of them, which single-handedly almost derailed all of Grossdeutschland's attack. Poor decisions in Army Group Kempf also get attention (e.g. the dismantling of an infantry division near Belgorod), as do the decisions to delay taking of key hills overlooking Soviet positions until just before the attack (when they could have been useful as artillery observation and intelligence positions). Another valuable addition the book provides is that the German command had from the start planned to "turn" units attacking the southern face to the north-east prior to proceeding north, in order to deal with expected arrivals of Soviet reserves. This lead to the clash at Prokhorovka, which thus was not necessarily "unexpected" by the Germans. The problem for the Germans turned out to be a lack of infantry divisions as well as the slow progress of Army Group Kempf. The reports also reveal the failure of using increased artillery, airpower, and new armored vehicles to make up for the deficiencies in infantry units.

Newton's book also hammers home the point that Citadel was doomed, particularly in the north, because the 9th Army had insufficient protection on its flanks. When the Soviet offensive was launched against the Orel sector, 9th Army was immediately forced on the defensive (it had already bogged down anyway). Soviet offensives in the south forced the application of the few German reserves (including the SS Wiking Division), thus sucking them away from being able to reinforce Citadel. Newton's book leaves the reader with the clear impression that German tactics were flawed in many respects, that the Soviets were able to disrupt the flow of the attack, and that the Germans were never near accomplishing the goals of Citadel, even though units in the south did continue to press northward after meeting the 5th Guards Tank Army in front of Prokhorovka. An excellent book to accompany the Soviet General Staff Study, but not one for the general reader as Newton's book assumes familiarity with the details of the battle.

16 of 17 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Amazing, October 2, 2003

By 

mathieu laine (Québec, Quebec Canada) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Kursk: The German View (Hardcover)

Warning - this book is not for the "casual" WWII reader. The detailled account of the Kursk battle & the depth of its analysis require more than a fair knowledge of the Eastern front, of military terminology, of both german and soviet armies and some solid technical knowledge of the weapons used during Barbarossa. If you qualify as such a reader, this book is a must have. If you are "new" to the subject - yet still intrested - I recommended buying "Images of Kursk" by Nik Cornish, which is an easier read, and a good introduction.