Language and Human Behavior (Jessie and John Danz Lectures) (Hardcover)

by Derek Bickerton (Author)

Editorial Reviews

Amazon.com Review
According to Derek Bickerton, language is not simply for communication, it is the syntax of human consciousness. In this intriguing look at the origins of consciousness, Bickerton offers a tantalizing alternative to the theories of sociobiologists such as E. O. Wilson and strong artificial intelligence theorists such as Daniel Dennett: Syntax, as hard-wired into the brain, is what distinguishes the consciousness of modern humans from that of animals and human ancestors. A remarkably accessible argument and sure to stir up debate for some time to come. --This text refers to the Paperback edition.

About the Author
LANLIN --This text refers to the Paperback edition.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 180 pages
• Publisher: Univ of Washington Pr (September 1995)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0295974575
• ISBN-13: 978-0295974576
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 5.9 x 0.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 13.6 ounces
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars See all reviews (3 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #1,951,107 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

37 of 39 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Intelligence came from language, not vice versa, June 11, 2000

By	Michael H. Barnes (Dayton, OH) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

This review is from: Language and Human Behavior (The Jessie and John Danz Lectures) (Paperback)

It is easy to suspect that we humans can talk because we have smart brains. Bickerton instead argues that as our brains developed the capacity for speech we thereby became smart. Like other animals we have "on-line" thinking to help us survive. This consists of sensory('objective') knowledge of the world and ('subjective') inner states of consciousness. These latter are sometimes automatic responses to sensory knowledge --when you see a lion slinking, run! Sometimes they are awareness of inner states such as pain or body position. On-line thinking is automatic, either instinctual or a kind of learned stimulus-response process. But humans also have "off-line" consciousness. This consists of mental representations of the world and of ourselves, but even of events that are not really occuring. We can think about things not present to us, far away or in the past or in possible futures. So we can evaluate possibilities and make choices in our head; we can plan ahead. Bickerton uses his expertise in pidgin and creole languages to compare different kinds of thought. By this he shows that full "online" thinking is much more than koko, washoe, and kanzi, the sign-using primates (and two-year old children for that matter) are able to do. How he gets from pidgin and creoles to his conclusions is a major aspect of the book. He does it clearly and elegantly. Overall, he argues that as the mind developed capacity for full language, it was also developing the capacity to formulate, hold on to, and manipulate concepts and the relations among them. This language skill is also skill at thinking. So as the human brain developed the structures and connections to make language possible, this created the possibility of offline thought--the power to manipulate ideas well beyond the limits of ordinary "online" sensory experience and flash responses to those experiences.

7 of 7 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Human Cognition Came Out of Syntax, April 17, 2004

By	Ramon M. Casares Gallego (A Coruna, SPAIN) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

This review is from: Language and Human Behavior (The Jessie and John Danz Lectures) (Paperback)

If you like Dennett's books, I urge you to read this one, "Language and Human Bahavior", by Bickerton. The whole book, which is not long, developes a single argument clearly and cogently. It is Vytgotsky's argument (see "Thought and Language" written in 1934), but updated and expanded. In Bickerton's own words: "human cognition came out of language" (page 160), though the title of this review is more exact. So Vygotsky from psychology and Bickerton from linguistics reach the same heretical conclusion. I believe very deeply that they are right.

Summary: The book is very interesting and very well written; it was easy reading for me. It deserves the best score and I strongly recommend it.

3 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Talking Apes, June 11, 2007

By	David Ludden - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

This review is from: Language and Human Behavior (The Jessie and John Danz Lectures) (Paperback)

By any measure, humans are pretty amazing animals. Only humans build cities, drive cars, fly airplanes, surf the Internet and write book reviews to post on Amazon. Clearly intelligence is what underlies all these abilities, but where does our intellectual endowment come from? The standard explanation has to do with brain-to-body ratio, which is far greater in humans than in any other species. On this view, our big brains make us more intelligent, giving us the ability to solve problems, make plans and communicate with each other effectively. Because it seems obvious that intelligence is advantageous to survival, it is assumed that it would be selected for and that evolution would push hominids towards larger and larger brains.

However, linguist Derek Bickerton takes issue with the standard model. In particular with regard to the relationship between intelligence and language, he believes the evolutionary scientists have the process backwards. Instead of viewing language as a product of intelligence, Bickerton argues instead that intelligence is a product of language. In "Language and Human Behavior," Bickerton presents the case that humans stumbled upon language, which then drove brain expansion and intelligence.

Bickerton argues that language evolved in two stages, and that "fossils" of the first stage still exist today. The distinction he makes here is between proto-language and full language. Proto-language has a limited vocabulary and no syntax; it is spoken in a halting fashion and has limited range of expression compared to full language. Full language, other the other hand, is represented by English, Chinese, or any other language spoken in the world. It also includes most signed languages, as well as the languages of so-called "primitive" peoples. (It should be noted that while their technologies are primitive compared to ours, their languages are every bit as complex.)

The speech of young children is one example of proto-language. From about one year of age until around age three, children's vocabularies are extremely limited, and the utterances they produce are simple, typically consisting of a single word or a two-to-three word string. A second example of proto-language is pidgins. When adults who do not speak a common language are forced to live and work together, they quickly develop a simple communication system consisting of a small vocabulary and virtually no syntax. Pidgins have arisen naturally many times over recorded history. A third example of proto-language comes from attempts to teach language to apes. In some cases, primates (and even a parrot) have been able to learn a vocabulary of several hundred words that they can understand and produce; however, they never seem to pick up on the rules of syntax. Finally, some mentally disabled and aphasics are only able to produce short, halting utterances with the same characteristics of proto-language.

Bickerton reviews the evidence on human evolution and argues that a punctuated-equilibrium approach best explains the data. Technological advancement (as judged by tool remains) has proceeded in a stepwise fashion from homo habilis to homo erectus to homo sapiens. That is, there is some technological advancement at the rise of each new species, followed by a long period of stagnation. And then around fifty thousand years ago there was a "great leap forward," from which time human technology has been advancing apace. Bickerton maintains that such a fossil record is inconsistent with a gradualist approach. Rather, some important change occurred two million years ago in homo habilis, and then again in homo sapiens fifty thousand years ago.

What made homo habilis different from any other primate, Bickerton speculates, is proto-language. Having stumbled upon a simple communication system, homo habilis was now able to coordinate group activity toward directed goals. Just as half an eye is better than no eye at all, proto-language gave homo habilis a significant evolutionary advantage. It also gave them a means for thinking out problems.

Continuing in this line of thought, Bickerton explains the great leap forward fifty thousand years ago by the advent of full language. A key difference between proto-language and full language is syntax, which allows for complex thought, including causal inferences. Thus, Bickerton argues, human intelligence arose from language, and not the other way around.

In the remainder of the book, Bickerton fleshes out his theory of linguistically driven intelligence. First, he makes a distinction between on-line and off-line thinking. On-line thinking involves direct interaction with the environment; inputs are received by the senses and processed by the brain, which then programs responses. Driving a car is a good example of on-line thinking in humans. Any creature with a nervous system engages in on-line thinking, although the degree of complexity varies greatly from species to species. Off-line thinking, on the other hand, is detached from the immediate environment, and operates on mental models instead. Making future plans, abstract problem solving and hypothetical supposition are all examples of off-line thinking. As far as we know, only humans engage in off-line thinking.

Language is related to thinking by the way each type of thinking is represented. On-line thinking works on sensory inputs and motor outputs, and Bickerton calls such a system a primary representational system. But off-line thinking operates on abstract representations that have no direct connection to the immediate environment. Bickerton calls such a system a secondary representational system, and he argues that it is language that provides these abstract representations.

Bickerton swims against the mainstream; however, his arguments are not without merit. Most evolutionary scientists do not fully appreciate the complexity of language and discount its importance, viewing it simply as a communication system only tangentially related to thinking and intelligence. Most linguists are woefully (and sometimes even blissfully) ignorant of human evolution, and do not even attempt to build linguistic theories that are evolutionary plausible. Bickerton is well versed in both fields, and so both evolutionary scientists and linguists alike should pay heed to what he has to say.