Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism [Paperback]

Ruth Garrett Millikan (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0262631156 | ISBN-13: 978-0262631150 | Publication Date: December 16, 1987

Preface by Daniel C. Dennett Beginning with a general theory of function applied to body organs, behaviors, customs, and both inner and outer representations, Ruth Millikan argues that the intentionality of language can be described without reference to speaker intentions and that an understanding of the intentionality of thought can and should be divorced from the problem of understanding consciousness. The results support a realist theory of truth and of universals, and open the way for a nonfoundationalist and nonholistic approach to epistemology.Ruth Millikan is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut at Storrs. A Bradford Book.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"An exciting book. It is a sustained effort at developing a naturalistic view of intentionality. Millikan's writing is clear, forceful, and illuminating." Hector Neri-Casteneda, Indiana University

About the Author

Ruth Garrett Millikan is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut. She is the author of Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (MIT Press, 1984) and White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice (MIT Press, 1995) and On Clear and Confused Ideas.

Product Details

• Paperback: 367 pages
• Publisher: The MIT Press (December 16, 1987)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0262631156
• ISBN-13: 978-0262631150
• Product Dimensions: 9 x 5.8 x 0.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.2 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,232,580 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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7 of 9 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars defines "function" in a non-circular way, March 31, 2002

By 

Toni Wuersch (New York, NY USA) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism (Paperback)

The book explains why the reproduction of tools, actions, adaptations and habits can matter separately from single instances of use, without referring to any specialized internal mechanisms, as Fodor or Chomsky might require.

It thus throws an enormous weight of exemplary philosophical junk (Dennett might claim most of the literature on free will goes here) in the dumpster, by showing that a battery of single counterexamples can be irrelevant to a reproductive motive.

The book also defines "function" by referring to reproductive motives, not use motives. A mass of literature referring to function becomes clearer thereby. Dysfunction becomes far less relevant than one might expect when one sees "dysfunction" opposed to "function", as if a law of contradiction applied.

I like the formalism in the book, which Millikan seems to have felt compelled to softpedal in her subsequent writings. In a way, Millikan does for "function" here what Abraham Robinson did for infinitesimals. She rehabilitates an aid to intuition, so that people who might be inclined to deny it because it lacks a formal well-definition might have to admit it.

The context is biological, i.e., survival and posterity matter more than origins in the mist, a process is step by step, and ideas can persist despite cases of failure.

1 of 3 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars An essential source for philosophy of mind, May 25, 2007

By 

Aaron Boyden (Providence, Rhode Island) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism (Paperback)

And probably for related topics. Millikan's account of functions and "Normal" functioning is extremely well-developed, and can provide much needed content to "functionalist" accounts of various kinds, helping greatly in evaluating their merits and their defects. Her notion of a function also enables a unified account to be given of functions for which things are designed and for things which are not designed (obviously without the theological dodge of saying everything is designed).