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12 of 12 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
lessons as yet unlearned, September 5, 2001
We entered Indochina to save a country, and ended by rescuing a ship. -Henry Kissinger With America now the world's unchallenged superpower, it is all too easy to forget the depths to
which we had sunk in the 1970s. Ralph Wetterhahn's Last Battle is a healthy reminder of how deep
and of some of the reasons why. The book succeeds in three disparate tasks. First, Wetterhahn, a former Air Force pilot, reconstructs
the rarely told--and, his research suggests, never completely told before--story of the Mayaguez
"rescue", in May 1975, adeptly switching back and forth between the deadly military action and the
political games being played in the Ford White House. The stark contrast between the bravery of the
men on the ground and the conniving of Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger, in particular, is an ugly
reminder of how disconnected the private political concerns of Washington politicians had become
from the reality of sending men to die in Southeast Asia. It is hard to avoid the conclusion, and
Wetterhahn makes it even harder, that the Mayaguez affair was scene by Gerald Ford as an easy and
cheap way to deflect attention from the ignominious Fall of Saigon two weeks earlier and from his
disastrous pardon of Richard Nixon. Even more maddening is the level of chaos and incompetence that Wetterhahn depicts at the highest
levels of the decision making process. From attacking the wrong island to commencing after the
Cambodians had already announced they would release the ship to President Ford actually issuing
orders to pilots during the attack, the whole mess is one long example of how not to use American
military might. One illustrative moment, which would be funny if it weren't so frightening, sees the
White House photographer speak up during a meeting to suggest that the massive retaliation Ford is
contemplating might be inappropriate. And the most shocking portions of the book detail the
administration's willingness to cover up how many men were lost in the engagement--41, including 23
Air Force servicemen killed in a helicopter crash which was treated as if it had nothing to do with the
exercise--and the fact that three Marines, still alive and fighting when last seen, were left behind on
Koh Tang Island. Wetterhahn does an excellent job of dissecting the whole morass and drawing out lessons from it. He
also makes a convincing case that the failure to openly discuss the problems at the time may well have
contributed to future disasters like the botched Iranian hostage rescue in the Carter administration. The final portion of the book is the most poignant though, as Wetterhahn, by now pretty much
obsessed with the fate of those three marines, spends years ping-ponging between the US government
and Cambodia, trying to determine their fate and recover them or their remains. Here the story takes
on both the nature of a mystery tale, the fate of the three at the heart of it, and of a psychological
thriller, with Wetterhahn's own need to reach finality practically taking control of his life. Mr. Wetterhahn deserves great credit for sinking his teeth into this story and refusing to let go. His
determination pays off in the fullest portrait we're likely to get of a relatively minor incident that
reveals more than we might like to know about the shabby way we treated our military forces during
the Vietnam era. In the end, it reveals the terrible costs, in human lives, human emotions, and the
continuance of faulty, even deadly, procedures, that is paid when government refuses to honestly face
up to the consequences of its actions. Though the events herein happened almost thirty years ago, the
lessons to be learned are always timely. And it is never too late to honor the sacrifices made by our
fighting men. For three brave Marines--Danny G. Marshall, Joseph Nelson Hargrove, and Gary Lee
Hall--that recognition has waited until now, but they well deserve it. GRADE : A
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26 of 30 people found the following review helpful:
2.0 out of 5 stars
An alternative view, September 4, 2001
I have read LTC Wetterhahn's book and find that, while it makes interesting reading, it is factually lacking in numerous areas. As a crewmember on the mission, I find many of the details of LTC Wetterhahn's book to be inaccurate, and thus he is led to some erroneous conclusions. As a low-ranking aircrew member (I had recently been promoted to first lieutenant at the time, flying as copilot aboard one of the HH-53 Jolly Green rescue helicopters), I was obviously not privy to many of the "behind the scenes" decisions which were unfolding during the incident. However, the aircraft I was on was involved in the battle from the initial insertion to the final pullout, logging 16 hours of flight time during the mission. Based on that, I feel relatively well qualified to comment on the tactical side of the operation. As an example, on page 102, LTC Wetterhahn states "A talented A-7 strafer can routinely get off a very tight quarter-second burst, sending twenty or so rounds within a two-square-yard area." As a former project engineer at the Air Force Armament Laboratory, Guns and Rockets Branch, Eglin AFB, FL, I can tell you that, even if all weapons mounting and aiming tolerances were to be magically reduced to zero on the A-7s gun, the manufacturing tolerances of propellant load and projectile weight alone would still put the ballistic performance of the 20-mm gatling cannon on the A-7 outside of the range quoted in the book. Add back in the mounting, boresight and aiming system tolerances, and this statement is ludicrous. If the A-7 gunnery system was so accurate, why did it take multiple passes for the A-7s to neutralize the sunken gunboat off the north end of the island, as stated on p. 226? The fact is that the gunnery skills of the fighters, particularly the F-4s, was nowhere near what LTC Wetterhahn claims. As to his major conclusions, on page 311, he writes: "Off the shores of Cambodia, the strategic imperatives of showing a "clear, clear" American victory resulted in the conscious abandonment of three Marines." I, and all of the crewmember with which I have spoken since this book was released, take serious exception with this statement. There was no conscious decision to abandon anyone on the island. LTC Wetterhahn himself describes how TSgt Wayne Fisk stepped off the last departing helicopter, not once but twice, in an attempt to make sure we had everyone. TSgt Fisk did this at great risk to his own life. All of the crews still flying at the end of the day asked the command section numerous times to verify that all ground personnel were accounted for, and we were given an affirmative answer. To the best of our knowledge, we had all of the personnel on board with the departure of the last helicopter. All of the crewmembers who took part in this operation felt a great loss upon learning that some Marines were not recovered from the island, and we all salute the memories of the valiant servicemen who gave their lives in service to their country. However, as far as any "conscious abandonment" is concerned, I seriously disagree with LTC Wetterhahn's assessment on this point. I further take exception to his conclusion, on page 259, that the seizure of the ship was the result of a decision by a local official rather than of the central government. I, for one, find it much more likely that the new government in Phnom Penh did, in fact, order the seizure of an American vessel as a way to show the world that it was in charge of the country which it had just taken over. With the example of the Pueblo to go on, and the fact that the US had just three weeks before been ejected from Vietnam, the Pol Pot government saw the situation as a prime opportunity to assert its authority and gain (at least, in its view) credibility with the world community by "tweaking the tiger's tail." They did not figure that President Ford would respond with a military action, and when it turned to mud around them, the high officials searched for a scapegoat. For LTC Wetterhahn to accept the word of an official of a government which went on to murder one-third of its own population is, in my opinion, excessively naďve. Such naivete casts doubts on the credibility of other statements credited to Khmer officials. I agree with his assessment on one point, however, and that is that attempting to run tactical military operations from the highest levels of the government has been shown, on numerous occasions, to be a less-than-optimal method. In my opinion, it is the function and duty of the executive branch to determine the goals and objectives of the country's foreign policy. When such policy involves the use of military force, the determination of how to best do that should be in the hands of the military, with appropriate executive and Congressional oversight. Lyndon Johnson proved that running a war from the White House only guarantees defeat. Henry Kissinger, in this case, underscored that fact with his meddling in affairs with which he was unfamiliar. The failure of the command and control of this operation is well documented in LTC John Guilmartin's book "A Very Small War." This the lesson which should be remembered from the Mayaguez incident. I further salute LTC Wetterhahn's dedication to investigating this incident. It is obvious from his writing that he has spent considerable time and effort, not to mention personal funds, to pursue this investigation. I merely disagree with most of the main conclusions of the book. By the way, what happened to the review by Charles Brown? As a crewmember on one of the participating aircraft, I should think that his opinion would be represented. Bob Gradle Copilot, Jolly 43
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13 of 14 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A sad but heroic secret revealed after 20 years, May 17, 2001
With great anticipation, I finally had the opportunity to read Ralph Wetterhahn's, The Last Battle. The book is all I hoped it would be, and more. The Last Battle reads like a novel, but the plot of this thriller was written in American blood on a fierce battlefield-and in a lonely killing field in Cambodia. He has unearthed a story that had remained buried in unmarked graves for more than twenty years. Five years ago, Ralph shared an account of his strange return to Southeast Asia. He told of being bumped from a flight to Hanoi by none other than ex-President George Bush. Instead, Ralph had visited Koh Tang Island, the site of America's last horrific battle of the Vietnam War. He had a wild tale of a few days with the Joint Task Force for Full Accounting (JTF-FA) searching to recover remains of eighteen Americans lost on the island in May 1975. I remember his discussions of searches on the beach and in the water; a typhoon that swamped search boats of the JTF-FA; white phosphorous that dried out and ignited after the ramp of a downed HH-53 was pulled from the water; his jungle encounter with Cambodian troops; and his finding that much of the battle could still be traced through overgrown emplacements, discarded shell casings, and trees marked forever during fourteen hours of desperate fighting. And, Ralph told me that his fluency in the Thai language had helped him discover the last battle's most troubling aspect-a sad secret known only to very few for these twenty years. While US Air Force helicopters returned under heavy fire to rescue the ill-fated American force from the darkened beach, three of those eighteen Americans were inadvertently left behind. Even in the mid-1990s, Ralph was convinced that these three US Marines were critical in holding the right flank and keeping the Cambodians off the beach. Now The Last Battle provides the long-overdue full accounting of events. We get the whole story from the moment Cambodian gunboats are spotted bearing down on the S.S. Mayaguez through the deaths of L/Cpl Joseph Nelson Hargrove, PFC Gary Hall, and Pvt. Danny C. Marshall at the hands of their Cambodian captors. Ralph Wetterhahn's extensive journalistic research into previously Top Secret accounts of National Security Council Meetings integrates the story of high-level decision-making in with the tales of valor on the beaches of Koh Tang. Through his several returns trips to Cambodia and his personal interviews with American and Cambodian veterans of the battle, he has extended all previous tellings of the Mayaguez Incident. The Last Battle is a well-integrated and highly comprehensive account. Reading of the valiant attempts to put Marines on the beaches of Koh Tang, one can't help wondering how any of these brave Americans survived the murderous fire. The many original photos provided in The Last Battle are fascinating. As a highly decorated veteran of two combat tours in US Air Force and US Navy fighter aircraft, Ralph is the man to bring the entire story together. His approach is unlike that of so many journalists who brought a strong anti-American bias into their accounts of the Vietnam War. American Vietnam Vets deserved better. Ralph gives this factual, well documented, account built upon his well-earned membership in the brotherhood of brave men and women who served their country under adverse circumstances. He has persisted over all these years partly because those in that brotherhood feel a responsibility to those who did not return. As a veteran, he knows what it is like to be at the tip of the spear instead of being comfortably settled within the beltway. The Last Battle makes a powerful argument that just because real-time tactical information can rise to the halls of power in Washington, D.C., our national leaders shouldn't usurp tactical decision making from those in the field who know such things as daylight comes before official sunrise. Ralph gained the confidence of Em Son, the grizzled one-legged Cambodian veteran who commanded Khmer Rouge forces on Koh Tang in May 1975. Through discussions with Em Son, Ralph learned of the final resting places of the three and of a fourth American, whose body couldn't be recovered during the evacuation. It is fitting that the final photo taken in January 2001 shows the flag-draped casket thought to include remains of L/Cpl Ashton Loney, that fourth American. If not for Ralph's dedication to the memory and honor of these four men, their final resting places would yet remain undiscovered by the JTF-FA. Those of us who are veterans of that difficult war owe a sharp salute to Ralph Wetterhahn for that accomplishment. Well done! -Jimmie H. Butler Colonel, USAF, Retired Author of A Certain Brotherhood, Red Lightning-Black Thunder, The Iskra Incident
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