Last Chance For Victory: Robert E. Lee And The Gettysburg Campaign [Paperback]

Scott Bowden (Author), Bill Ward (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: June 3, 2003

Long after nearly fifty thousand soldiers shed their blood there, serious misunderstandings persist about Robert E. Lee's generalship at Gettysburg. What were Lee's choices before, during, and after the battle? What did he know that caused him to act as he did? Last Chance for Victory addresses these issues by studying Lee's decisions and the military intelligence he possessed when each was made.Packed with new information and original research, Last Chance for Victory draws alarming conclusions to complex issues with precision and clarity. Readers will never look at Robert E. Lee and Gettysburg the same way again.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"Last Chance for Victory is the most insightful work on the generalship of Robert E. Lee and on the character and fighting power of the Army of Northern Virginia since Douglas Southall Freeman's Lee's Lieutenants."

From the Publisher

Scott Bowden, a lifelong student of Gettysburg and the Civil War, is the highly acclaimed author of several excellent works in Napoleonic history. He is a graduate of Texas Christian University, and makes his home in Arlington, Texas. Bill Ward is a political science professor at the University of Texas. Like his co-author, he is both a lifelong student of the Civil War and a native of Texas. This is his first book. --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

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Product Details

• Paperback: 640 pages
• Publisher: Da Capo Press (June 3, 2003)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0306812614
• ISBN-13: 978-0306812613
• Product Dimensions: 8.7 x 6 x 1.6 inches
• Shipping Weight: 2 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.1 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (42 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #746,911 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
  • #54 in Books > Biographies & Memoirs > People, A-Z > ( L ) > Lee, Robert E.

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

41 of 44 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars A flawed masterpiece, July 13, 2001

By 

Marc E. Nicholson (Washington, D.C.) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Last Chance for Victory: Robert E. Lee and the Gettysburg Campaign (Hardcover)

Bowden and Ward's book is a very fresh look at Gettysburg. It provides a generally good synopsis of the events of the campaign and the battle but, more importantly, it offers original analysis and a sharp analytical focus on the "big questions," that is, the decisions and actions from Presidential down to brigade level which determined the outcome...and (somewhat courageously on their part) a specific analysis of the turning-points which could have made a difference in that outcome. Moreover--and refreshingly--they analyze those key decisions in terms of what the (Southern) players knew at the time--not in terms of an a-historical post mortem analysis based on twenty-twenty hindsight.

The strength of this book thus is in its originality; its focus on analysis, not micro-history; its deft sense of strategy/tactics; and its plumbing of sources. I agree with other reviewers on this site that one will never look at Gettysburg quite the same way again after reading this book. It clearly makes a valuable contribution. HOWEVER, the book also has its weaknesses:

1) It views the battle essentially from the Southern side, which creates an inbuilt bias towards explaining Gettysburg not as a battle the North won but as one the South lost. In this regard, I endorse the recommendation of other reviewers that a good companion volume to the book would be Coddington's classic work on the Gettysburg campaign, which gives more equal time to both sides (with, if anything, more attention to the Union).

2) Much more seriously, the book at times has an almost polemical (non-objective?) tone...the exoneration of Lee from virtually all responsibility for the outcome--blame being placed primarily on his corps commanders. To reach this conclusion the authors at times appear too willing to "cook the books" on the historical evidence or, perhaps better put, they fail to acknowledge uncertainties in the historical record. The latter is important, because the defeat at Gettysburg engendered a major and politicized post-war Southern finger-pointing campaign (particularly directed at Longstreet) which, unfortunately, renders suspect many of the Confederate memoirs which form many of the "original sources" for modern scholarship, including this book. A sense of prudence, of fairness, of acknowledgment in some cases of ultimate uncertainty in the historical record is warranted. That is a cardinal virtue, for example, of George Stewart's book on Pickett's Charge, which, as Bowden and Ward acknowledge, is a "classic"--and which remains, in my opinion, the defining work on the Third Day at Gettysburg (minus Culp's Hill and a couple cavalry actions)...better, may I add, than Bowden and War's version of the events. Unfortunately, one does not find the same sense of disinterested prudence in Bowden and Ward's book, however brilliantly argued at times.

Thus, this is a book every serious student of Gettysburg should own. HOWEVER, if your interest in the subject is limited and you are looking for one or only one or two books on Gettysburg, this is not it....because you need a depth of background and sources in order to distinguish the weak from the strong points in Bowden and Ward's arguments...sometimes brilliant, sometimes forced. What is the one book you should have? Well, most others suggest Coddington's. Being a relative layman, I will refrain from a specific recommendation. But I do know that this book is not the one: it has too much a POINT OF VIEW. That is both its brilliance, and its (partial) failing.

Finally, a couple annoyances in the book. First, it is the worst edited work I have ever seen in print--shot through with typos and minor grammatical errors which frankly do the authors (or even more their publishing house) a disservice by giving the whole exercise an amateurish image. Bowden and Ward deserve better than that...they are serious scholars...so hopefully the 2nd edition will clean up this mess.

Second, Bowden and Ward have a tendency to ride their arguments into the ground--i.e., to think an argument is more cogent if it is repeated ten times rather than just once. It is not. "Me thinks she doth protest too much" applies: repetition is a confession of uncertainty, and this applies in particular to Bowden and Ward's unconvincing (in my view) attempt to suggest that Lee's loose orders giving wide discretion to his corps commanders were somehow tighter than they actually were. It would be more accurate and honest to say, I suspect, that such looseness of command, or allowance of discretion, worked brilliantly for Lee in some battles, and failed in others (Gettysburg). The difference was simply that his corps commanders performed better in some instances, less well in others. One takes the good with the bad. But Bowden and Ward's eagerness to exonerate Lee tends to lead them, I think, to gloss over that point and attempt (unconvincingly) to suggest Lee exercised (and intended to exercise) at Gettysburg a tighter rein than he did.

Bottom line: if you are a "buff," you MUST read this book. If you are a "one-off" amateur, probably best to seek elsewhere.

Finally, while there is NO "smoking gun," the textual evidence suggests rather strongly that Bowden and/or Lee have been reviewing (and critiquing) other Gettysburg books on Amazon.com's site anonymously ("a reader from Texas") over the last 2-3 years. While "Last Chance for Victory" is perhaps their first published book on the Civil War (as vs. books on the Napoleonic Wars which were Bowden's previous speciality), I think the time has come (indeed is past) for them to consider themselves major scholars of the Civil War era, also with an interest in the book trade competition, and thus with a responsibility to use their own names when critiquing competing scholars' works rather than using pseudonyms. That said, I CANNOT be sure they are in fact the author(s) of a couple critical reviews on this site; on the other hand, read their book with its particular (and rather original) hobbyhorses, then those reviews with their particular (and similar) hobbyhorses, and reach your own conclusion.

33 of 38 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars The real deal, August 25, 2002

By 

James H. Fink "[e-mail]" (Laurel Park, NC) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Last Chance for Victory: Robert E. Lee and the Gettysburg Campaign (Hardcover)

Other reviewers of this book are correct in assessing this book as one-sided (Confederate) and pro-Lee. Nevertheless, it is well worth the reading.

In particular, it has three major benefits.

It explicitly and exhaustively explains Napoleonic and contemporary (1860) strategic and tactical thought and technique, and arrives at a favorable comparison of Lee's practice to contemporary practice.

It explicitly quotes relevant documents when examining controversial actions. For example, six relevant messages surrounding the orders given to Stuart are repeated verbatim and analyzed as to their meaning. The usual treatment for this kind of material is to footnote it and summarize for conclusions only, leaving (and leading) the lay reader to agree. This book invites the reader to analyze the material, and disagree. It often presents both sides of an argument, but sometimes does not make an opposing argument as strongly as it might be made. The footnotes are extensive, and easy to manage as they are at the end of each chapter.

It is particulalry well organized, presenting the battle in chronological fashion. One of the advantages of concentrating on the Confederate side of the battle is that Confederate actions and inactions are presented in a coherent fashion due to this organization.

In short, you may disagree with the authors, but you will know why they drew the conclusions they did, and will find that they have strong evidence to support those conclusions.

I would recommend that the interested reader read another major work on this battle BEFORE reading this work. The authors clearly assume that the reader is familiar with the battle and the controversies surrounding it. If you can take it, try Coddington. He is definitive, but hard to read. For brilliant literary style, try Foote.

A word about me. I am studying to take the National Park Service Examination to be a Licensed Battlefield Guide at Gettysburg. As part of this study, I have recently read or re-read all of the major works on this battle in a most thorough and exhaustive manner, cross-checking facts and conclusions. In my judgment, this book is the most transparent in how and why the authors reached the conclusions that they did.

20 of 22 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Thought Provoking, March 30, 2003

By 

Dennis Phillips "The Book Friar" (Bulls Gap, Tennessee USA) - See all my reviews
(VINE VOICE)    (REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Last Chance for Victory: Robert E. Lee and the Gettysburg Campaign (Hardcover)

No matter which school of thought one follows concerning Robert E. Lee, this book is bound to make you give a lot of thought to Lee's leadership at Gettysburg. If the writers are able to make the reader stop and think about his or her preconceived notions then they have accomplished much. At times, I found myself laying the book aside and picturing in my mind various areas of the battlefield along with the movement of the troops that the authors were then describing. The use of excellent maps to illustrate the point that was being made was also a great plus for this book.

After the numerous books that have come out in the last few years criticizing Lee mercilessly, this book is a welcome counterpoint. Unfortunately, these authors, like those who heap criticisms on Lee, tend to go to the extreme. The truth probably lies somewhere in between. This work makes a very credible argument that Lee's orders to J.E.B. Stuart were fairly explicit as the army began to move north and that Stuart simply went off on his own. There is also clear evidence that A.P. Hill was responsible for the failure of the attack on July 2nd and that Richard Ewell, new to corps command and possibly unnerved by his own initial success on July 1st let a clear opportunity to carry Cemetery Hill pass. The words, "if practicable," in his orders is a poor excuse for his lack of action because taking that hill was very practicable. The authors also give a very clear and convincing argument as to why Longstreet's flanking maneuver would not have worked and present the most clear and well written picture I have read of what Lee was up to with his echelon attack on July 2nd.

On the other hand this book fails to explain away some of Lee's failures during the campaign. The cavalry Lee has with him is dismissed as little more than guerrilla fighters and not up to the tasks Lee needed Stuart for. While it is true that these units might not have been able to perform all of Stuart's duties they most certainly could have been used to scout the enemy. In fact, it would seem that they would have been better than Stuart at that type of duty. Lee was simply too dependent on Stuart and if it weren't for Longstreet having taken the initiative and sending out scouts, the Confederate army might have been destroyed bit by bit. The authors also pin blame on Lee's chief of artillery William Pendleton. As they argue, he was incompetent, but it was Lee who kept him on in that position out of courtesy and therefore it is Lee who must bear the blame for Pendleton's mistakes. The authors also explain that Lee didn't directly intervene when Hill's Corps was ruining the echelon attack on July 2nd because for Lee to go back and make Hill follow his orders would have negated Lee's need for corps commanders. In fact, Lee did just that on July 1st forcing Hill to act like a corps commander.

Finally, the authors do not paint a convincing picture of how Lee could have succeeded on July 3rd. They argue that had Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble's men been followed by a second wave, as Lee had wanted, the Union center would have broke. Here their arguments are weak and a second wave still appears to me to be only an invitation to more destruction of that fine army. The authors simply brush by the question of why the weak troops under weak leaders (Brockenbrough and Davis) and divisions that had been chewed to pieces on July 1st (Archer and Pettigrew) were chosen to join Pickett's fresh troops on July 3rd. The truth seems to be that after Longstreet had convinced Lee that Hood and McLaws divisions were too beaten up to make the advance, Lee simply gave Longstreet the closest available troops from Hill's Crops. This is a mistake that rests with Lee, and Lee alone.

This is an excellent book for someone who wishes to study Gettysburg from all angles. Read this in tandem with some of Gary Gallagher's works and decide for yourself how well Lee performed at Gettysburg. Overlook the typos for they are not the author's fault and remember some of the fault for the Confederate loss at Gettysburg does lie with the Yankee army. To their credit, the authors of this book do point that out.