Customer Reviews

Last Chance for Victory: Robert E. Lee and the Gettysburg Campaign

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Bowden and Ward's book is a very fresh look at Gettysburg. It provides a generally good synopsis of the events of the campaign and the battle but, more importantly, it offers original analysis and a sharp analytical focus on the "big questions," that is, the decisions and actions from Presidential down to brigade level which determined the outcome...and (somewhat courageously on their part) a specific analysis of the turning-points which could have made a difference in that outcome. Moreover--and refreshingly--they analyze those key decisions in terms of what the (Southern) players knew at the time--not in terms of an a-historical post mortem analysis based on twenty-twenty hindsight.

The strength of this book thus is in its originality; its focus on analysis, not micro-history; its deft sense of strategy/tactics; and its plumbing of sources. I agree with other reviewers on this site that one will never look at Gettysburg quite the same way again after reading this book. It clearly makes a valuable contribution. HOWEVER, the book also has its weaknesses:

1) It views the battle essentially from the Southern side, which creates an inbuilt bias towards explaining Gettysburg not as a battle the North won but as one the South lost. In this regard, I endorse the recommendation of other reviewers that a good companion volume to the book would be Coddington's classic work on the Gettysburg campaign, which gives more equal time to both sides (with, if anything, more attention to the Union).

2) Much more seriously, the book at times has an almost polemical (non-objective?) tone...the exoneration of Lee from virtually all responsibility for the outcome--blame being placed primarily on his corps commanders. To reach this conclusion the authors at times appear too willing to "cook the books" on the historical evidence or, perhaps better put, they fail to acknowledge uncertainties in the historical record. The latter is important, because the defeat at Gettysburg engendered a major and politicized post-war Southern finger-pointing campaign (particularly directed at Longstreet) which, unfortunately, renders suspect many of the Confederate memoirs which form many of the "original sources" for modern scholarship, including this book. A sense of prudence, of fairness, of acknowledgment in some cases of ultimate uncertainty in the historical record is warranted. That is a cardinal virtue, for example, of George Stewart's book on Pickett's Charge, which, as Bowden and Ward acknowledge, is a "classic"--and which remains, in my opinion, the defining work on the Third Day at Gettysburg (minus Culp's Hill and a couple cavalry actions)...better, may I add, than Bowden and War's version of the events. Unfortunately, one does not find the same sense of disinterested prudence in Bowden and Ward's book, however brilliantly argued at times.

Thus, this is a book every serious student of Gettysburg should own. HOWEVER, if your interest in the subject is limited and you are looking for one or only one or two books on Gettysburg, this is not it....because you need a depth of background and sources in order to distinguish the weak from the strong points in Bowden and Ward's arguments...sometimes brilliant, sometimes forced. What is the one book you should have? Well, most others suggest Coddington's. Being a relative layman, I will refrain from a specific recommendation. But I do know that this book is not the one: it has too much a POINT OF VIEW. That is both its brilliance, and its (partial) failing.

Finally, a couple annoyances in the book. First, it is the worst edited work I have ever seen in print--shot through with typos and minor grammatical errors which frankly do the authors (or even more their publishing house) a disservice by giving the whole exercise an amateurish image. Bowden and Ward deserve better than that...they are serious scholars...so hopefully the 2nd edition will clean up this mess.

Second, Bowden and Ward have a tendency to ride their arguments into the ground--i.e., to think an argument is more cogent if it is repeated ten times rather than just once. It is not. "Me thinks she doth protest too much" applies: repetition is a confession of uncertainty, and this applies in particular to Bowden and Ward's unconvincing (in my view) attempt to suggest that Lee's loose orders giving wide discretion to his corps commanders were somehow tighter than they actually were. It would be more accurate and honest to say, I suspect, that such looseness of command, or allowance of discretion, worked brilliantly for Lee in some battles, and failed in others (Gettysburg). The difference was simply that his corps commanders performed better in some instances, less well in others. One takes the good with the bad. But Bowden and Ward's eagerness to exonerate Lee tends to lead them, I think, to gloss over that point and attempt (unconvincingly) to suggest Lee exercised (and intended to exercise) at Gettysburg a tighter rein than he did.

Bottom line: if you are a "buff," you MUST read this book. If you are a "one-off" amateur, probably best to seek elsewhere.

Finally, while there is NO "smoking gun," the textual evidence suggests rather strongly that Bowden and/or Lee have been reviewing (and critiquing) other Gettysburg books on Amazon.com's site anonymously ("a reader from Texas") over the last 2-3 years. While "Last Chance for Victory" is perhaps their first published book on the Civil War (as vs. books on the Napoleonic Wars which were Bowden's previous speciality), I think the time has come (indeed is past) for them to consider themselves major scholars of the Civil War era, also with an interest in the book trade competition, and thus with a responsibility to use their own names when critiquing competing scholars' works rather than using pseudonyms. That said, I CANNOT be sure they are in fact the author(s) of a couple critical reviews on this site; on the other hand, read their book with its particular (and rather original) hobbyhorses, then those reviews with their particular (and similar) hobbyhorses, and reach your own conclusion.

Other reviewers of this book are correct in assessing this book as one-sided (Confederate) and pro-Lee. Nevertheless, it is well worth the reading.

In particular, it has three major benefits.

It explicitly and exhaustively explains Napoleonic and contemporary (1860) strategic and tactical thought and technique, and arrives at a favorable comparison of Lee's practice to contemporary practice.

It explicitly quotes relevant documents when examining controversial actions. For example, six relevant messages surrounding the orders given to Stuart are repeated verbatim and analyzed as to their meaning. The usual treatment for this kind of material is to footnote it and summarize for conclusions only, leaving (and leading) the lay reader to agree. This book invites the reader to analyze the material, and disagree. It often presents both sides of an argument, but sometimes does not make an opposing argument as strongly as it might be made. The footnotes are extensive, and easy to manage as they are at the end of each chapter.

It is particulalry well organized, presenting the battle in chronological fashion. One of the advantages of concentrating on the Confederate side of the battle is that Confederate actions and inactions are presented in a coherent fashion due to this organization.

In short, you may disagree with the authors, but you will know why they drew the conclusions they did, and will find that they have strong evidence to support those conclusions.

I would recommend that the interested reader read another major work on this battle BEFORE reading this work. The authors clearly assume that the reader is familiar with the battle and the controversies surrounding it. If you can take it, try Coddington. He is definitive, but hard to read. For brilliant literary style, try Foote.

A word about me. I am studying to take the National Park Service Examination to be a Licensed Battlefield Guide at Gettysburg. As part of this study, I have recently read or re-read all of the major works on this battle in a most thorough and exhaustive manner, cross-checking facts and conclusions. In my judgment, this book is the most transparent in how and why the authors reached the conclusions that they did.

No matter which school of thought one follows concerning Robert E. Lee, this book is bound to make you give a lot of thought to Lee's leadership at Gettysburg. If the writers are able to make the reader stop and think about his or her preconceived notions then they have accomplished much. At times, I found myself laying the book aside and picturing in my mind various areas of the battlefield along with the movement of the troops that the authors were then describing. The use of excellent maps to illustrate the point that was being made was also a great plus for this book.

After the numerous books that have come out in the last few years criticizing Lee mercilessly, this book is a welcome counterpoint. Unfortunately, these authors, like those who heap criticisms on Lee, tend to go to the extreme. The truth probably lies somewhere in between. This work makes a very credible argument that Lee's orders to J.E.B. Stuart were fairly explicit as the army began to move north and that Stuart simply went off on his own. There is also clear evidence that A.P. Hill was responsible for the failure of the attack on July 2nd and that Richard Ewell, new to corps command and possibly unnerved by his own initial success on July 1st let a clear opportunity to carry Cemetery Hill pass. The words, "if practicable," in his orders is a poor excuse for his lack of action because taking that hill was very practicable. The authors also give a very clear and convincing argument as to why Longstreet's flanking maneuver would not have worked and present the most clear and well written picture I have read of what Lee was up to with his echelon attack on July 2nd.

On the other hand this book fails to explain away some of Lee's failures during the campaign. The cavalry Lee has with him is dismissed as little more than guerrilla fighters and not up to the tasks Lee needed Stuart for. While it is true that these units might not have been able to perform all of Stuart's duties they most certainly could have been used to scout the enemy. In fact, it would seem that they would have been better than Stuart at that type of duty. Lee was simply too dependent on Stuart and if it weren't for Longstreet having taken the initiative and sending out scouts, the Confederate army might have been destroyed bit by bit. The authors also pin blame on Lee's chief of artillery William Pendleton. As they argue, he was incompetent, but it was Lee who kept him on in that position out of courtesy and therefore it is Lee who must bear the blame for Pendleton's mistakes. The authors also explain that Lee didn't directly intervene when Hill's Corps was ruining the echelon attack on July 2nd because for Lee to go back and make Hill follow his orders would have negated Lee's need for corps commanders. In fact, Lee did just that on July 1st forcing Hill to act like a corps commander.

Finally, the authors do not paint a convincing picture of how Lee could have succeeded on July 3rd. They argue that had Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble's men been followed by a second wave, as Lee had wanted, the Union center would have broke. Here their arguments are weak and a second wave still appears to me to be only an invitation to more destruction of that fine army. The authors simply brush by the question of why the weak troops under weak leaders (Brockenbrough and Davis) and divisions that had been chewed to pieces on July 1st (Archer and Pettigrew) were chosen to join Pickett's fresh troops on July 3rd. The truth seems to be that after Longstreet had convinced Lee that Hood and McLaws divisions were too beaten up to make the advance, Lee simply gave Longstreet the closest available troops from Hill's Crops. This is a mistake that rests with Lee, and Lee alone.

This is an excellent book for someone who wishes to study Gettysburg from all angles. Read this in tandem with some of Gary Gallagher's works and decide for yourself how well Lee performed at Gettysburg. Overlook the typos for they are not the author's fault and remember some of the fault for the Confederate loss at Gettysburg does lie with the Yankee army. To their credit, the authors of this book do point that out.

This is not just another book on Gettysburg. It is a long-overdue study of this important battle written from the point of view of what Lee and his generals knew before and during the 1863 battle. The authors care-fully craft Lee's background and his history and relationship with other leaders including Jefferson Davis and Jeb Stuart. They describe Lee's plans and the actual battle, including the failure of subordinates to effectively utilize their artillery on the disastrous last day. The authors did not base their presentation on how the battle turned out. Instead they explored the actions of the Confederates and analyzed the facts known to Lee, Stuart, and the others to determine the basis for decisions and courses taken. In doing so, Bowden and Ward reach conclusions drastically different than those of many other historians, showing that many of the popular myths about the battle are indeed false. By using Stuart's initial troop movements while Lee was moving north, they show that Stuart did indeed have orders to move north rather than take his wayward ride around the Union forces. They show that Lee's orders to Richard Ewell to take Cemetery Hill were not discretionary. They not only look at actions taken; they also examine options not taken. Lee's generalship in this battle is shown to be much better than often credited to him. The arguments of many of Lee's critics are addressed and refuted in detail. Even a reader with great knowledge of this battle will benefit from this book. It is a "Must Read" for every student of the War.

After reading some of the "hit reviews" about this book on this site, I'm reminded why so many critics either don't read what it is that they are criticizing, or simply are unable to process the detailed discussions presented by these authors. The "hit reviews" of this book are proof positive why uncritically thinking Civil War "buffs" love popularist histories, and how they do not like books that offer critically thinking analysis.

"Last Chance for Victory" is a mind-bender, because it challenges almost every incorrect and oft-repeated nonsense about Lee at Gettysburg that has ever been published. And the authors do not excuse Lee for his faults. Instead, they examine the Confederate general and other Southern leaders in a way that exposes the popcorn-chomping, sophomoric approach that wrongly dipicts General Lee and others in the campaign. And while I still have some issues with a couple of the arguments within the book that I may not full agree with, I can never remember a better historical treatment of Robert E. Lee and the explanations of command issues facing the Confederate general on July 1 AND July 2; the three chapters that deal with these days are alone are worth much more than the price of the book.

And as for Dennis Callaghan's "hit review"---why don't you try to find a better criticism of "Last Chance for Victory" than by lifting almost verbatim Sears' words from his incredibly mediocre history (which are entirely off-base and incorrect)? By using Sears' words, and passing them off as your own, along with admitting you did not read the book, tells everyone all they need to know.

This is a well-researched and fresh look at the Battle of Gettysburg. Having read more than 20 books on Gettysburg and countless others on the Civil War, I thought that I knew all there is to know about the epic three day battle.

Bowden and Ward pleasantly surprised me with their fresh analysis of this battle and Lee's generalship. They look at the battle from a different perspective. In the process, they shatter (conclusively in my humble opinion) many of the traditions that have grown out of the battle.

The tour de force of the book, in my opinion, is the chapter on Day Two. The authors' conclusions are compelling and thought-provoking.

While it's a cliche, it's true: once you read this book, you will never think about the Battle of Gettysburg the same.

In addition to being thought-provoking and compelling, the book is also an excellent read -- dare I say a page turner!

Every serious student of the Civil War and military history should read this book.

It is also very approachable for those not entirely familiar with all the nuances of Gettysburg and the Civil War.

It is instructive to read Bowden and Ward's study, "Last Chance for Victory," because the book takes issue with much recent scholarship about the Battle of Gettysburg and of the factors which led to Southern defeat. Many students attribute the result of the battle to Southern overconfidence and to mistakes in judgment by the Confederate high command, particularly Robert E.Lee.

Bowden and Ward draw a basic distinction in their study between command decisions on the one hand and the execution of these decisions on the other hand. They conclude that Lee was actively involved in the Battle of Gettysburg, on both the first and the second day, and that the failures on these days were failures of execution by Lee's subordinates. For example, Jeb Stuart's disobedience to Lee's orders early in the campaign, Richard Ewell's failure to take Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill, A.P. Hill's failure to timely advance his divisions on July 2 as part of Lee's en echelon plan of attack.

Bowden and Ward exonerate James Longstreet, in agreement with most recent studies of Gettysburg, of dilatoriness on the second day of the battle. But they are highly critical of Longstreet's performance on July 3 and come too close to accusing Longstreet of responsiblity for the failure of Pickett's charge. Bowden and Ward also criticize Lee for delegating too much responsiblity to Longstreet on day 3, particularly when he knew that Longstreet opposed the frontal assault, and for failing to assume direct control of the charge himself.

The aim of the study is polemical, in good part. The book is longer than it needs to be and many sections are too argumentative. Some of the argument I found unconvincing, which is not necessarily a bad thing in a book on a subject as controversial and difficult as the Battle of Gettysburg.

The book has some outstanding virtues. The writing is clear (although the book is marred by many typos). When Bowden and Ward get down to explaining the specifics of the battle, the writing is informative, consise, and not overly bogged-down in detail. After reading the account of the fighting on July 1 and July 2, I thought I understood the confusing action of these days better than I had before. The maps in the book are helpful. The authors do a good job relating Lee's military strategy at Gettysburg to military theory, particularly as developed in the Napoleonic campaigns.

This is not the only book a student of the Battle of Gettysburg should read because Bowden and Ward write from a standpoint presupposing some familiarity in the reader with recent accounts of the Battle. One of the cardinal virtues of the book is that it serves to remind the reader that there are many sides to a story. In any kind of serious study, it is good to learn to withhold judgment until one has considered a variety of points of view. This is a lesson in studying Gettysburg or in any serious study and the book teaches it well.

I learned a great deal from this book but came away not entirely convinced. The main difficulty I have with Bowden and Ward's argument is that they try to separate too sharply the orders that Lee gave and his battle plan from the execution of these plans by his subordinates. The plan and the execution were closely related at many critical points of the battle. The shortcomings in execution by Lee's subordinates cannot be sharply distinguished from Lee's orders. In spite of what Bowden and Ward argue, many of these orders were ambiguous and were so viewed by those to whom they were directed. Further Lee had the opportunity to rectify many of the dilatory actions of his subordinates (or many of their actions which perhaps did not accord with his orders) but did not do so. For example, Lee could have been much more explicit with Ewell about capturing Cemetry Hill to remove any grounds for doubt and could have followed-up agressively with him. Lee had the opportunity to tell A.P. Hill to correct his formations on July 2 and to have his (Hill's) subordinate commanders move more decisively following the actions of Longstreet's Corps. He did not do so. There was a great deal of difficulty to go around in the Confederate battle plan and in its execution in these three momentous days. In addition, as Bowden and Ward realize, there was the Union Army. When these factors are considered, Bowden and Hill can be read as modifying but not radically changing scholarly consideration of the Battle of Gettysburg.

Bowden and Ward try to foist responsiblity for the failure of "Pickett's Charge" on July 3 on Longstreet. There is nothing in their brief treatment of day 3 of the battle that convinces me that Pickett's charge had much chance of success or that Longsteet was to blame for the conception of the attack or for its execution. I don't understand that Bowden and Ward contend that the attack would likely have succeeded if it had been executed as they claim Lee had planned. I think the treatment of the third day of the battle is the weakest portion of this book.

This book will help the student rethink the Battle of Gettysburg and to learn the value of deliberation before one draws overly firm and dogmatic conclusions about a difficult matter.

This is an extremely well thought-out, annotated and bibliographed defense of Lee's actions at Gettysburg. It details the strategic and tactical thinking that Lee used to arrive at, then fight at, that particular spot in Pennsylvania. Lee is not completely absolved of blame for the Confederate loss, and ample credit is given to key players on the Union side (with some surprises). Great emphasis is placed on the shortcomings of Lee's lieutenants during those three days, however, and the book brilliantly details Lee's intended battle design. It's lengthy, but so engaging and readable that I was disappointed when it ended.

Every book on Gettysburg (or any battle for that matter) should have maps this good. I felt that the detail of this book was wonderful. But be prepared for an almost overwhelming bias towards R.E. Lee. I, for one, tend to agree with the argument that Lee's generals didn't serve him well during the Gettysburg campaign, but the authors of this book seem to believe that Lee's only errors were in not anticipating that his commanders and staff would let him down. Nevertheless, if you are interested in Gettysburg, buy this book.

A provocative look at the Battle of Gettysburg. You never doubt where the author's stand. It is difficult to find something new and compelling on the Battle of Gettysburg. This book is. The authors attack almost every conventional interpretation of the battle with well-reasoned arguments. A must read for anyone interested in the batte.