The Last Word [Paperback]

Thomas Nagel (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0195149831 | ISBN-13: 978-0195149838 | Publication Date: November 1, 2001

If there is such a thing as reason, it has to be universal. Reason must reflect objective principles whose validity is independent of our point of view--principles that anyone with enough intelligence ought to be able to recognize as correct. But this generality of reason is what relativists and subjectivists deny in ever-increasing numbers. And such subjectivism is not just an inconsequential intellectual flourish or badge of theoretical chic. It is exploited to deflect argument and to belittle the pretensions of the arguments of others. The continuing spread of this relativistic way of thinking threatens to make public discourse increasingly difficult and to exacerbate the deep divisions of our society. In The Last Word, Thomas Nagel, one of the most influential philosophers writing in English, presents a sustained defense of reason against the attacks of subjectivism, delivering systematic rebuttals of relativistic claims with respect to language, logic, science, and ethics. He shows that the last word in disputes about the objective validity of any form of thought must lie in some unqualified thoughts about how things are--thoughts that we cannot regard from outside as mere psychological dispositions.

Editorial Reviews

Amazon.com Review

In The Last Word, Thomas Nagel argues against what he calls subjectivism, "a general tendency to reduce the objective pretensions of reason." On his enemies list are the architects of postmodernism, social scientists with delusions of grandeur, and philosophers ranging from Hume and Kant to W.V. Quine and Richard Rorty. Regarding reason as based on contingent features of our nurture, culture, or nature, such subjectivists contend that reason is not generally valid, but valid only from our point of view. Challenges to reason in general are bound not to convince: they subvert themselves if based on reason, but are not worth taking seriously otherwise. Challenges to reason in particular domains, such as logic or ethics, are expressed by "ritualistic metacomments declaring one's allegiance to subjectivism" about logic or ethics. But, Nagel argues, the subjectivist claims are unintelligible unless understood as claims of logic or ethics, and therefore can be adjudicated on logical or ethical grounds. The drastically schematic nature of Nagel's refutation of subjectivism is troublesome, inviting the question of whether anyone truly accepts the position that he attacks. It also inspires doubt that his refutation is developed enough to be, as advertised, the panacea for subjectivism. Nevertheless, The Last Word is highly recommended to philosophers and anyone else interested in thinking about reason. Elegantly written and incisively argued, it is sure to provoke discussion--and thus ensure that it will be anything but the last word. --Glenn Branch --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

Review

"...[a] subtle, compact, and forceful book....The Last Word is a work of philosophical reflection...a significant contribution to the culture wars of our time."--New York Review of Books

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Product Details

• Paperback: 160 pages
• Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA (November 1, 2001)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0195149831
• ISBN-13: 978-0195149838
• Product Dimensions: 8.1 x 5.4 x 0.6 inches
• Shipping Weight: 7.8 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.1 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (16 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #661,621 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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53 of 54 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars A defense of rationalism against subjectivism and relativism, May 4, 2000

By 

John S. Ryan "Scott Ryan" (Cuyahoga Falls, OH) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: The Last Word (Hardcover)

In this volume, Thomas Nagel mounts his case for rationalism against the onslaught of several varieties of subjectivism and relativism.

The kernel of his case is his more-or-less-Kantian claim that there is a "category of thoughts that we cannot get outside of," which in some way provide a basic structure that we have ultimately no choice but to regard as objective. Once we recognize this category of thoughts, he maintains, "the range of examples turns out to be quite wide."

He proceeds to demonstrate his point in the areas of language, logic, science, and ethics (to each of which he devotes a chapter). His arguments are intended to show, essentially, that meaning, logical necessity, the demand for order in objective reality, and normativity are not reducible to matters of pure subjectivity, and for the most part they are fairly successful.

His closing chapter -- "Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion" -- is remarkable for several reasons, not least of which is its stunning candor. Nagel is an atheist who nevertheless recognizes that his somewhat Platonic commitment to reason, and in particular to a Peircian belief in an objective "order of . . . logical relations among propositions," raises the question "what world picture to associate it with." He cannot avoid the "suspicion that the picture will be religious, or quasi-religious," and notes that rationalism "has always had a more religious flavor than empiricism."

And -- here comes the candor -- he attributes at least some anti-rationalism to a "fear of religion" which he confesses himself to share: "I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn't just that I don't believe in God and, naturally, hope that I'm right in my belief. It's that I hope there is no God! I don't want there to be a God; I don't want the universe to be like that."

He finds, though, that he must acknowledge the distinct possibility that "the capacity of the universe to generate organisms with minds capable of understanding the universe is itself somehow a fundamental feature of the universe." He adds at once that this view need not amount to "anything that should count literally as religious belief" -- though, honestly, it is hard to see why not.

At any rate, whatever the implications for religion, Nagel's arguments in this volume are delivered with his usual clarity and flair and will be of interest to anyone seeking a philosophical defense of reason. As Nagel himself notes not far from the outset of his book, the knowledge that subjectivism is self-refuting may be as "old as the hills," but it seems that it cannot be too often repeated.

14 of 14 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars An Excellent Introduction, September 10, 2002

By 

Flounder (Substitution Instance) - See all my reviews

This review is from: The Last Word (Paperback)

This is classic Nagel. He is one of the most important philosophers in America today. And his philosophical prose style clearly demonstrates why that is the case: it is clear, direct, and straightforward. This text (along with Mortal Questions and A View From Nowhere) would be a great Intro. to Philosophy text; it is a superb example of how analytic philosophy should be written. There are actually arguments here. Imagine that.

Yes, the text bashes various forms of relativism and subjectivism (in favor of "objective facts" and "objective values"). But possibly the most important chapter is titled, "Logic." Read this chapter. I won't ruin the sunset ending for you.

I highly recommend this text. As well as: Searle, Mind, Language, Society; and Nozick, Invariances.

8 of 8 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars Extreme Subjectivism/Relativism Defeated, July 16, 2006

By 

D. S. Heersink "D. Stephen Heersink" (San Francisco) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: The Last Word (Paperback)

Ostensibly, Nagel's work is an assault on extreme relativism/subjectivism. On another level, it complements Nozick's "Nature of Rationality" (while rightly attacking Nozick's misuse of evolutionary principles). If extreme relativism/subjectivism were the sole objective, Nagel could have defeated it with a single statement: "All truth/logic/science/ethics is relative/subjective," is self-refuting (which Nagel cites).

But the rationalist Nagel really has a stronger objective. He rightly wants to insist that constructivist/subjectivist/relativist (he uses "perceptivist") claims against reason, logic, science, and ethics are embedded in the very criteria they want to deny, and worse, their efforts to use external criteria "to get outside" to challenge these claims is (1) impossible (because they use the very tools they criticize), or (2) untenable, because they use irreducible principles in one category to assault irreducible principles in another, or Ryle's "category mistake (misuse)," (3) implausible, because they substitute less plausible hypotheses to assault rationally and empirically more plausible hypotheses, or (4) two or more of the preceding three. Except for ethics, his observations are valid.

The chapter on ethics is more elusive and certainly inconclusive. He begins with ethics as a species of practical reason, itself a feature of decision-theory, which is distinctly non-instrumental (a controversial claim, he concedes), that requires "reasons" (i.e., justifications). Except for the "non-instrumental" claim, there is nothing controversial thus far. Everything that follows, however, seems lost. He begins denying Hume's "pleasure/pain" motivation of ethics, raises the empathy factor (Hume, Smith), admits emotions (typically non-rational) are often involved (Hume, Smith), as are other "background" information (Mill, Bentham), that "impartiality" is one of its features (all but virtue theory), as is the "universifiability" of the action (deontological, consequentialist), then gives a concrete consequentialist example, followed by a concrete deontological example, of "reason," then concedes he isn't sure where all this leads. I assume this exercise was meant to instantiate that agents act for "reason(s)," but the "reasons" are intended to satisfy individual integrity for having acted.

The final chapter is a series of ruminations, something about naturalism not becoming a religion, Nozick's (mis)use of Darwinism as an escape hatch, and a reminder that the natural world and our use of it also necessarily includes us in it (a dominant theme throughout).

Nagel reinforces Nozick's point about rationality being inherently circular, but according to Nagel that is simply necessary and unavoidable (not an objection). The principal idea is the individual's inability to escape his embeddedness, much less his ability to approach his perspectives "outside" them is both impossible and undesirable, and why these facts repudiate extreme subjectivism/relativism. Most philosophy students already know this. Most in postmodernism and the humanities don't, and they will most benefit from this book.