The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204-1453 (The Middle Ages Series) [Paperback]

Mark C. Bartusis (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0812216202 | ISBN-13: 978-0812216202 | Publication Date: January 1, 1997

Mark C. Bartusis opens an extraordinary window on the Byzantine Empire during its last centuries by providing the first comprehensive treatment of the dying empire's military.

A History Book Club selection

Editorial Reviews

Review

"An essential tool for comparative historians, Byzantinists, Balkanologists, historians of the later Crusades, medieval Islamic, especially Ottoman, and western European medieval and Renaissance history. Its publication reinforces the reputation of Bartusis as a foremost authority on many dimensions of late Byzantine institutions and the related social and economic context."—Walter Kaegi, Journal of Military History

About the Author

By Mark C. Bartusis

Product Details

• Paperback: 464 pages
• Publisher: University of Pennsylvania Press (January 1, 1997)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0812216202
• ISBN-13: 978-0812216202
• Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 6.1 x 1.2 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.6 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,856,454 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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10 of 10 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars The Late Byzantine Army by Mark C. Bartusis, June 18, 2000

By 

Emmett Strode (Lynchburg, VA) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204-1453 (The Middle Ages Series) (Paperback)

Mark C. Bartusis' book is a tightly written and well organized scholarly exploration of the Byzantine army in the final two-and-a-half centuries of the empire. Divided into two sections, the first part of the work is an overview of the army's role in the political organization of the empire. The section concludes with a very well-written short essay on the fall of Constantinople. The second section is a technical discussion of the organization and financing of the army. Coming to the book as a general reader with an interest in Byzantine history, I found the glossary of court and military terms very helpful. The bibliography provides a wealth of possibilities for future reading. Bartusis' writing is scholarly but it is not stilted and overly-formal as is the work of many scholar-historians. "The Late Byzantine Army" provides the general reader and the reader of military history with a brief but well-drawn and understandable portrait of the subject.

2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204-1453, November 3, 2010

By 

Eric Williams (South-Eastern Pennsylvania) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204-1453 (The Middle Ages Series) (Paperback)

The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204-1453. Mark C. Bartusis. 1997. 464 pages.

This is not a book about tactics, strategy, orders of battle, training, equipment or philosophy of war. It is not a military history and skimming the table of contents is deceptive. Along the lines of a quote by Graf Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf about the primary national requirement for a war being money and the second being money and the third being money, this book is largely about financing the Byzantine Military establishment.

The first section of the book discusses the size and use of the Imperial Military from 1204 to 1453. 1204 is the beginning of the Latin Crusader occupation of Constantinople which was taken back by the Byzantines in 1261. The Byzantine forces of this period and until the end in 1453 were very different in composition from those of earlier times. The composition was different but there were attempts to tie them to those earlier forces by function, title, or honorifics. There is some discussion of the fleet but 85% or more of the text is given over to ground forces their composition, source of recruitment and financing.

What becomes apparent is that warfare, especially civil war was constant even beyond 1261 and the re-establishment of the empires capital in Constantinople. Given the costs involved in warfare, there was reluctance by the Byzantines to use their own forces when surrogate forces could be had for payment at a cheaper rate. Consider the cost of recruitment, training, equipping, maintaining, and the need to replace that person in the civilian work force as well. Drawing a significant part of their sovereign forces from landholders meant that when the y were mobilized either they had to find some one else to work the land (source of income for soldier and through taxation for the state) or in the case of larger estates to oversee the workers. To fight a battle with your army is to risk losing it and possibly your state as well. This seems to have been well understood by the pragmatic Byzantine mind. To allow for the continued use of armed force as an aspect of statecraft and diplomacy the Byzantines preferred to hold their own native force in reserve and use other forces when ever possible in pursuit of their goals.

The various unit types or classification of these other forces and the native forces are well documented in this text. The bulk of the text discusses their recruitment, definition, role in the imperial system and how they were financed. It is very detailed and interesting but not for the general reader or the military specialist. It is easy to get lost in the details. There were surprises in the financial and legal aspects of the text. The first is the relationship between Church, Money, State and War. The encroachment and growth of monasteries' economic power had a serious impact on the solvency of the state. Some monasteries were charged with recruiting and paying for defenses including soldiers in the field.

I was interested in the late recruitment of the Varangians and other Imperial Bodyguards. They were initially Viking but in this later period they were predominantly English and the book detailed some of their civic and military responsibilities. What was interesting was their proclaiming in church (Saint Sophia) using English in the heart of Greek speaking Byzantium. The texts are clear that they proclaimed in their own language. The state seemed willing to forego any attempt at forced conversion or Hellenization as a way to insulate the forces from domestic politics.

The book is tedious though detailed in its writing. Not a casual or light read. I would not recommend it as a starting point or an intermediate point of entry into the world of Byzantium or military history. It has a function and it is well suited to that function, detailing the recruitment, structure, and financing of Byzantine ground force from 1204-1453. Beyond that function is little appeal.