Customer Reviews

Law, Darwinism, and Public Education: The Establishment Clause and the Challenge of Intelligent Design

5 star:		(23)
4 star:		(2)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(2)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

Increasingly school boards are becoming the battle grounds over the debate between advocates of Darwinism-only education and those who'd like students to be exposed to other scientific theories as well. A common claim by the Darwinist-only lobby is that all other theories, especially that of intelligent design, are inherently religious and thus not suitable for science classes. Beckwith's clear and short book dispels this line of argumentation. Beckwith shows why in the best spirit of liberal education, ID can rightfully be included in a science class. Beckwith provides a great background of ID including a captivating summary of the debate in Ohio [2002] over ID and evolution.

This is a must have for anybody who thinks that students are only better educated when they are taught to think critically, and evaluate competing ideas. A quick reading, along with a few marked pages, will easily put you at the forefront of this debate. You'd add a lot to the often confused debates over the legalilty of discussing alternatives to Darwinism. And very likely, your school board, teachers & students will be grateful for the clear, informed rationality you'll gain from this book.

I am a LL.M. graduate of Harvard Law School with an academic appointment at a law school at which I teach law and religion. After reading the book note of Beckwith's monograph in my alma mater's law review, and after reading of all the controversy surrounding the book by assorted legal bloggers, I decided to pick up a copy. I was pleasantly surprised by Beckwith's grasp of establishment clause jurisprudence. His judicious walk through the cases is very good.

What makes this book such a gratifying read is that Beckwith is so good at clearly defining what he means and then, in a Socratic fashion, presenting arguments and counter-arguments.

I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in law and religion

The vitriol leveled against this book got me curious about it. I bought it, read it, and was amazed at how wrong the negative critics are. I also discovered that it had been endorsed by an opponent of ID (L. Arnhart, Northern Ill. U.), reviewed positively by a strong anti-creationist in the Journal of Church & State (J. Alston, Texas A & M), and praised in a book note that appeared in the January 2004 issue of the Harvard Law Review. That note resulted in a huge public argument about the Harvard Law Review on the internet that was started by skeptic Chris Mooney, picked-up by blogger Brian Leiter (U. of Texas), and then editorialized by Beckwith's grad assistant Hunter Baker in National Review online. Wow!

For all the hoopla, it's pretty much a law book, but not as boring as you'd think. It's highly footnoted and Beckwith's presentation of the constitutional issues is worth the price of the book.

Beckwith's book makes some very important distinctions and points that seem to be lost on some reviewers that read for quote-mining rather than to learn. Here's one example. One reviewer claims that Beckwith's self-refuting charge of Overton's opinion is laughable since a description about a set of things does not have to be one of the things in the set. That seems fair. But, unfortunately, the reviewer misses Beckwith's point entirely. The point is this: Overton is saying that unless X fits this five-part criterion of what is science, X cannot be taught in science class. All that Beckwith points out is that Overton's own five-part criterion itself could not be taught in science class because it does not fit the five-part criterion. Beckwith then makes the point that perhaps Overton would adjust his judgment and say that the criterion is a philosophical assessment about science rather than a claim of science (which is exactly what the reviewer claims Beckwith does not explore--talk about misrepresenting a view!). Beckwith then goes on to say that if Overton were to do that then one could not in principle reject the teaching of ID in public schools since ID's plausibility is tied to some important philosophical challenges to materialism and methodological naturalism. THAT's Beckwith's argument. It is a nuanced, deliberate, Socratic interaction with an initial criticism, a rescuing of his opponent's argument, and then showing that that prop-up now supports the position that his opponent opposes.

Beckwith is only saying that if the criterion of teaching stuff in science class is Overton's criterion, then Overton's criterion could not be taught in science class, which means that a teacher could not tell her students why she is excluding creationism if she were asked. However, if Overton were to take the tack of the one-star reviewer--it is a crterion about science and not a criterion of science and that is acceptable to teach in science class (a tack that Beckwith himself offers to Overton to get him out of his jam)--then what would be wrong with teaching criticisms of evolution that are tied to criticisms of the nature of science on which the plausibility of ID and evolution turn?

What is laughable is the steady-stream--the golden leak, one may say--of reviewers who want to spin Beckwith's book to say something it is not saying. But it is not entirely surprising that those who see nature as nothing but "red tooth and claw" would protect their materialism--their very intellectual survival--by tactics that are less than moral.

Beckwith's monograph is a splendid assessment of the complex legal questions surrounding the teaching of origins in public schools. It is not a book of science; it is a book of juriprudence in which Beckwith explores the issues with candor and rigor. I'm not quite sure what book his detractors have read, but the book about which I write is careful in its claims and modest in its conclusions. Unfortunately, the one-star reviewers are not as careful and thus not as modest, and it tarnishes their assessment of this fine work. For example, one reviewer says with unwarranted confidence that Beckwith does not mention non-Darwinian options besides ID. Not true. In his presentation of evolution Beckwith brings up genetic drift, punctual equillibrium, the founder effect, and recombination, pointing out that "the notion of common descent is fundamental to macroevolution even if Darwinian and neo-Darwinian accounts of this descent are replaced or supplemented by another theory." (p. 4). Another reviewer says that Beckwith claims that ID has no evidence to support it. This is a misleading, if not false, comment. Beckwith spends 29 pages (91-120) and 10 pages of endnotes (166-176) presenting the case for ID. Of course, he does not make any pronouncements of their soundness. But that is not the purpose of his project. The purpose is to delve into a jurisprudential question. Another reviewer says that Beckwith's book is not peer-reviewed in a science journal. Again, misleading. Beckwith's book is a revised version of his Master of Juridical Studies dissertation at the Washington University School of Law, St. Louis. It was peer-reviewed by faculty there including his advisor Stanley Paulsen, a philosopher and law professor conservant in the area pertinent to Beckwith's work, the philosophy of science. Another reviewer states that Beckwith does not cite one pro-ID article that has been published in a peer-reviewed science journal. But the reviewer will not tell you that that Beckwith cites ID works that have been peer-reviewed by scientists (e.g., Darwin's Black Box), peer-reviewed by philosophers of science and scientists (e.g., W. L. Craig's work on the anthropic argument, Del Ratzsch's book, the Design Inference) and published in philosophy of science journals and prestigous academic monograph series. Beckwith, in an extensive endnote, addresses the peer-review question with candor and accuracy (unlike his detractors). He admits that theID folks suffer from a deficit in peer-reviewed science journals, but that the other peer-reviewed works in anthologies, philosophy of science journals, and academic monograph series is impressive. The fact that the reviewer has to parse his words so carefully so that each adjective is precisely placed so that the ID works can be dismissed without engaging them speaks volumes of the sort of "authority envy" scientistic types suffer from. So, this is how the game is played: if the ID guys are peer-reviewed, we require "science peer-reviewed." But if they do that, and its in a book, then it must be "science peer-reviewed JOURNAL." I suspect that if they were to publish it in NATURE, it will be "science peer-reviewed journal that doesn't begin with an `n.'" At some point these reviewers have to actually get their hands dirty and quit relying on worn-out stereotypes and out-moded paradigms.

Another reviewer states that Beckwith mischaracterizes science textbooks. If you have been paying attention, you can probably guess why this objection has been leveled: Beckwith does not deal with textbooks, for that is not his project (again!). He is not offering an assessment of science textbooks; he is examining a question of principle, whether it would be permissible to insert ID in a curriculum with running afoul of our Constitution.

"Naturalistic evolution" is defined rather nicely by Beckwith, for his purpose, as I understand it, is to show that evolution is more than a theory of biology, but a grand tale of how everything came to be out of matter without the assistance of guidance of any intelligence. If this is the story told in science textbooks, then it is giving a naturalistic account as true, since, as Beckwith points out, science is the paradigm of knowledge in our culture. It is unlikely that the Gilchrist study cited by a reviewer would have considered such an account as "naturalistic evolution" since naturalism is so built into the scientistic culture; it's like asking fish if they see water.

It is interesting that the reviewers attack Beckwith by pointing out that he is a legally trained philosopher and not a scientist. In my judgment, this gives him a tremendous advantage, for lawyers and philosophers are taught how to think through arguments and to assess their soundness. Scientists are notoriously bad at making philosophical distinctions about the nature of what they do, for they are not trained in that way. They are narrowly-trained professionals--with great intellects in most cases--who work under the strictures of a paradigm that they have never dreamt of critically assessing. This is why a scientist can say--with a straight face--that "science is what is testable" to a creationist to ward him off, and then praise Steve Hawking's multiple-universe hypotheses even though it is, well, not testable. A scientist can make a distinction between science and non-science--an act of pure philosophy--and then make fun of philosophy. A scientist can make fun of lawyers, and then restrict their access to the science guild on the basis of an epistemological exclusionary rule, a law if you will. So many scientists are amateur philosophers and lawyers, and get away with it, because they call their pedantic meanderings "science."

There is no doubt that priesthood has its privileges, and apparently one of these privileges is to play fast and loose with the truth while reviewing the works of legal theorists, like Beckwith, whose superior command of argument cannot be tolerated by the guardians of all that is "true." Much of what these guys have written here is badly reasoned and badly written.

Beckwith is a fearless philosopher who has never been afraid to ruffle a few feathers along the way and THE LAW, DARWINISM AND PUBLIC EDUCATION is no exception. A must read for anyone interested in the constitutionality of teaching intelligent design in public schools. Beckwith uses the legal philosopher's tools of logic and critical thinking to dissect what has formerly been a playground open only to scientists.

His detractors loathe him because Beckwith is their worst nightmare, a highly intelligent, witty, young thinker who is not a creationist. When it comes to teaching creationism in public schools, Beckwith is no different than the guy with the darwin fish on the back of his car, he's against it. This book is not about that. This book deals with whether or not it is constitutionally permissible to teach Intelligent Design in public schools. This book is important for people on both sides of the I.D. debate to understand the potential ways the law may interpret this issue. Because at the end of the day, for better of worse, it is the courts who have the final say on subjects like this, not the scientists.

First, I am an atheist. Second, I am an atheist who believes that given the right conditions, the theory of intelligent design would pass constitutional muster. It does not promote a religion (thought it is compatible with many religions, including deism), and it does not interfere with people's right to practice their religion freely. While it is beyond question that those who wrote the "ID statement" into the Dover curriculum had religious motivaitons, it need not be the case that ID is INHERENTLY a religious doctrine, or have the effect of promoting a religion.

The problem is not with Francis Beckwith's position; the problem is with the reasoning he uses to get there. In fact, for a book whose first word is "Law," it is a bit suprising that only two of the chapters are really devoted to the legal arguments.

The first chapter to focus on law focuses on the cases to do with Creation Science (the evolutionary ancestor of intelligent design). It goes through the majority opinions and dissents in these cases and finds - quite unsuprisingly - that ID would not fall into the same camp as creation science, as it is not an endorsement of religion with ties to a holy book, as was the case with creation science. (Beckwith also suggests that ID is not an inherently religous doctrine and that, in order to be disallowed, the Court would have to find a religious motive or effect to adopting a policy teaching ID. It is interesting to note that in teh case of Kitzmiller, written after this book, that is EXACTLY what kept ID out of the curriculum.)

The next chapter - certainly the weakest one, where Beckwith shows his naivete - is a chapter outlining the philosophical arguments leveled by ID proponents against evolution. All have been answered many times (though Beckwith doesn't really cite those answers), and some plaln do not make sense. Beckwith criticizes methodological naturalism, for instance, by suggesting that methodological naturalism is not itself a scientific proposition based on observation, and thus, it is self-refuting. This old linguistic trick has been gotten out of many ways, only one of which is to suggest that such a claim does not refute, but justifies, itself by showing that, by its use, science has progressed, and progressed, and progressed. (One can imagine how much science would have progressed without methodological naturalism - if we just stopped at "god must have done it." Hmm.) Tired argument, but Beckwith is quite fond of it.

It is in the latter part of this chapter that Beckwith starts making the political and legal argument as to why ID should be allowed in schools. He suggests, quoting Plantinga, that in a pluralistic society where - apparently - the idea that science ONLY studies the natural is controversial, we should teach alternate conceptiosn of science, such that evolution is taught to be well-established ONLY IF you believe in methodological naturalism. In turn, ID would be taught as well-established IF you believe in methodological supernaturalism.

Of course, pluralism is only ONE aim of schools! In fact, the whole idea of standardized education belies the idea that pluralism - rather than ensuring a degree of homoegeneity - is the main purpose of schools. Science classes, quite simply, exist to teach students a realistic picture of what sceince has come up with. Science has not come up with ID (a lawyer named Philip Johnson did that with the help of William Paley). Science has come up with evolution, though. And that is the realistic picture of what science has discovered in the area of biology.

To put it differently, those - like Beckwith and Plantinga - who value pluralism in education above all else, should also be making the argument that history teachers should teach that the Holocaust did not happen so that those people who do not believe history should rely on evidence might be satisfied. (Read this chapter, and see if Plantinga's argument cited by Beckwith would not very easily justify that!)

It is only in the last chapter that Beckwith gets to suggesting the legal reasons why ID is not a violation of the first amendment. Is it a religion? No. Does it hinder people's free exercise? No. Does its exclusion on grounds that it is a faith tantamount to a violation of the first amendment? Beckwith says yes, becasue excluding a viewpoint just because it is compatible with a faith is tantamount to discriminating against religion.

But did you notice where Beckwith slips up here? He cannot, in one chapter, deny that ID is a religion, while, in another chapter, suggest that blocking ID from the classroom is discrimination against religion (which he suggests ID is not).

In the end, he is right on a few points (those I reviwed in the first paragraph of this review). Otherwise, his case is quite bad, assuming that one is familiar with the literature on the subject (as there are many great refutations of all the thinkers he points to to support his arguments).

Read this; then read those.

It is a tragedy that Amazon.com permits the publishing of reviews which reveal that their authors have not read the book under "review." For example, the Feb. 10, 2004 review consists almost entirely of anti-ID one-liners, some of which are addressed in some detail in Beckwith's book. Take for instance the charge that ID is not "science." In the book's first chapter Beckwith presents, in some detail, some of the conceptual problems in trying to dismiss ID by the "testability" standard when it comes to ID. First, Darwinism claims to account for design without resorting to intelligent agency as an explanation. This would, of course, mean that ID has been tested and has failed. So, if evolution in general (as a comsic theory, and Darwinism as a theory of biological change) is a complete account of the complexity in nature and living organisms in particular, then, on evolutionary premises, ID has been tested, but has failed. Thus, ironically, to say that ID is not testable is to deny the explanatory power of evolution. Second, Beckwith spends about 1/3 of chapter 3 dealing with demarcation theories (i.e., attempts to distinguish science from non-science). In addition, he deals with demarcation theories in chapter 1 as well, when writing about the Seagraves case as well as McClean v. Arkansas (an article on the latter was recently published by Beckwith in the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy). So, for the reviewer to say that Beckwith does not address this question is a fabrication. Third, Beckwith does not defend ID. The purpose of the book is to explore a question of Constitutional law, a perfectly acceptable subject of scholarly research in jurisprudence. Beckwith argues that the typical arguments used against creationism in constitutional jurisprudence simply do not hold muster when applied to ID. Is he arguing that ID should be given equal treatment with evolution? Absolutely not. Is he arguing that ID should be taught at all in public schools? Absolutely not. He is merely arguing that it is constitutionally permissible to do so and that public school teachers who touch on it, only briefly, in their science instruction are protected by their academic freedom, which federal courts have ruled is found in the First Amendment. This is what Beckwith's book argues. It is clear that these "reviewers," such as Feb. 10-man, rely on stereotypes and prejudice rather than the text of the book. Do yourself a favor. Read the book! By the way, Harvard Law Review just reviewed it and gave it positive assessment....

I don't agree with Beckwith. I don't believe that ID is even permissible to teach in public schools if it is the only option to evolution offered (which is the same position as Kent Greenawalt, the Columbia U. law professor, whose major article on this can be found in the same issue of the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy as Beckwith's). However, Beckwith's case is the strongest one out there, and for that, I have great respect for what appears to be a powerful intellect.

I think the book's major flaw is that it underestimates the role that religion plays in the motivations of ID advocates. Beckwith does address this by showing that appealing to motivation is logically fallacious (i.e., the genetic fallacy), and Beckwith is clearly correct. However, the courts are not arbitors of the logical soundness of argument. They are trying to make policy (even if they deny they are doing so).

In short, this is well-done book, even though I think the author is wrong.

Beckwith systematically debunks the notion that science and materialism are one in the same. I'm not surprised that Darwinists hate this book as they do. It's a devastating critique of their attempts to force their materialistic views on the population through the courts. It's no surprise, then, that Beckwith's critics are in panic mode.

If you are intellectually honest, this book is a must read.