Enter your mobile number or email address below and we'll send you a link to download the free Kindle Reading App. Then you can start reading Kindle books on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required.
To get the free app, enter your email address or mobile phone number.
The essays collected in this book provide an excellent overview of the philosophical issues which surround the nature and role of interpretation in legal thought. Each of the authors brings to the subject a unique perspective or philosophical position, and argues for it persuasively. Needless to say, the contributors are not all in agreement regarding the fundamental questions under discussion. Topics covered include the nature of interpretation generally, in art and literature as well as in law; the claim by proponents of the Critical Legal Studies movement that every application of a legal rule involves an interpretation of it, and that the open texture of law is incompatible with the demands of political liberalism; Ronald Dworkin's distinction between rules and principles, and the significance of "original intent" in the interpretation of statutory or Constitutional provisions. While familiarity with modern analytic philosophy may not be an indispensable prerequisite to a reading of this book, it would certainly do much to enhance your understanding of the argumentation. I suspect that a reader who lacked such knowledge would find some of the essays particularly challenging. In no way is this a criticism of the book; in order to address the philosophical issues adequately it is simply necessary to discuss, for example, Wittgenstein's remarks on "rule following" in the Philosophical Investigations, Kripke's misinterpretation thereof, and the realist/anti-realist controversy. With its meticulous and thorough analyses, this book makes an outstanding contribution to legal philosophy, which I would highly recommend.
Was this review helpful to you?