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64 of 69 people found the following review helpful:
1.0 out of 5 stars
Lecturing traders on writing, July 5, 2009
This review is from: Lecturing Birds on Flying: Can Mathematical Theories Destroy the Financial Markets? (Hardcover)
I was attracted to this book partly by the intriguing title, but mostly by the fact that the foreword was written by Nassim Nicholas Taleb, the author of 2 fascinating books on roughly the same material, "Fooled by Randomness" and "The Black Swan".
I was expecting more of the same from Triana, but with perhaps a slightly different viewpoint and possibly more details. What I got was a 350 page polemic from a confirmed math phobe and a slavish paen to Taleb. OK, Black-Scholes is not a great idea and VAR greatly underestimates market risk, but to repeat this theme again and again borders on the lunatic.
But that's not all, here's a quote from p. 203 that sums up the style of writing; he's referring (endlessly) to Black-Scholes-Merton and, in this case, to the S&P 500 volatility surface: "...Obviously, horizontal is not the same as curved. A curved line is a complete violation of BSM. Horizontal is not the same as curved. The end results are not BSM-compliant any more. It's not BSM. Curved is not horizontal. It's something else. BSM endorses horizontality. BSM negates curvedness. It can't be BSM. Curved is not horizontal". I kid you not.
The message of the book, delivered amply in Taleb's foreword and elsewhere, is that too often in the past econometric models put foward by the likes of Merton, Scholes and others have been blindly followed by market makers and regulators, with resultant disastrous effects. Unfortunately, Triana adds little additional insight and commits the greatest of all faults an author can make--to bore the reader.
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43 of 48 people found the following review helpful:
2.0 out of 5 stars
The most repetitive book ever written, July 6, 2009
This review is from: Lecturing Birds on Flying: Can Mathematical Theories Destroy the Financial Markets? (Hardcover)
I read Nassim Nicholas Taleb books, "Fooled by Randomness" and "...Black Swan"; so I figured (regrettable, on hindsight) given that Taleb wrote the foreword then the book would be on par with his books! I was wrong.
Negatives:
The book is way too repetitive!
-Imagine going for >74 pages (that's the longest chapter, #7) of repetition. Not only is he repeating lines from other chapters, no.... at times from the the same paragraph!
The writing style is rather weird.
- At some point he mentions Victor Niederhoffer by name and then at another chapter, he talks about the same story but this time it's no longer Victor but rather a "famous speculator"
- Again, he mentions Emanuel Derman by name and then in another chapter, he talks about the same story but this time, it's not longer Emanuel but it's now a "...famous quant/academic..."!
- I coud go on....
Positive(s):
His understanding of the subject is not in question, at least not by me!
His opinions on VaR, BSM.
His opinions on the need for change, especially the financial economics professors' influence in the real world of finance
The relating of his work experience is another positive
All in all, I'd rather pass on the book, for I can assure anyone that the repetitiveness will be found very annoying.
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15 of 15 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
A lot of trouble, but some useful insight, November 2, 2009
This review is from: Lecturing Birds on Flying: Can Mathematical Theories Destroy the Financial Markets? (Hardcover)
I agree with the complaints about repetitiveness and poor writing, but it is possible to understand this book. Most poor writing springs from unclear thinking, it is usually not worth deciphering. In this case I blame passion and unfamiliarity with English. If you eliminate all adverbs, ignore everything splitting infinitives, assume prepositions were chosen randomly, recast all sentences into present tense, active voice, indicative mood (the author is very fond of the inverted pluperfect subjunctive, perhaps from reading a lot of 19th century English poetry or conversing with Yoda) and eliminate irrelevant words borrowed from clichés, the book makes sense. For example:
"It is not fanatically expected that those pros who bring advanced analytics into the fold of practice would believe that the adopted models have a high chance of igniting trouble down the road. Rather, they would be assumed to be hopeful about the possible gains to be obtained by pledging allegiance to the math, whether in the shape of better prices, improved hedges, or more accurate risk measurements (the exception here would be those situations where financiers are forced by regulators to embrace a particular quantitative construct, the foundations of which they agitatedly distrust and which side effects they massively fear)."
Means simply:
"Quants do not build models to cause trouble. They hope models improve pricing, hedging and risk management. Sometimes bad models are imposed by regulators."
I understand most readers will not go through the trouble of decoding the prose. If they do, however, they will find there are some original points here, different from Taleb and Derman. They will also find junk. Triana constructs several straw man arguments, then loses to them ungraciously, heaping sarcasm rather than admitting defeat. I disagree with those reviewers who praised his views on Black-Scholes-Merton and Value-at-Risk, those views are deeply misinformed. One of his basic errors, repeated frequently, is to claim the goal of risk management is to predict and prevent disasters. People who guess the future and people who fear failure are the enemies of risk managers. Risk management means trying to prepare for anything that might happen, not guessing the future nor insuring no bad things ever happen. Institutions with good risk management fail often and fail fast, institutions with bad risk management fail only once.
The book's original contribution is to defend traditional corporate finance, as practiced in the United States from about 1910 to 1970. Triana is deeply reactionary. His only similarity to the revolutionaries and technocrats he quotes is dislike of current practice. Taleb wants to throw away prediction and measurement and face the unpredictable future with elegance. Derman wants us to understand the limits of models, to continue on our present course but with more humility and broader vision. Triana wants to go back to a simpler time when hands-on managers used simple math and no theory. There is a strong religious streak in this book, on the "may the force be with you" level.
Few people have less sympathy for this view than I do, but I still found it a useful and thought-provoking argument. I cannot recommend this book for general readers, but if you are very interested in this stuff and have the patience to wade through the style and repetition, you will learn things from it.
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