Lee Moves North: Robert E. Lee on the Offensive [Hardcover]

Michael A. Palmer (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0471164011 | ISBN-13: 978-0471164012 | Publication Date: March 19, 1998 | Edition: 1

Lee Moves North "A revisionist look at Lee's career . detailed and interesting." --Orlando Sentinel "Michael Palmer says that Robert E. Lee was 145;a man of military genius'--but only when he was reacting to a Union attack. When he analyzes Lee on the offensive, Palmer labels him a woefully inadequate general. Powerfully written, this no-holds-barred criticism of Lee the general will shake long-held perceptions of historians and buffs. Like this book or not, it is must reading." --John F. Marszalek, Mississippi State University author of Sherman: A Soldier's Passion for Order "A superb study--one that provides refreshingly new insight into the generalship of Robert E. Lee .a must for Civil War and military historians." --William N. Still Jr., coauthor of Why the South Lost "A unique and careful analysis of Lee's generalship #133;an excellent and persuasive consideration of the Marble Man." --Alan T. Nolan, author of Lee Considered Reconsidering a Confederate Legend . In a boldly revisionist look at the career, leadership capability, and decisive battles of the venerated General Robert E. Lee, prize-winning historian Michael Palmer delivers a riveting new perspective on one of the most compelling figures in United States history.

Editorial Reviews

Amazon.com Review

For much of the Civil War, Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia fought on the defensive, but it's during three specific invasions northward--Antietam, Gettysburg, and the lesser-known Bristoe Station--that both the genius and failings of General Lee come to light. Historian Michael Palmer offers a revisionist look at how Lee, who has been at times nearly universally revered, made serious mistakes when engaging in offensive operations. Regardless of whether the reader totally agrees with Palmer's thesis, the argument is well presented, and the sources cited and Palmer's writing could engender a lively debate.

From the Publisher

Few military figures have attained the legendary status of Robert E. Lee. Yet, though he displayed tactical brilliance in the defensive mode, Lee's offensive moves were often hastily undertaken with virtually no logistical preparation. And not surprisingly, these assaults ended in defeat. Lee Moves North explores the weaknesses of Lee's leadership by focusing on three of his unsuccessful campaigns to break ground in the North: the abortive Maryland invasion in Sharpsburg of 1862, the disastrous Gettysburg campaign of 1863, and the lesser-know Bristoe Station fiasco later that year.

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 189 pages
• Publisher: Wiley; 1 edition (March 19, 1998)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0471164011
• ISBN-13: 978-0471164012
• Product Dimensions: 9.5 x 6.5 x 0.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.1 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 2.9 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (8 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #4,042,262 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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16 of 18 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars An excellent study of Robert E. Lee's strategic failures, August 27, 1998

By A Customer

This review is from: Lee Moves North: Robert E. Lee on the Offensive (Hardcover)

Michael Palmer's analysis of Confederate General Robert E. Lee's strategic operations during the American Civil War reveals a general who was (and remains) without peer as a tactical genius, but also one who possessed dubious talents as a military strategist. Palmer focuses on three notable strategic offensives undertaken by the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia under Lee's command: The Sharpsburg campaign of September 1862, the Gettysburg campaign of June-July 1863 and the Bristoe Station campaign of late 1863. All three campaigns possessed several common characteristics: (1) A lack of proper logistical support for the forces in the field (2) The lack of a clear-cut military objective. As a consequence, all three Confederate strategic campaigns ended in a stalemate and the withdrawal of the Army of Northen Virginia from the fields of battle. In defense of Lee, it has been speculated that Lee's strategic judgement was impaired as the Gettysburg campaign began in June 1863 due to a heart ailment and that he suffered a heart attack at the height of the battle in early July 1863. In the end, these failed strategic offensives contributed - along with the Union's superior manpower reserves, overwhelming industrial production facilities and the hard-won quality of its officers and enlisted men - to the defeat of the Confederacy. Palmer's work is an excellent study of Robert E. Lee's strategic mind and is worthy of study, reflection and debate by students and scholars of the American Civil War.

15 of 18 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Lee's Offensive Strategy, October 16, 2000

By 

E. E Pofahl (HUNTINGTON, WV USA) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Lee Moves North: Robert E. Lee on the Offensive (Paperback)

In the book's preface, Professor Palmer asks the thought provoking question "Did he and his lieutenants simply have a couple of bad days? Or were there other factors at work? ....could the strategic offensive, then be the shared thread, the common denominator that might help to explain Lee's failures?" He then reviews Lee's Maryland, Gettysburg and Bristoe Station campaigns to answer his question.

In Chapter 1, Palmer states that lacking published plans and with an ambiguous objective, Lee moved into Maryland without Jeff Davis's prior approval . The author asserts that the Maryland campaign was a Federal success and allowed "the Lincoln administration to solidify its political support...." Quite the contrary happened. Aghast at the Antietam casualties, northern voters in the 1862 fall elections for governors and congressmen, gave Lincoln's party several major reverses. The chapter makes the ridiculous comparison that "Lee was one of many southerners caught up in a wave of `victory disease', not unlike that which gripped the Japanese before the battle of Midway". The Japanese defeat at Midway was not due to "victory disease" but due to their naval code having been broken and Admiral Nagumo's bad tactical decision,

Nevertheless, regarding Maryland, Professor Palmer correctly writes "Why had Lee failed? The answer is simple: virtually all of the assumptions upon which he based his plans were unfounded."

The Gettysburg campaign chapter is well written and objective. The review of events leading to the Gettysburg campaign is excellent. Normally given limited coverage, the narration of the meetings in Richmond with Davis and his cabinet plus the correspondence regarding Lee's Gettysburg campaign is very interesting. Palmer reviews Lee's organization problems writing "....two of the three men leading corps and three of the nine men leading divisions were untested at their new levels of commands....Such dramatic changes in the organization and leadership....suggested the need for delays, not haste." Considerable space is devoted to whether Lee wanted to fight a major battle in Pennsylvania quoting Lee stating in 1868 that "he did not want to fight" and ending with Lee biographer Emory Thomas's statement "that battle was central to Lee's plan."

Palmer noted "....two fundamental forces worked against the successful execution of Lee's campaign, First....it was never was properly developed....Second, Lee relied on a very decentralized approach to command and control." Lee's decentralized command philosophy required component subordinates. Regarding the competence at Gettysburg of Lee's key commanders, Stuart, Ewell, and Longstreet , the book provides a brief review of their failures concluding that "....while Ewell's incompetence and Longstreet's recalcitrance were important factors, Lee's unwillingness to issue direct orders or to take charge of the battle lay at the root of the problem".

Analysis of Lee's strategic offensive continues with a review of the Bristoe Station campaign. Again Lee initiated a campaign in secrecy, without a clearly stated objective, no detailed operation plan and limited or misleading communications to Richmond. The author speculates that one motive for the campaign was to prevent further detachment of Lee's troops to the west and states "Lee moved north to engage Meade because the latter had not come south....Had Meade been more aggressive in August or Lee been able to take the offensive, Davis would never have sent Longstreet west." The book notes that the command problems evident at Gettysburg had not been corrected and lacking capable corps commanders another debacle occurred. Professor Palmer states that "while Heth and Hill were blamed, Lee also bore some responsibility for the failures of his subordinates" and concludes at Bristoe Station "....for Lee to attack an army twice the size of his own in October was absurd."

Evaluating Lee, in the fourth and final chapter the author asks the critical question "Could the South have won the Civil War?" Professor Palmer contends that while the North had countless advantages, the Confederacy had several advantages noting that the South did not need to invade or conquer the North to win stating "The Confederacy had only to survive until the Yankees lost their will to continue the struggle." Referencing the writings of Clausewitz and Delbruck, Southern strategies are evaluated noting that the Confederate government failed to adopt either a strategy of exhaustion or of annihilation. He further states that Lee's contributed to the South's failure to adopt a consistent strategic policy in that he usurped Davis's role as commander-in chief while Davis failed to respond and shape a well-defined national strategy.

Professor Palmer writes Lee launched all three offensives without anything approaching a formal plan basically commanding by the seat of his pants. He writes "LEE'S TWIN PENCHANTS for the offensive and for secrecy contorted the outline of Confederate national strategy between 1862 and 1863 and led to his own failures as a commander." He notes that the traits that served Lee so well for strategic defense failed him when his army went over to the strategic offensive.

The book's weakness is that it does not ask "why ?" With Lee's respect for authority, why didn't Davis control strategy directing Lee to comply and fully reveal his plans? Why would a commander noted for honesty and integrity try to deceive Richmond? Regarding a strictly defensive strategy, was Lee independently responding to Frederick the Great's chilling aphorism "He who defends everything, defends nothing."? Why was Lee secretive, was it solely to deceive or was it basically because both North and South were getting critical intelligence from the newspapers? Etc.

Some may take offense at the concluding statement "...what Lee failed to understand was that a commander of an army can no more effectively shape national strategy on the sly and on the cheap, than a tail can wag a dog." But for the historian or serious student of the Civil War, this short book is worth reading as thought provoking, often controversial, issues are raised.

5.0 out of 5 stars Lee Moves North, November 2, 2010

By 

Alan Di Sciullo (Princeton Junction, NJ, US) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Lee Moves North: Robert E. Lee on the Offensive (Paperback)

Product came on time and in excellent condition, even for a used book. Would definitely buy from this seller again.