Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg [Hardcover]

Troy D. Harman (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: July 1, 2003

For almost 100 years, analysis of the Gettysburg Campaign has been centered around a set of commonly held beliefs, among them an oversimplified view of Confederate general Robert E. Lee's goals for the battle. Author and Gettysburg National Military Park historian Troy D. Harman believes this view is misinformed. Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg presents a provocative new theory regarding Lee's true tactical objectives during this pivotal battle of the American Civil War.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"Troy Harman's Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg is a thoughtful, well-researched, and provocative study that seems certain to create controversy. All serious students of the battle will want to read it and ponder its conclusion."

About the Author

Troy D. Harman has been a National Park Service Ranger since 1984. His assignments have included historical interpretation at Appomattox Court House N.H.P., Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania N.M.P., and, since 1989, Gettysburg N.M.P. This is his first book.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 168 pages
• Publisher: Stackpole Books; 1 edition (July 1, 2003)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0811700542
• ISBN-13: 978-0811700542
• Product Dimensions: 9.2 x 6.4 x 0.7 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.2 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (15 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,001,461 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

More About the Author

Discover books, learn about writers, read author blogs, and more.

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

33 of 37 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars the rest of the story, September 19, 2003

By 

Yalensian - See all my reviews
(VINE VOICE)   

This review is from: Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg (Hardcover)

Troy Harman has written a truly outstanding and engaging work of revisionist history--revisionism based not upon some ideological or personal agenda but upon getting to the truth behind years of myths and (usually unintentional) distortions. He uses the historiographical methods of Carl Becker as a starting point, particularly the notion of an "ephemeral event" versus an "affirmed event." The ephemeral event is the actual historical occurrence--here, the battle--as it unfolds; the affirmed event is the event as it is described, explained, and constructed by participants and historians in the years following. The ephemeral event evanesces, is never completely knowable, while the affirmed event assumes layer upon layer of interpretation, exaggeration, and distortion. Harman seeks to strip away the chaff and get to what he believes is the true story of the ephemeral battle of Gettysburg.

Harman's thesis is straightforward: Lee's real plan at Gettysburg was to gain control of Cemetery Hill. His argument is cogently and logically presented; one point flows into, and provides a foundation for, the next. Beginning with the opening of the battle, Harman explains the importance of Cemetery Hill and why Lee focused on it. From there, he spends a great deal of time--indeed, the bulk of the book--on the battle's second day, July 2, and places the rebel assault, particularly Longstreet's, within the Cemetery Hill scheme, rather than in the affirmed version that depicts the day's action as an assault on both Union flanks. Lee's day-two objective was the Peach Orchard, from which artillery could fire on Cemetery Hill, and thus Sickles's moving his III Corps is seen as somewhat less foolish. Moreover, as Harman posits, Lee did not aim for Little Round Top; rather, the fight for it occurred quite by accident when the intended Confederate attack up the Emmitsburg Road diverted to the right and toward the Round Tops after Hood was wounded. Finally, day three and Pickett's Charge receive treatment. The objective of the attack was Cemetery Hill, which commanders such as Longstreet and Hancock understood, and Harman explains at length how the "copse of trees" came to be seen as Lee's focus.

Harman supports his points with the words of the participants, with his intimate familiarity with the lay of the land (from his experience as a Park Ranger), and with his rigorous analysis and close-reading of sources. So much of this book's fun is seeing Harman build up his argument piece by piece and assemble Lee's tactical strategy into a coherent whole. It is a joy to read. Except for a minor quibble here or there, I find Harman's thesis convincing. More than that, his insightful and refreshing ephemeral-versus-affirmed approach has fundamentally changed the way I look at history; I will now view the past through that lens. As others have said, this is not a book for the neophyte, but anyone interested in Gettysburg, willing to think, and willing to re-consider traditional understandings should enjoy this book.

18 of 23 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Intellgent and very readable, February 19, 2004

By 

James W. Durney (Tampa Bay area) - See all my reviews
(VINE VOICE)    (TOP 500 REVIEWER)   

Amazon Verified Purchase

This review is from: Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg (Hardcover)

Excellent! This a well thought out idea that "fits" within the accepted story of the battle. In place of Lee blundering into battle and willing to trying anything in the hopes that something would work. In place of Lee being controlled by Ewell or unable to move Longstreet. In place of a sick desperate Lee willing to throw away the lives of his men. In place of fixing the "blame" for losing Gettysburg on Longstreet or Ewell or Stuart. In place of missing cannons, lack of water or the thousands of other "reasons" why the South lost at Gettysburg this small book presents a logical overall plan that Lee had and kept to from the afternoon of the July First to the end of the battle. Excellent maps and photos illustrate the why and how of the central idea. In addition, the author defines what happened to cause Lee's master plan to fail. This is not an introduction to the Battle of Gettysburg and without a good working knowledge of the battle the reader will quickly become lost. For students of the battle this will be a "must have" book that will be referenced and augured over as long as people talk about the Battle of Gettysburg.

14 of 19 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Troy Harman's Gettysburg, July 7, 2004

By 

Robin Friedman (Washington, D.C. United States) - See all my reviews
(TOP 50 REVIEWER)    (HALL OF FAME REVIEWER)    (VINE VOICE)    (REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg (Hardcover)

From the moment of its conclusion, the Battle of Gettysburg has provoked endless controversy regarding its significance, the plans and strategies employed by the armies, the tactics, and the reasons for the result. It has been said that if a reader doesn't like a particular account of the battle, it is only necessary to read on to find a more appealing version.

Troy Harman is a historian and a ranger with the National Park Service at Gettysburg. He has intimate familiarity with the Battlefield and a thorough grasp of the literature on the Battle. In his book, "Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg" (2003), Mr. Harman takes issue with what he terms the "affirmed version" of the Battle and offers what he believes to be a new and competing account. His account is well and lucidly presented and will provoke thought among students.

Mr. Harman argues that most students of the Battle have tended to focus on the details of the three days of fighting and have failed to understand the plan that the Confederate commander, Robert E. Lee, developed for the Battle and pursued during its entirety. According to Mr. Harman, Lee's focus throughout was on the heights of Cemetery Hill on the Union right. At the conclusion of the first day's fighting, the Confederates did not attempt to capture Cemetery Hill. But in the second day of fighting on the Union left, (Little Round Top, primarily) and in Pickett's Charge on the third day, the objective of Lee's plans, Mr. Harman maintains, was Cemetery Hill, due to its height, its control of the town and roads, and its vulnerability as a salient exposed to potential attack on three sides.

This is a challenging claim, particularly as it involves the second day of the Battle. Mr. Harmon argues that Longstreet's troops were to advance along the Emmitsburg Road, which essentially parallels the Union line and take Cemetery Hill, giving only slight attention to Little Round Top. Mr. Harmon argues that the objective of Pickett's famous charge on day 3 was Zeigler's grove on the right of the Union line rather than the more famous Angle and Copse of Trees.

There is a great deal to be learned from this, and from any attempt to revisit a received and too comfortably accepted account. But I think Mr. Harman tends to overemphasize the originality of his approach and to type-cast the account with which he takes issue. The basic points in Mr. Harman's approach, involving the alleged importance of Little Round Top, the advance of the Third Corps of the Union Army to the Peach Orchard, and the focus of Pickett's Charge have been addressed by many writers. These points are and will remain highly controversial, and Mr. Harman's understanding of each of them is shared with (and also disputed by) many other scholars. Mr. Harman's primary claim -- the importance of Cemetery Hill -- has also been addressed in a slightly different way in a book called "Last Chance for Victory" by Bowden and Ward which likewise challenges the received account of Gettysburg.

Mr. Harman also is too quick, I think, in forulating his understanding of the "affirmed version" of Gettysburg. Most of the accounts of the battle I have read take a more nuanced view than that indicated in Mr Harman's summations. They recognize, I think, the changing nature of the Battle and the choices these changes forced on commanders North and South. Lee does seem to me to have ordered a charge up the Emmitsburg Road, based on the faulty information he had about the size and position of the Union troops, but this plan had to change on the spot when Longstreet discovered the location of Sickles and his third Corps. Pickett's charge on the third day may well have had Zeigler's grove as its objective, but the fact remains that the Southern attack crested at the Copse of Trees, thus entitling it to its reputation as the "High Water Mark".

Mr Harman has taken a fresh, lively approach to the Battle which taught me a great deal and which will inspire the interested reader to learn more. It will instill in the reader a sense of fluidity and a reluctance to dogmatize over significant historical events.