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Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg

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Troy Harman has written a truly outstanding and engaging work of revisionist history--revisionism based not upon some ideological or personal agenda but upon getting to the truth behind years of myths and (usually unintentional) distortions. He uses the historiographical methods of Carl Becker as a starting point, particularly the notion of an "ephemeral event" versus an "affirmed event." The ephemeral event is the actual historical occurrence--here, the battle--as it unfolds; the affirmed event is the event as it is described, explained, and constructed by participants and historians in the years following. The ephemeral event evanesces, is never completely knowable, while the affirmed event assumes layer upon layer of interpretation, exaggeration, and distortion. Harman seeks to strip away the chaff and get to what he believes is the true story of the ephemeral battle of Gettysburg.

Harman's thesis is straightforward: Lee's real plan at Gettysburg was to gain control of Cemetery Hill. His argument is cogently and logically presented; one point flows into, and provides a foundation for, the next. Beginning with the opening of the battle, Harman explains the importance of Cemetery Hill and why Lee focused on it. From there, he spends a great deal of time--indeed, the bulk of the book--on the battle's second day, July 2, and places the rebel assault, particularly Longstreet's, within the Cemetery Hill scheme, rather than in the affirmed version that depicts the day's action as an assault on both Union flanks. Lee's day-two objective was the Peach Orchard, from which artillery could fire on Cemetery Hill, and thus Sickles's moving his III Corps is seen as somewhat less foolish. Moreover, as Harman posits, Lee did not aim for Little Round Top; rather, the fight for it occurred quite by accident when the intended Confederate attack up the Emmitsburg Road diverted to the right and toward the Round Tops after Hood was wounded. Finally, day three and Pickett's Charge receive treatment. The objective of the attack was Cemetery Hill, which commanders such as Longstreet and Hancock understood, and Harman explains at length how the "copse of trees" came to be seen as Lee's focus.

Harman supports his points with the words of the participants, with his intimate familiarity with the lay of the land (from his experience as a Park Ranger), and with his rigorous analysis and close-reading of sources. So much of this book's fun is seeing Harman build up his argument piece by piece and assemble Lee's tactical strategy into a coherent whole. It is a joy to read. Except for a minor quibble here or there, I find Harman's thesis convincing. More than that, his insightful and refreshing ephemeral-versus-affirmed approach has fundamentally changed the way I look at history; I will now view the past through that lens. As others have said, this is not a book for the neophyte, but anyone interested in Gettysburg, willing to think, and willing to re-consider traditional understandings should enjoy this book.

Excellent! This a well thought out idea that "fits" within the accepted story of the battle. In place of Lee blundering into battle and willing to trying anything in the hopes that something would work. In place of Lee being controlled by Ewell or unable to move Longstreet. In place of a sick desperate Lee willing to throw away the lives of his men. In place of fixing the "blame" for losing Gettysburg on Longstreet or Ewell or Stuart. In place of missing cannons, lack of water or the thousands of other "reasons" why the South lost at Gettysburg this small book presents a logical overall plan that Lee had and kept to from the afternoon of the July First to the end of the battle. Excellent maps and photos illustrate the why and how of the central idea. In addition, the author defines what happened to cause Lee's master plan to fail. This is not an introduction to the Battle of Gettysburg and without a good working knowledge of the battle the reader will quickly become lost. For students of the battle this will be a "must have" book that will be referenced and augured over as long as people talk about the Battle of Gettysburg.

From the moment of its conclusion, the Battle of Gettysburg has provoked endless controversy regarding its significance, the plans and strategies employed by the armies, the tactics, and the reasons for the result. It has been said that if a reader doesn't like a particular account of the battle, it is only necessary to read on to find a more appealing version.

Troy Harman is a historian and a ranger with the National Park Service at Gettysburg. He has intimate familiarity with the Battlefield and a thorough grasp of the literature on the Battle. In his book, "Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg" (2003), Mr. Harman takes issue with what he terms the "affirmed version" of the Battle and offers what he believes to be a new and competing account. His account is well and lucidly presented and will provoke thought among students.

Mr. Harman argues that most students of the Battle have tended to focus on the details of the three days of fighting and have failed to understand the plan that the Confederate commander, Robert E. Lee, developed for the Battle and pursued during its entirety. According to Mr. Harman, Lee's focus throughout was on the heights of Cemetery Hill on the Union right. At the conclusion of the first day's fighting, the Confederates did not attempt to capture Cemetery Hill. But in the second day of fighting on the Union left, (Little Round Top, primarily) and in Pickett's Charge on the third day, the objective of Lee's plans, Mr. Harman maintains, was Cemetery Hill, due to its height, its control of the town and roads, and its vulnerability as a salient exposed to potential attack on three sides.

This is a challenging claim, particularly as it involves the second day of the Battle. Mr. Harmon argues that Longstreet's troops were to advance along the Emmitsburg Road, which essentially parallels the Union line and take Cemetery Hill, giving only slight attention to Little Round Top. Mr. Harmon argues that the objective of Pickett's famous charge on day 3 was Zeigler's grove on the right of the Union line rather than the more famous Angle and Copse of Trees.

There is a great deal to be learned from this, and from any attempt to revisit a received and too comfortably accepted account. But I think Mr. Harman tends to overemphasize the originality of his approach and to type-cast the account with which he takes issue. The basic points in Mr. Harman's approach, involving the alleged importance of Little Round Top, the advance of the Third Corps of the Union Army to the Peach Orchard, and the focus of Pickett's Charge have been addressed by many writers. These points are and will remain highly controversial, and Mr. Harman's understanding of each of them is shared with (and also disputed by) many other scholars. Mr. Harman's primary claim -- the importance of Cemetery Hill -- has also been addressed in a slightly different way in a book called "Last Chance for Victory" by Bowden and Ward which likewise challenges the received account of Gettysburg.

Mr. Harman also is too quick, I think, in forulating his understanding of the "affirmed version" of Gettysburg. Most of the accounts of the battle I have read take a more nuanced view than that indicated in Mr Harman's summations. They recognize, I think, the changing nature of the Battle and the choices these changes forced on commanders North and South. Lee does seem to me to have ordered a charge up the Emmitsburg Road, based on the faulty information he had about the size and position of the Union troops, but this plan had to change on the spot when Longstreet discovered the location of Sickles and his third Corps. Pickett's charge on the third day may well have had Zeigler's grove as its objective, but the fact remains that the Southern attack crested at the Copse of Trees, thus entitling it to its reputation as the "High Water Mark".

Mr Harman has taken a fresh, lively approach to the Battle which taught me a great deal and which will inspire the interested reader to learn more. It will instill in the reader a sense of fluidity and a reluctance to dogmatize over significant historical events.

Mr. Harman offers in this fine little book a believable explanation of what Gen. R. E. Lee tried and failed to acomplish on the three days of battle at Gettysburg. Harman contends Lees' objective on all three days, was Cemetery Hill at the apex of the Union line. He argues this by quoting extensively from actual after battle reports as well as post war memoirs. If he is correct it goes far to explain and defend Longstreets actions on the second day as well as the disaster of Picketts charge on the third. He also diminishes the importance of the Roundtops in the battle and somewhat justifies Sickles forward movement to the Peach orchard. Both heretical opinions to most students of the battle. Since the book rarely goes below brigade level in describing troop movements it is much easier to follow than many other histories . Still I think it probably requires a previous knowledge of the battle and its controversies to be of interest. The one complaint I have were the poor photographs used to illustrate certain points in his thesis. The book has good maps , is printed on fine coated paper and has a sewn binding, all things I greatly appreciated.

Harmon's book is a repackaging of his thesis in his original book entitled Cemetary Hill-The General Plan was Unchanged. So if you have that book, you essentially know what he is talking about. This new book is a bit more polished. He presents an interesting theory, although unconvincing for me.

History is a great argument and perspective is everything.Historian and National Park ranger Troy D. Harman has written yet another book about the Battle of Gettysburg,but this is a great addition to meaningful literature on that topic. Yes this is revisionist history but it is thought provoking. In the introduction, Harman quotes from historian Carl Becker who noted that when any historical event takes place it is "ephemeral" that is the event as it actually took place but that the event is fleeting and true knowledge of it quickly disappears.Becker says what often takes place next is the "affirmed event" which is an agreed upon understanding of an event.Harman's main thesis is that Lee did not shift his attack plans at Gettysburg as the 3 day battle progressed as is often cited by traditional descriptions of the tale.Instead of attacking Culps hill,then focusing on the Round Tops and concluding with an attack on the Union center at Cemetery Ridge, Harman argues that Lee always concentrated on attacking Cemetery Hill which he saw as the key to defeating the Union Army.This may offend people who see the events at Little Round Top as being the turning point of the battle. Harman further argues that the "copse" of trees was not the focus of the attacks on July 3, 1863 but that Lee envisioned a series of oblique assaults aimed toward Cemetery Hill.He also states that Pickett's Charge which plays an important role in the American imagination did not really resemble the more sophisticated, complex plan that Lee desired. The author also has an unconventional take on one of the popular "goats" of the battle, General Daniel Sickles. Many readers may not like Harman's conclusions but he makes you think. This is a great companion to Carol Reardon's excellent book on Pickett"s Charge. This book is not for beginners but it deserves attention when considering this fascinating battle which people have argued about since 1863.

Troy Harman, a longtime park ranger at Gettysburg National Military Park, has an intriguing thesis. He looks at the infamous Pickett's Charge, and wonders what the real objective of it was. Rather than simply charging toward the center of the Union line, the purpose of this charge was to occupy the high ground on Cemetery Hill.

While I'm not 100% convinced by Ranger Harman's thesis, he does make a compelling argument that must be confronted by future histories of the battle.

This is not the first book on the Battle of Gettysburg that I would recommend for a novice, but it is perfect for those who wish to study the battle in greater detail.

I found this book to be pretty interesting but I wondered if the author was really stating the obvious here. Cemetary Hill according to the author, was the real objective of Robert E. Lee's plans during the three days at Gettysburg. I don't think that itself was any great discovery on it own. Anyone with any knowledge of the battle would know this as I did for a super long time since it don't take much to read a map of the battle. Why is this so? Well, as the author clearly pointed out, Cemetary Hill is one of the major keys to the Union position. Capture of it would be a key to winning the battle. No great mystery here.

The book goes on to describe how Lee planned this battle to support this thesis. While I do not debate the central concept, I think the author overstates his case when he focus too narrowly on Cemetary Hill. After all, Lee's deployments and movements during the battle tells us that while he was aiming for Cemetary Hill as his ultimate target, he had other ways of getting there. The author dismissal of Little Round Top appears too casual. Of course he says this because he wondered how the Confederates can benefit from capturing Little Round Top with Union Sixth Corps so closed by. Of course, Lee didn't know that but the author does. This sound bit self-serving. The author often dismissed many accounts because they were made in hindsight after the fact, he too make too much assumptions of his own based on hindsight after the fact. Not only that, I don't think author's idea that Longstreet on the second day would advanced toward Cemetary Hill from his starting position to be very practical even if Union III Corps stay where it was supposed to be.

The book is not very strong when it deals with Pickett's charge. There seem to a lot of guessing and conjectures here over where the charge was to hit home. The idea that once the Confederate forces broke the Union lines, it will roll up the Union lines toward Cemetary Hill sound bit like a fantasy scenario considering all the reserves Union army had which will prevent such manuvers.

As any commander would say, any plan is worthless once contact is made with the enemy. I think what may defeat this book in the end will be the actual deployment, movements and attacks of the Army of Northern Virginia which historians will see as Lee's actual plans at work.

As an old Army Field Artillery Officer, I had always wondered why the obvious nature of the Cemetery Hill was never presented. It was the high ground for crying out loud! Anyone worth their salt would see the case presented by Harmon is long overdue. He did an exceptional job of presenting factual evidence, and did not present a tired rehashing of the same old "accepted story." It was an eminently readable effort. The next time that I travel to the battlefield I will have to meet this man for an autograph in my copy of the book. (Maybe they should read this one in the service schools too.)

Harman's book is a breath of fresh air in Gettysburg scholarship. Too often (and I include myself here) students of the battle have focused upon the micro-history, what 2d Platoon, G Company, 73d Ohio was doing at 7:13pm on 2 July. And this is not a critique of that type of scholarship.
But what Troy has done is to step back from micro-historiography and returned to a bigger picture. For this he deserves great credit.
It is really pleasurable to read something that shows an intelligent analysis of the ground, of command and control, above the divisional level.
In terms of the essential theses of Troy's book, I have little to add that other reviewers have not commented upon. other than to say that it is high time someone credited Sickles' move (however brash or unauthorized) with the impact it had upon Longstreet's attack. The III Corps may have ended up being a speed bump, but that speed bump was essential to what transpired (and did not).

Well done!!!!!